EXHIBITION ON BACTERIOLOGICAL WAR CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


歷史的事實
ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЕ ФАКТЫ
HISTORICAL FACTS
FAITS HISTORIQUES
美國政府十年來進行細菌戰的準備工作
PREPARATIONS FOR BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE MADE BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS

Under the auspices of the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace, the "Exhibition on Bacteriological War Crimes Committed by the Government of the United States of America" was opened for preview on May 2, and formally inaugurated on September 15, 1952, in Peking.

Displayed in the exhibition are documental proofs of the long preparations for bacteriological warfare made by the U.S. Government; the written and sound-record confessions of the prisoners of war (U.S. Air Force) about their own experience of dropping bacteria bombs in Korea; the bacteria bombs dropped in Northeast China and Korea by American planes, with specimens of germ-laden insects and other objects, together with photos; reports by specialists on identifications and laboratory examinations; and reports of investigations conducted by both foreigners and Chinese. All of these testify to the irrefutable fact that the United States Armed Forces are using bacteriological weapons in Korea and Northeast China.

This pictorial is published in the hope that those who have had no chance to visit the Exhibition may comprehend the heinous crimes committed by the U.S. Government in waging bacteriological warfare.

Photos: Exhibition Hall of the "Exhibition on Bacteriological War Crimes Committed by the Government of the United States of America."





The Dean of Canterbury, the Very Rev. Dr. Hewlett Johnson examining the four-compartment bacteria bombs dropped by American planes in Korea and Northeast China.



Yves Farge, President of the French National Peace Council, inspecting the various kinds of bacteria bombs dropped by American planes in Korea and Northeast China.

Representatives of the trade unions of India listening to the sound-records of the confessions of the prisoners of war (U.S. Air Force) who had dropped bacteria bombs.

Representatives of the trade unions of Algeria looking at photographs of on-the-scene investigations conducted by the Korea Group of the Commission for Investigating the Crime of Bacteriological Warfare Committed by the American Imperialists.

Representatives of the trade unions of the German Democratic Republic studying the diagrams showing results of research on anthrax bacilli disseminated by American aircraft.



Representatives of the trade unions of Australia inspecting the shells of bacteria bombs dropped by American planes.

(RECAP)
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IN AN ATTEMPT TO AVERT ITS INEVITABLE MILITARY DEFEAT, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS OPENLY RESORTED TO BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN KOREA AND NORTHEAST CHINA IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND AGAINST HUMANITY. THE HISTORICAL FACTS, MATERIAL PROOFS, AND TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES, TOGETHER WITH FIRST-HAND REPORTS OF INVESTIGATIONS CARRIED OUT ON THE ACTUAL SCENES BY UNBIASSED PEOPLE, BOTH CHINESE AND FOREIGN, HERE EXHIBITED, ALL TESTIFY TO THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN WAGING BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE.

HISTORICAL FACTS



PREPARATIONS FOR BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE BY THE U. S. GOVERNMENT DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS

February 2—9, 1946. KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 7711

A. WORLD WAR. — Biological Warfare. - British U.S., and Canadian Research on Defence Measures. - U.S. Navy Dept. Statement on Bacterial Warfare Research.

The Ministry of Information published on Jan. 4 a statement

Professor of Bacteriology in the University of California had, during the war, worked on a method of spreading mists containing the organism of a disease (not specified) which was "centuries old and one of the greatest of killers." Work began in April 1943 on the direction of Vice-Admiral Ross T.

Mr. Merck's report stated that systematic study of germ warfare started in the U.S.A. towards the end of 1941, a committee being set up by the National Academy of Sciences on the direction of the Secretary of War. Two months after Pearl Harbour the committee reported that biological warfare was feasible and urged that steps should be taken for defence against it. The War Research Service, with Mr. Merck as director, was organised with President Roosevelt's approval in the summer of 1942, and specially designed laboratories were set up and other research projects turned over. In Nov. 1943 the Office of Strategic Services reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff indications that the Germans might be planning to use biological warfare agents, and it was decided to accelerate the work (particularly with regard to the protection of troops) and to transfer a large part of the responsibility to the U.S. War Dept. At the peak, 3,900 workers were employed in the U.S.A. on biological warfare research (carried out in strictest secrecy), including 2,800 Army men, nearly 1,000 Navy personnel, and nearly 100 civilians. As in the U.K., the main object was to develop methods of defence, but it was also necessary to investigate offensive possibilities, and the possibility of retaliation in kind could not be disregarded; a wide variety of agents pathogenic for men, animals, and plants was therefore considered. Those selected for research were made as virulent as possible and produced in specially selected culture media, the studies resulting in discoveries of great value to agriculture. Installations, necessitating the design and construction, of special equipment, were established as follows: (1) a parent research and pilot plant in Maryland (Apr. 1943); (2) field testing facilities in Mississippi (summer 1943); (3) a plant for investigating larger-scale production in Indiana (early 1944); (4) field-testing facilities in Utah (summer 1944). Apart from the immediate objectives, much information of lasting value for human welfare was obtained, the more important accomplishments being: (*a*) development of methods for the mass production of micro-organisms and their products, and for the rapid and accurate detection of minute quantities of disease-producing agents; (*b*) significant contributions to the control of airborne disease germs and knowledge concerning the immunisation of human beings and animals against certain infectious diseases; (*c*) production and isolation of a crystalline bacterial toxin, opening the way for a more highly-purified toxoid; (*d*) development and production of an effective toxoid in sufficient quantities to protect large-scale operations, if necessary; (*e*) important advances in the treatment of certain infectious diseases of human beings and animals and in the development of effective protective clothing and equipment; (*f*) application of special photographic technique to the study of airborne micro-organisms and the safety of laboratory procedure; (*g*) information of the effect of over 1,000 chemical agents on living plants, and studies of the protection and control of certain diseases of plants.

In 1941 the U.S. Government began to set up special organizations to study and manufacture bacteriological weapons.

—See the report submitted to Secretary of War Patterson on January 4, 1946, by George W. Merck, former Chairman of the Biological Warfare Committee of the U.S. Army Chemical War Service. (From "Keesing's Contemporary Archives", London, February 2-9, 1946.)

This report was withdrawn shortly after the release because it shocked public opinion.

Left photo: **G. W. Merck**



5-26-55 L.S.

Theodor Rosebury, formerly Chief of the Air-Borne Infection Project at Camp Detrick, admitted in 1949 that the Bacteria Factory in Camp Detrick had never stopped production ever since World War. II.

—See Rosebury: "Peace or Pestilence", 1949. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York.

A SPECIAL POLICE FORCE GUARDS CAMP DETR

Camp Detrick, the central laboratory established by the U.S. Department of War in April, 1943, for large-scale manufacture of bacteriological weapons.

Photo: The main entrance to the camp.

——From "Life", October 8, 1951.

TODAY'S QUESTIONS 9

There follows a short paragraph which I shall cite later, and then this concluding statement:

"In whatever deliberations that take place concerning the implementation of a lasting peace in the world, the potentialities of biological warfare cannot safely be ignored."

Amen.

As international tension mounted after the end of the war the Army, having lifted ever so slightly the lid of the germ-warfare Pandora's box, slammed it shut again under strict secrecy regulations. But it is no secret that work at Camp Detrick continues. Soon after the Merck Report appeared, for instance, Colonel Henry M. Black, commanding officer of Camp Detrick, stated that the camp would become a permanent Army installation and, as a newspaper story put it, "will continue the research that was done in the strictest of wartime secrecy, when steps were taken to combat biological-warfare developments that enemy governments might design for use against the United States." And Hanson W. Baldwin, writer on military affairs for *The New York Times*, reported several months later that "experimentation and production of some lethal toxins are continuing under the general supervision of the Chemical Warfare Service of the Army." many technical reports have been issued from Camp Detrick, among which the most recent, which may represent post-war research, reveal no immediate connection with biological warfare. It may be assumed that fundamental as well as practical research is necessary for the development of this subject, and it is possible that only papers dealing with the former sort of work are now being released for publication.

I found the following interesting note in the middle of an AP story that appeared in the spring of 1948 under the headline ARMY "SECRETS" GET AIRING IN CONGRESS TALKS:

"A little item relating to bacterial warfare, a secret that currently rates with the atom bomb, lists a $862,830 appropria-

THEODOR ROSEBURY: The author was chief of the Air-Borne Infection project at the United States Biological Warfare Headquarters at Camp Detrick, Maryland, during the war. His recent EXPERIMENTAL AIR-BORNE INFECTION is the technical report of that work. He is now Associate Professor of Bacteriology at the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia University.

A WHITTLESEY HOUSE BOOK




TARGET
BIOLOGICAL WEAPON
HOW SPREAD
NORMAL SYMPTOMS AND FINAL RESULTS
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT
PSITTACOSIS VIRUS
INFLUENZA VIRUS
Q FEVER RICKETTSIA
PNEUMONIC PLAGUE BACTERIA
TULAREMIA BACTERIA
MELIOIDOSIS BACTERIA
BRUCELLOSIS BACTERIA
BOTULISM TOXIN FROM BACTERIA
RINDERPEST VIRUS
FOOT AND MOUTH VIRUS
HOG CHOLERA VIRUS
FOWL PEST VIRUS
WHEAT STEM RUST FUNGUS SPORES
CORN SMUT FUNGUS SPORES
POTATO LATE BLIGHT FUNGUS SPORES
BEAN BLIGHT BACTERIA
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

BACTERIAL WARFARE 19

might be used to contaminate shrapnel and other weapons. It is possible that spores, particularly if desiccated, may resist the instantaneous high temperature and pressure of detonation. Duffour (1937) mentions this possibility as having been "proved"; but the writers know of no actual data on this question. On the other hand, shrapnel wounds and other war wounds are very likely to be infected with clostridia without deliberate contamination of weapons, and it may be doubted that such contamination could effect an improvement upon nature sufficient to justify the effort. Since effective vaccination against tetanus is now part of army routine, this member of the group may probably be eliminated. The possible use of a combination of spores of anthrax and one or more of the gas-gangrene clostridia as a projectile contaminant may be worth experimental study.

The Air-Borne Infections

This group includes the largest number and probably the most important potential infective agents of warfare. The following are considered in detail in section IV: pneumonic plague, influenza, measles and mumps, psittacosis, anthrax, several diseases of animals, and, included somewhat unconventionally and in several instances tentatively, on the basis of evidence given for each agent, tularemia, brucellosis, glanders, melioidosis, yellow fever, and Rift Valley fever.

The air-borne route of infection seems to be the most practicable for bacterial warfare, and the agents listed above constitute its chief potential arsenal. It is therefore necessary to consider the mechanism of air-borne infection closely, particularly because as a concept it is comparatively new and has not yet achieved universal acceptance.

After the classical experiments of Pasteur and Tyndall had shown that bacteria are associated with the dust of the air, and that dust particles large enough to be visible in the Tyndall beam settle out rapidly in an enclosed space, the view came to be accepted that bacteria do not remain long suspended in air. When Flügge later showed that bacteria in droplets sneezed or coughed into the air could be recovered only at relatively short distances from their point of origin, he seemed to establish the idea that respiratory infections can be transmitted only by direct transfer of infected droplets. This concept of droplet infection as the sole means of transmission of most infections of respiratory origin was generally accepted until recently. Early observations that infection via the respiratory tract with the organisms of plague, tuberculosis and anthrax may occur at a distance and independently of droplets have been regarded as exceptions; and the well-known ability of measles and chickenpox to spread rapidly in flagrant disregard of the droplet concept has been put down as baffling, but has not disturbed the theory.

A large and growing body of data developed chiefly during the last ten years indicates that droplet transfer by close contact is only an alternative means of transmission of infections of respiratory origin. Of apparently far greater epidemiological significance is their transmission at a distance in both space and time. The pioneer in developing these data seems to have been the French worker



Laboratory infections were reported from Camp Detrick as follows:

Ellingson, H. V., P. J. Kadull, H. L. Bookwalter, and C. Howe, "Cutaneous Anthrax: Report of Twenty-five Cases." *Journal of the American Medical Association, 131:* 1105, August 3, 1946.

Howe, C., and W. R. Miller, "Human Glanders: Report of Six Cases." *Annals of Internal Medicine, 26:* 93, January, 1947.

Howe, C., E. S. Miller, E. H. Kelly, H. L. Bookwalter, and H. V. Ellingson, "Acute Brucellosis among Laboratory Workers." *New England Journal of Medicine, 236:* 741, May 15, 1947.

Howe, C., L. L. Coriell, H. L. Bookwalter, and H. V. Ellingson, "Streptomycin Treatment in Tularemia." *Journal of the American Medical Association, 132:* 195, September 28, 1946.

Rosebury, T., H. V. Ellingson, G. Meiklejohn, and F. M. Schabel, "A Laboratory Infection with Psittacosis Virus Treated with Penicillin and Sulfadiazine, and Experimental Data Bearing on the Mode of Infection." *Journal of Infectious Diseases, 80:* 64, January–February, 1947.

These are various bacteriological weapons listed by the American magazine "Life". Theodor Rosebury admitted that while manufacturing these weapons, many laboratory workers at Camp Detrick contracted the following diseases: Cutaneous Anthrax, Acute Brucellosis, Tularemia, Psittacosis, etc.

Upper photo: **"Life", October 8, 1951.**

Lower photo: **A page from the book entitled "Peace or Pestilence" by Theodor Rosebury.**



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CHEMOTHERAPY

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In May, 1947, a lengthy report, made public by bacteriological expert Theodor Rosebury and others who were working in the bacteriological laboratory at Camp Detrick, pointed out that germs spread by aircraft by

The report stated that although Japan fostered developments in bacteriological warfare from 1936 until as late as 1945 and had made definite progress, she had not by the end of the war reached a position where these could have been of operational use, investigations by special intelligence officers in all theatres indicating that in their work the Axis were behind the U.S.A., Britain, and Canada.

A closely guarded war secret was disclosed on the same day (Jan. 4) by the U.S. Navy Dept., which announced that a Naval Medical Research Unit under Capt. Albert P. Krueger, Professor of Bacteriology in the University of California had, during the war, worked on a method of spreading mists containing the organism of a disease (not specified) which was "centuries old and one of the greatest of killers." Work began in April 1943 on the direction of Vice-Admiral Ross T. McIntire, Navy Surgeon-General, when investigations were undertaken into the possible use by the enemy of the organism of a highly deadly disease whose identity was not disclosed; as a "blind" for this secret work it was given out that the researchers were studying means of preventing and controlling airborne infections, notably influenza. The Navy Dept. stated that the result of these researches "demonstrate that a man-made epidemic as an instrument of war is a likely possibility" and that "conclusive information has been obtained . . . . of great value not only for protection against bacterial attack but for control of communicable airborne diseases among a peace-time population." It was added that a protective suit with self-containing oxygen supply had been devised for workers in any prospective rescue or decontamination operations, and that the rubberised suits and other protective measures during the researches had proved so efficient that not a single case of infection occurred among the investigators.—(Times - New York Times - Daily Telegraph - Manchester Guardian)

B. WHALING. — International Whaling Conference

In April, 1943, Vice Admiral Ross T. McIntire, U.S. Navy Surgeon-General, ordered the commencement of research work on bacteriological weapons.

—See report made public by the U.S. Navy Department, on January 4, 1946. (From "Keesing's Contemporary Archives", London, February 2-9, 1946.)



BACTERIAL WARFARE 25

drug-resistant variants, or both. The possibility that strains with unusual properties might be developed by such means should be one of the problems studied by a military experimental unit.

Assembly. Types of containers for infective agents and the manner of assembling or packing them depend on the nature and physical state of the agent and on the use to which it is to be put. Culture preparations of bacteria or viruses intended for either the water-borne or the indirect contact routes might be dispensed, either in liquid suspension or in dry form as may be indicated, in large thin-walled glass ampules. These might then be packed in sawdust in outer containers for safe handling, arranged so that the bottom can be removed before discharging the ampule over the target. To insure the breaking of such an ampule on contact with water, a gas-generating element like those used in fire extinguishers might be included in the ampule, which would then be weighted at the upper end and maintained upright until discharged. An alternative container for water-borne agents in dry form, such as botulinus toxin, might be made of porous paper impregnated with a water soluble gum or pectin, perhaps protected for safety in handling by a metal frame heavy enough to sink the container.

The possibility of using projectile contaminants has been mentioned on page 19. If this method of assembly is found feasible the agent should probably be incorporated in the projectile rather than merely applied to its surface, in order to provide a sufficient quantity of the agent and for the safety of those handling the projectile before discharging or firing it.

For air-borne agents the problem of assembling them in suitable containers is part of the larger problem of means for their dissemination, which is considered below.

Containers for infected vectors must be so constructed as to permit survival of the vector inside for the required periods, and to allow safe landing from aircraft and insure liberation of the vectors on the ground, along with the usual requirement for safety in handling up to the point of discharge. The method of discharging infected fleas attributed to the Japanese (Editorial, 1942) suggests a crude device whereby these insects were liberated at the plane itself. Adequate safety as well as greater effectiveness would seem to require somewhat more elaborate measures. Pasteboard or other light containers, either small or with large surfaces to slow their descent, suitably perforated and screened if necessary, perhaps with one weighted and fragile point to assure breakage on landing, might serve the purpose.

Dissemination. Aircraft appear to be the most useful means for dissemination of all agents, whether the agent itself is capable of spreading by the air-borne route or not.

For the dissemination of agents other than the air-borne group from aircraft no requirement suggests itself other than the simple discharge of the appropriate container over the target, with or without automatic devices to increase aiming precision as circumstances may indictae. The dissemination of air-borne agents, on the other hand, is a special problem, but one on which only the most tentative suggestions can be offered without experimentation.

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NUMBER 1, MAY, 1947

The Appearance of Sheep Cell Lysins and Human A Cell Agglutinins in a Rabbit Immunized with a Partially Purified Blood Group A-Specific Substance from Hog Gastric Mucin. David H. Brown, Edward L. Bennett and Carl Niemann.......... 1

Bacterial Warfare, A Critical Analysis of the Available Agents, Their Possible Military Applications, and the Means for Protection against Them. Theodor Rosebury and Elvin A. Kabat, with the assistance of Martin H. Boldt.......... 7

means of air-contagion and insect-contagion have the utmost military value.

—See "The Journal of Immunology", May, 1947.



56 SCIENCE DIGEST April

The first is unlikely to be effective on a large scale. It could not be successfully applied to reservoirs as the normal filtering apparatus would probably remove the germs. This fact was forcibly demonstrated by the cholera epidemic at Hamburg in 1892. There were 17,000 cases and nearly 9,000 deaths within two months. Hamburg did not filter its drinking water; the nearby city of Altona, which did, escaped the epidemic.

The second method does not seem to be practicable because of the danger of blow-back through wind changes.

Method No. 3 seems to be the most suitable. The latest information available to me shows that a practicable long-range bacterial warfare weapon which could be put into operational use if required has been devised in the U. S. It is a cluster-bomb made up of 4-pound canisters each containing a small amount of concentrated germ culture. Dropped from a high-flying aircraft, the bomb would scatter the canisters at any required height much as incendiary bombs were scattered. Each canister is fitted with an impact or altitude fuse setting off a small opening charge.

Field trials carried out in Utah show that considerable numbers of bacteria survive the heat and blast of the opening charge. Eventually about 10 percent of the original culture gets scattered in aerosol form.

By testing the bomb over an area laid out with culture plates, and by experiments on animals, the U. S. scientists have calculated that about four tons of such canisters would effectively contaminate about one square mile of battlefield. About 50 percent of any troops there not adequately protected might be infected. A similar bomb-load exploded over a built-up area would contaminate about half a square mile infecting perhaps 1,000 people.

Such a weapon would seem to possess a powerful "terror" value and would be attractive for attempts at reducing strong points and distant industrial targets not requiring immediate occupation.

There is evidence, too, that experiments on the deliberate spreading of crop pests like wheat rusts and leaf-spot disease of rubber have been partially successful.

As with every weapon there are operational shortcomings associated with B.W. Whereas with an atomic bomb it is possible to make a reasonably accurate assessment of casualties, field commanders could never accurately anticipate the effects of germ weapons. Much must always depend on local wind conditions, temperature, and above all the susceptibility of the population being attacked.

Medical authorities can never be sure when a disease will become epidemic. Sometimes when conditions seem favorable for a local outbreak to develop into an epidemic it fizzles out.

Attempts to destroy rabbits in

What are the facts about biological warfare? Will it outmode the A-bomb? In this article, the author, a British scientist, has examined the facts that are available and reaches some surprising conclusions

Condensed from Discovery magazine (London)

Chapman Pincher, B.Sc.

"Science Digest", April, 1951, admitted that a kind of cluster bomb for use in bacteriological warfare has been devised in the United States of America.

Photo: Document.

——From "Science Digest," April, 1951.



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rapid diagnosis is essential, and the preparation of protective agents such as vaccines or anti-toxins on a really large scale would require development.'

The lethal dose of diphtheria toxin is given as 0·03 milligrams, giving thirteen million lethal doses from a pound of toxin. This implies individual injection, and the actual effectiveness when used as a mist would be far lower, but how much lower is not suggested. The toxin of botulism is stated to be higher than that of diphtheria. Thimann also discusses the possibility of attack on growing crops by means of new types of chemical compounds, and by the spreading of natural diseases such as wheat rust.

Some further details and a bibliography of relevant published papers are given in a report to the United Nations by the American Association of Scientific Workers,[1] from which the following extracts are taken:

> A routine unpurified preparation of psittacosis virus, a representative member of the group of highly infective disease agents characteristic of bacterial warfare, has been reported to contain per cubic centimetre approximately twenty million respiratory doses for man. No published data are available on the dispersion efficiency of bacterial warfare munitions, but even if the efficiency were as low as 0·01 per cent, the potency of this material would be still extraordinarily high. Such preparations of psittacosis virus could easily be produced in litre amounts in a single small laboratory, with only such equipment and materials as are common to virus laboratories throughout the world. The pay-load in a psittacosis 'bomb' and therefore probably the whole munition, could be small, cheap and easily turned out in quantity. . . . Bacterial warfare production could proceed in any civilized country irrespective of its size or relative wealth.

No very concrete picture of the real possibilities of biological weapons in major wars emerges from these published accounts, but it is clear that the various authors considered them of comparable danger to atomic bombs.

In the *Finletter Report*, which is discussed more fully in Appendix V, appears the following paragraph:[2]

> Atomic weapons will not long remain our monopoly. And there are other weapons of comparable destructiveness. Mankind has not indulged in biological warfare on a large scale so far; but the biological sciences are evolving so rapidly that it is impossible to

[1] Reprinted *B.A.S.*, p. 363, Dec. 1947.

[2] *Finletter Report*, p. 12.



FUTURE TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS 65

> predict the future. The nations might be foolish enough to try it out. Biological warfare might become a serious factor in another war and we must be alert to every aspect of defence against this kind of attack. And sabotage—heretofore a relatively unimportant means of war are—is in the process of becoming a serious menace. The preplacement of atomic and biological weapons may soon become a major military problem.

It will be noticed that this supposedly authoritative report brackets biological and atomic weapons together as comparable dangers.

The use of radio-active poisons has been discussed in various articles, but again without much detail. There appear to be two main forms in which they can be used. In the first, the poisons occur as an after-effect of the explosion of an atomic bomb, due to the production during the explosion of large quantities of radio-active materials with a lifetime ranging from minutes to years. At Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where the bombs were exploded well up in the air, it has been stated that very little radio-activity remained on the ground. On the other hand, after the underwater test burst at Bikini,[1] intense radio-activity remained for several months in the water and on the ships which had been deluged with active water, and would have killed all living things remaining there for any length of time. The intensity of the radiation is given as the equivalent of many hundreds of tons of radium.

Of more importance, perhaps, as a weapon, is the possibility of spreading over enemy country the radio-active materials (fission products) which are a by-product of the manufacture of plutonium in a pile. For every kilogramme of plutonium produced, about a kilogramme of fissile products are also produced with lifetimes ranging from minutes to years.[2] If these fission products could be spread by spraying or in some other way over cities or the countryside, all personnel remaining there for a considerable time would be killed. No statement seems to have been published indicating the area which could be made lethal in this way by a kilogramme of fissile material, but a comparison of the known intensity of radiation from the fission products with the maximum safe dosage of radium rays allowed in medicine, shows that the area must be extremely large.

A recent statement by a political student, Mr. Ernest Oppenheimer[3] suggests that the efficacy of radio-active poisons may be rated very high in America. Under the sub-title of 'Fallacy of Preventative

[1] *B.A.S.*, p. 26, Aug. 1947.

[2] See, for instance, J. R. Menke, 'Nuclear Fission as a Source of Power', *Econometrica* 15, p. 314, 1947, also *B.A.S.*, April 1948.

[3] Ernest Oppenheimer, *B.A.S.*, p. 370, Dec. 1947.

In January, 1948, Thomas K. Finletter (now U.S. Secretary of Air Force), Chairman of U.S. President's Air Policy Commission, insisted upon placing biological weapons in a position of first-rate military importance.

—See report submitted to Truman by Thomas K. Finletter. (From "Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy" by P. M. S. Blackett, 1950, London.)



IPORARY ARCHIVES July 9—16, 1949. July 9—16, 1949. KEESING'S CONTE

very substantial progress", the announcement adding that the tests had involved 10,000 Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel and civilian scientists. A further Presidential announcement of July 24, 1948, stated that the Eniwetok tests had shown that the U.S. position in atomic weapons had "substantially improved", declared that "to-day we possess powerful atomic weapons," and added that, whilst it was at present necessary to keep the details highly secret "in an insecure world", this requirement would disappear when the nations were prepared to take part in international control of atomic energy.

The Atomic Energy Commission, in its annual report to Congress on Jan. 31, 1949, disclosed that the U.S.A. possessed atomic bombs of greater explosive power than those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; stated that new types of bombs tested at Eniwetok had resulted in a "substantial increase in energy release"; and added that at the Los Alamos (New Mexico) laboratory, where 2,700 people were working on the military aspects of atomic energy, other successful tests had been carried out in new designs of atomic weapons. "Production of fissionable materials," said the report, "is going on in 15 States. It is carried on in 30 plants at 23 locations and employs tens of thousands of workers. To house and sustain people who work in its major plants requires two large communities with a combined population of 50,000." The Commission pointed out that the U.S.A. was still dependent for most of its uranium on Canada and the Belgian Congo, but added that "energetic" exploration was also in progress in the U.S.A. itself, particularly in Colorado.

Biological Warfare. On March 12, 1949, the late Mr. Forrestal, in his capacity as Secretary for National Defence, issued a statement "to correct widespread misunderstanding of the potentialities of biological warfare", with special reference to the publication of a report originally issued in January 1946 and subsequently withdrawn. The text of Mr. Forrestal's statement was as follows:

"War inevitably brings with it the development of new and more effective weapons for the destruction of life or property. Such a new weapon was being developed by our enemies during World War II. This weapon was disease—the production of germs for deliberate introduction into enemy territory to cause sickness or death among its people and live-stock or the destruction of its food crops. Because of its nature the use of this weapon has been called 'biological warfare.'

It is the responsibility of the armed forces of a democratic nation to inform the public of their activities as far as is consistent with national security. With this responsibility in view, the War Dept., on Jan. 3, 1946, released a report by Mr. George W. Merck to the Secretary of War. This release informed the public of the combined efforts of American scientists and industry working with the armed forces, and in co-operation with agencies of our Allies, to develop means for defence against possible enemy attacks by biological warfare. Obviously in the press release concerning the Merck Report (which was subsequently withdrawn from circulation) it was not in the national interest to reveal in any detail the extent of progress made in this new field of military research, or to attempt a definite evaluation of the capabilities and limitations of this new weapon.

The announcement was followed by a number of unofficial articles in newspapers and magazines, and the subject was also discussed in domestic and foreign radio broadcasts. Owing in some measure to the limitations of official information, a great deal of this discussion was extravagant, inaccurate, and unduly spectacular in the light of present scientific knowledge. Some was so sensational as to be completely misleading. Such treatment unfortunately overshadowed in the public mind those articles which presented more sober and reasonable reflections on the subject. Therefore it is felt advisable that the American people be given an official statement concerning the potentialities of biological warfare.

Prompted by intelligence reports of enemy activities in this field during World War II, intensive investigations of the possibilities and potentialities of biological warfare were initiated in the U.S.A. in close collaboration with our British and Canadian allies. These investigations were aimed primarily toward securing for this nation adequate protection against the possible use of biological warfare by our enemies. Toward this end, Army, Navy, and civilian scientists, universities, private research institutions, industries, and departments of the Government all worked together. . . . Since these investigations involved many sciences and entirely new approaches, unique facilities had to be constructed to enable us properly to conduct our research.

Actually, large-scale biological warfare has never been used by any nation. Our research indicated, however, that germs or their poisonous products could be used effectively as weapons of war. It was also realized from the results of this research that work in this field could not be neglected in time of peace and had to be continued on a sufficient scale to provide us with adequate defences and to enable us to utilize this weapon in the future should it become necessary. As a by-product of the research on this subject during and following the war, much information of great peace-time benefit to mankind in the medical, agricultural, and allied fields has been freely given to the public. Over 160 technical articles describing these investigations have been released through the medium of scientific journals.

Unfortunately, the public has been given an exaggerated impression as to the potency and state of development of biological warfare. For example, it has been stated that a single plane with a small bomb filled with a biological agent would be capable of wiping out the population of an entire city with a single blow. Such a statement is not in accord with the facts as we know them to-day. As a further example, in a recent article it was stated that one ounce of a particular biological material would be sufficient to kill 200,000,000 people. The facts are that it is impossible to spread an ounce of any kind of material for the purposes of warfare in such a manner as to affect even a small percentage of such a tremendous number of persons. Many other exaggerated statements have appeared. One article stated that biological warfare makes it possible to kill the inhabitants of an entire continent very quickly. Another stated that it would be a simple matter to spread plague in the U.S.A. Still another maintained that a means is available for spreading various diseases among millions of people by dropping a few capsules from one airplane. Such claims are fantastic and have no basis in fact.

While it would be folly to under-estimate the potentialities of biological warfare, there is no factual basis for extravagant claims of the existence of a biological super-weapon. Many articles have described biological warfare as more terrible than the atomic bomb. The fact is that these two weapons differ from one another so basically that a direct comparison is meaningless. The atomic bomb destroys not only life but also buildings and other structures, and is in that respect similar to high explosive. In addition, atomic radiation may persist indefinitely in contaminated areas and produce serious effects on living matter. Biological warfare agents, on the other hand, affect only living matter, do not destroy material structures, and, in most cases, are non-persistent. Death, protracted sickness, or only temporary incapacitation might be produced in man by the dissemination of the proper biological agent.

Biological warfare is an attempt to harness certain forces of nature for purposes of war. In such warfare either epidemic or non-epidemic diseases might be used. In the language of biological warfare, an epidemic disease is one that is easily and rapidly spread from person to person, animal to animal, or plant to plant. A non-epidemic disease spreads less easily and therefore would be largely restricted to persons, animals, or plants directly exposed to the germs as they were distributed during an attack. In the case of epidemic diseases of man the factors governing spread are not completely understood, and in any case not all are controllable; hence it is not at all certain that an epidemic of significant proportions could be produced at will. Even if an epidemic were started, adequate public health and sanitation measures, and proper treatment methods promptly instituted, would tend to limit the spread and minimize the effects. The distribution of non-epidemic disease-producing agents and toxins would have to be very widespread to have a decisive effect.

Biological warfare would not be instantly destructive of life, and it should be appreciated that illness induced by biological agents may be counteracted by specific medical measures. An important defence against biological warfare lies in the early identification of diseases implanted and prompt institution of appropriate counter-measures to prevent further spread and restore the health of those affected. But it is obvious that extensive preparation for such defensive measures must be made in advance of an attack. During times of peace various Governmental agencies are concerned with the control of natural outbreaks of disease. Not only our population but also our crops and animals must be protected. To this end the U.S. Public Health Service, the Dept. of Agriculture, other Federal and many State and municipal agencies, are always on the alert. The threat of biological warfare has increased their responsibilities and difficulties. If a biological attack were made, the above agencies, in addition to the armed forces, would play an important rôle in counteracting the implantation and spread of disease.

We must guard not only against natural outbreaks of disease and biological attack in time of war, but also against the use of biological sabotage methods before a declaration of war has been made. Our food supplies would be particularly vulnerable to attack by saboteurs with biological weapons. We must, therefore, rely on the maintenance of high standards of public health and sanitation, and on protective measures for animals and crops, as our first line of defence against any biological warfare attack. Appropriate steps are being taken to ensure the co-ordination of the activities of our protective agencies. In addition, an active research programme on biological warfare, including methods for the prevention and treatment of diseases which might be caused by such warfare, is being conducted in the interests of national defence."

Civil Defence. The most important developments in this field were (*a*) the publication on Nov. 13, 1948, of detailed recommendations for a nation-wide Civil Defence system, drawn up by the Office of Civil Defence Planning (which was set up in March 1948 within the Dept. of National Defence), and (*b*) an announcement by Mr. Forrestal on Feb. 14, 1949, of the principles on which a Civil Defence organization would be established.

Report of the Civil Defence Planning Office. This report was drawn up by a large staff of experts, including Army officers, engineers, industrial consultants, Federal officials, scientists, physicians, and lawyers, headed by Mr. Russell J. Hopley, a business executive who was at the time Director of Civil Defence Planning in the National Military Establishment. After stating that "the possibility of the employment of atomic weapons against our country increases with time," the report presented the following conclusions: (1) the bomb would be detonated well above the industrial area attacked, similar to the American bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; (2) casualties of all types from a single detonation would reach 100,000; (3) up to 40,000 of these would be fatalities, with 20,000 being killed outright and 20,000 dying within a week; (4) about

On March 12, 1949, Forrestal, then U.S. Secretary of Defence, openly urged the use of bacteriological weapons "should it become necessary".

—See Forrestal's statement of March 12, 1949. (From "Keesing's Contemporary Archives", London, July 9-16, 1949.)



06 MILITARY REVIEW

bulk of the trigonometrical and mathematical work, and we find that officers with engineer training are best for this. Although modern technique has reduced the work of map making, modern mobility and, of course, the range of modern aircraft, have enormously increased the area of the earth's surface for which maps may be required. Improvements in plotting and map reproduction have made it possible for up-to-date maps to be issued on a pretty lavish scale. In no theater, unless extremely close to home, is it possible to operate nowadays without a large map reproduction and distribution service involving large numbers of big modern lithograph and printing machines.

One other activity for which the engineers are responsible is movement control. Strictly speaking, of course, this is a non-engineer staff function, but we find that engineer officers, especially those with railway and docks experience, usefully fill a high proportion of movement control posts.

Also, the Army Postal Service has always been manned by the RE. This dates from the days when we ran the Signals.

Bacteriological Warfare

Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Major Ernst Wiesmann in "Allgemeine Schweizerische Militarzeitschrift" (Switzerland) August 1949.

WHEN and if bacteria are employed as combat means in total warfare, man and his domestic animals or plants will suffer a fatal blow. To be suitable for military purposes, however, microbes must fulfill a large number of conditions. For this reason, the different types that can be used are few in number. The following requirements are the most important:

1. The microbes must be "raised" and kept in readiness in large quantities.
2. The requirement, "kept in readiness," includes a certain degree of ability to survive on the part of the microscopic forms of life, even under unfavorable conditions.
3. It must be possible to bring the active agent into contact with the enemy in the proper form.
4. The incubation period of the disease that is to be induced must be as short as possible.
5. Pathogenic ability must be as great as possible. That is, all infected persons, if possible, must be made sick.
6. The sickness produced must come to a crisis as speedily as possible and must not be chronic.
7. The sickness produced must be as hard as possible to diagnose and its producer must be hard to determine.
8. Wherever possible, artificial immunization must not be possible and the producer should not respond to any special chemical therapy.
9. It must be possible to immunize one's own forces against the sickness.

These requirements would seem to indicate that the possibilities of employing bacteriological warfare are rather limited. For example, requirements 1, 3, and 5 prevent the employment of the poliomyelitis virus; point 4 rules out the employment of the rabies virus, with an incubation period of 3 months, or of the tuberculosis bacillus; point 5 eliminates all producers of children's diseases; point 6 rules out tuberculosis bacillus or the producers of leprosy; point 8 eliminates the smallpox, tetanus, or diphtheria bacilli.

An attempt has always been made to associate bacteriological warfare with gas warfare, from the standpoint of their nature and employment. There is, however, a considerable difference between gas and



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The "Military Review", April, 1950, published by the Command and General Staff College of the Army, Kansas, U.S.A. openly talks about bacteriological warfare.

Photo: Document.

——From "Military Review", April, 1950.



Kartoffelkäferabwurf durch amerikanische Flugzeuge

Der Bericht der Außerordentlichen Untersuchungskommission der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik

In der Sitzung des Ministerrats der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, die am 15. Juni 1950 stattfand, berichtete der Staatssekretär im Ministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft,



Paul Merker, über das Ergebnis der Untersuchung über den Abwurf von Kartoffelkäfern auf dem Gebiet der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.

Der Außerordentlichen Kommission, die die Untersuchungen auf das sorgfältigste durchgeführt hat, gehören **Paul Merker** als Vorsitzender, **Alfred Welzer** vom Innenministerium, Bruno **Goldhammer** vom Amt für Information und die Spezialisten für Schädlingsbekämpfung Herbert **Hoffmann**, Johannes **Draßdo**, **Schifferdecker**, Max **Eger**, Gottfried **Lenke** und Alois **Planck** an.

Die Kommission stellte einwandfrei fest, daß **amerikanische** Flugzeuge über **Sachsen**, **Thüringen** und **Mecklenburg** Kartoffelkäfer in großen Mengen abgeworfen haben. Die außerordentlichen Funde an Kartoffelkäfern stimmten überall generell mit den durch Zeugenaussagen ermittelten Flugstrecken überein.

Der Bericht der Außerordentlichen Kommission

lautet wörtlich:

„Die Entwicklung in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik hat auf allen Gebieten des Lebens, besonders in der Wirtschaft einen bedeutenden Aufschwung genommen. Mit der Durchführung der Volkswirtschaftspläne wurde die Industrieproduktion gesteigert und die Intensivierung der Landwirtschaft gefördert. Durch die Anstrengungen der werktätigen Bauernschaft und unserer Landarbeiter, darüber hinaus durch die Unterstützung der Werktätigen in der Traktoren- und Landmaschinenindustrie, konnte die Frühjahrsbestellung mit Erfolg abgeschlossen werden. Sie hat die Voraussetzungen für die Erreichung der Friedenshektarerträge geschaffen, besonders ist dabei auf dem Gebiet des Kartoffelanbaus ein Fortschritt zu verzeichnen. Ein Drittel der gesamten Anbaufläche wurde mit hochqualifiziertem Saatgut bepflanzt und mit ausreichenden Düngemittelgaben versehen, so daß ein frohwüchsiger Kartoffelbestand eine gute Kartoffelernte erwarten läßt. Die Kartoffel ist nicht nur eines der Hauptnahrungsmittel des Menschen, sondern auch eines der wichtigsten Futtermittel. Bei einem größeren Anfall von Kartoffeln wird die gesamte Versorgung (auch für Fleisch und Fett) sowohl mengen- als auch qualitätsmäßig verbessert.

Ernährungsbasis sollte vernichtet werden

Die Früchte der Leistungen unserer Bevölkerung sind durch einen verbrecherischen Anschlag in Gefahr gebracht. In der Situation des verstärkten Kampfes aller Menschen guten Willens für die Sicherung des Friedens und gegen die Kriegsvorbereitungen haben die amerikanischen imperialistischen Kriegstreiber zu einem schändlichen, verbrecherischen Mittel gegriffen, um unsere Entwicklung und die Sicherung der Volksernährung zu stören. **Seit dem 22. Mai 1950 haben Flugzeuge, aus dem Westen kommend, über dem Gebiet der Republik Coloradokäfer in großen Massen abgeworfen.**



Die Bauern der betroffenen Gebiete konnten sich dieses massenhafte Auftreten von Kartoffelkäfern nicht sofort erklären. Sie konnten nicht auf den Gedanken kommen, daß **bewußt und mit aller Überlegung** auf so verbrecherische Art ein Teil der Ernährungsbasis unseres Volkes vernichtet werden sollte. Der Bevölkerung war es — und besonders der Landwirtschaft — unerklärlich, daß zu einem so frühen Zeitpunkt und so plötzlich ein Befall mit Kartoffelkäfern auftreten konnte. Das widersprach allen bisherigen Erfahrungen. Die ersten außergewöhnlichen Kartoffelkäferfunde wurden am 22., 23 und 24. Mai in Sachsen, in dem Gebiet **Oelsnitz**, **Aue** (Erzgebirge), **Zwickau**, **Glauchau** und **Plauen** festgestellt. Aus den Kreisen der Bevölkerung wurde dem zuständigen Bürgermeister und den Dienststellen der Verwaltungspolizei zunächst unabhängig davon Mitteilung gemacht, daß in der Zeit vom 22. bis 24. Mai Flugzeuge bemerkt worden sind, die teilweise auf einer außergewöhnlichen Flugstrecke aus der amerikanischen Zone in das Gebiet der Republik einflogen. In Verbindung damit wurden durch die Volkspolizei Überprüfungen vorgenommen, und Erkundigungen im Kreise der Bevölkerung ergaben, daß in der gleichen Zeit des massenhaften Auftretens des berüchtigten Schädlings Flugzeuge beobachtet wurden, die von der amerikanischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands von Hof kommend den Weg über das Erzgebirge in Richtung Zwickau nahmen und über **Jena**, **Langensalza**, **Nordhausen** nach Westen ausflogen. In der Zeit vom 2. bis 7. Juni wurden von seiten der Bevölkerung und der Dienststellen der Volkspolizei Einflüge gleicher Art in **Mecklenburg** festgestellt, die von der westlichen Zone ausgehend die Kreise **Hagenow**, **Ludwigslust**, **Parchim**, **Schwerin** und **Schönberg** berührten. Ein weiterer Einflug wurde in den Kreisen **Rostock**, **Güstrow**, **Schwerin** und **Schönberg** verzeichnet. Am 5. Juni wurde im Kreis **Heiligenstadt**, im Raum von **Worbis**, und in **Sachsen-Anhalt** im Raum von **Quedlinburg**, ein Einflug festgestellt. Die Untersuchung ergab, daß die außerordentlichen Funde an Coloradokäfern generell mit den festgelegten Flugstrecken übereineinstimmten.

From May to June, 1950, American airplanes spread Colorado potato beetles in the German Democratic Republic.

—See the report submitted June 15, 1950, by Paul Merker, State Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of the German Democratic Republic on the investigation of U.S. dissemination of Colorado potato beetles in Germany.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MAKES USE OF JAPANESE AND NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN PREPARING BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE


MATERIALS ON THE TRIAL OF FORMER SERVICEMEN OF THE JAPANESE ARMY CHARGED WITH MANUFACTURING AND EMPLOYING BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
МАТЕРИАЛЫ СУДЕБНОГО ПРОЦЕССА ПО ДЕЛУ БЫВШИХ ВОЕННОСЛУЖАЩИХ ЯПОНСКОЙ АРМИИ, ОБВИНЯЕМЫХ В ПОДГОТОВКЕ И ПРИМЕНЕНИИ БАКТЕРИОЛОГИЧЕСКОГО ОРУЖИЯ



EXCERPT FROM RECORD OF INTERROGATION
OF YAMADA OTOZOO

November 17, 1949 *City of Khabarovsk*

. . . Among the units under my command engaged in devising and in the mass production of bacteriological weapons were Detachment 731, Detachment 100, and their branches.

. . . Concerning the activities of detachments 731 and 100 in the preparations to conduct bacteriological warfare, it must be said that Detachment 731 engaged in devising and producing bacteriological weapons intended for the wholesale extermination of human beings. The activities of Detachment 100, in this respect, were of somewhat narrower scope, and were limited to devising and producing bacteriological weapons of sabotage in the form of exterminating animals and contaminating crops.

During 1935-1936, Japan established two organizations for the manufacture of bacteriological weapons in Northeast China. In 1941, for the sake of secrecy, these organizations were called "Detachment 731" and "Detachment 100". The Chief of "Detachment 731" was the Japanese bacteriological war criminal Shiro Ishii. The Chief of "Detachment 100" was Jiro Wakamatsu.

—From "Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen of the Japanese Army Charged with Manufacturing and Employing Bacteriological Weapons", 1950. Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow.

Photos: ***Above*—Testimony of the accused, Yamada Otozoo, formerly Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Kwantung Army.**

***Right*—Testimony of the accused, Kajitsuka Ryuji, formerly Chief of the Medical Administration of the Japanese Kwantung Army.**



EXCERPT FROM RECORD OF INTERROGATION
OF KAJITSUKA RYUJI

October 24, 1949 *City of Khabarovsk*

. . . Detachment 731 was reorganized in 1939-40 under a special secret decree issued by Emperor Hirohito of Japan in 1939. I was acquainted with this decree at the Kwantung Army Headquarters approximately in February 1940, signing a pledge of secrecy.

Besides this, by one or perhaps two secret decrees, issued by Emperor Hirohito in 1940, four branches of Detachment 731 were set up additionally in the second half of that year, to be located in the towns of Hailar and Sunyu, and at Hailin and Linkow stations, the dates of their formation being indicated. The appended tables of organization, signed by War Minister Tojo, showed that each of these branches had a personnel of up to 300 men.

Orders issued by Japanese War Minister Tojo in accordance with the emperor's decrees listed the hospitals and Detachment 731 which assigned a definite number of army medical specialists, non-commissioned officers and privates. The orders also indicated that civilians might be employed, but no more than 30 per cent of the entire personnel. . . .

Question: From whom did the idea of preparing for bacteriological warfare originate?

Answer: The idea of preparing bacteriological warfare originated from Ishii.

Ishii Shiro, born around 1893 in the Prefecture of Chiba, comes from the family of a wealthy landowner, and in 1919-20 graduated from the College of Medicine of the Imperial University in the town of Kyoto. He then entered the service of the Japanese Army as a volunteer. Soon after, he applied for enlistment in regular army service. Half a year

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

Beginning with 1933 Major General Nagata, Chief of the Military Affairs Division of the Japanese Ministry for War, supported Ishii's idea, and beginning with 1935, also Colonel Suzuki Yorimichi, Chief of the 1st Section of the Strategical Division of the Japanese General Staff.

All these circumstances, as well as the fact that Ishii was a big specialist, led to his being appointed Chief of Detachment 731, and upon taking up this post he began research on weapons of bacteriological warfare.

As head of a division in the Medical Administration of the Japanese Ministry for War I went over the order drafted by the Appointments Section of the Personnel Division ap-

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

Ruins of the central laboratory for research on bacteriological weapons at Pingfang Station near Harbin. The laboratory belonged to the bacteria factory of the Japanese "Detachment 731".



Photographed in April, 1950.

During the Anti-Japanese war, the Japanese "Detachment 731" frequently used Chinese, Korean and Soviet citizens as human guinea-pigs in their inhuman experiments. This is a furnace in which the corpses of victims were cremated.

Photographed in April, 1950.

In order to breed fleas for carrying plague bacilli, the Japanese "Detachment 731" raised large numbers of rats. Picture shows remnants of rat cages.

Photographed in April, 1950.



EXCERPT FROM RECORD OF INTERROGATION
OF YAMADA OTOZOO

December 1, 1949 *City of Khabarovsk*

. . . **Question:** Why was the production of bacteriological weapons activized in 1945?

Answer: The production of bacteriological weapons by detachments 731 and 100 was activized at that time because the preparatory period of the most effective bacteriological weapons that had been tested had ended. I have in mind the employment of the Ishii bacteria bomb, the spraying of plague-infected fleas from aircraft, and methods of bacteriological sabotage on land, about which I had learned from the reports of Generals Kitano and Takahashi, and from other persons.

Ruins of the bacteriological factory of the Japanese "Detachment 100" at Mongatong, Changchun.

Photographed in Mar. 1950.



These are the Ishii porcelain bacteria bombs designed by the Japanese bacteriological war criminal Shiro Ishii. According to the testimony given by Yamada Otozoo, former Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Kwantung Army, at the Khabarovsk Trial, these bombs were considered to be one of the most effective bacteriological weapons in 1945.

Photos: ***Left*—The Ishii bacteria bombs manufactured by the bacteriological laboratory of Japanese "Detachment 731".**

***Right*—Testimony of the accused, Yamada Otozoo.**



research and production. A Telepress despatch on December 5 last year reported that Ridgway had sent three former Generals, Shiro Ishii, Jiro Wakamatsu and Masajo Kitano to Korea to carry out experiments on Korean and Chinese prisoners of war and to perfect biological weapons for use "in winter warfare" against the Korean and Chinese people. They arrived on a freighter carrying all the necessary equipment for bacteriological warfare, including cholera germs, gas which induces blood poisoning, pestilence germs and other materials. All three are

部隊の中心人物石井四郎（当時
と彼の経営する蕎麦屋、ここで

Photo: Shiro Ishii

On the instructions of General Ridgway, Shiro Ishii, Jiro Wakamatsu and Masajo Kitano, Japanese bacteriological war criminals, arrived in Korea from Tokyo in the winter of 1951 to take part in the planning of the bacteriological warfare launched by the United States Government.

—See Telepress dispatch from Rangoon of December 5, 1951. A Reuter dispatch of December 9, 1951, gave a similar report.

Photo: Document. (From Hsinhua News Agency dispatch of March 20, 1952.)



敵人的滅絕人性的嗜血者的暴行，不但是經過長期準備，而且是在與朝中人民的死敵日本帝國主義佔領中國時期進行細菌戰的大戰犯、前日本陸軍軍醫中將石井四郎、獸醫少將若松次郎和北野政藏等人的勾結下進行的。據電通社一九五一年十二月五日仰光電引述拒絕透露姓名的兩名美國官員所透露的消息稱，這三個日本「細菌專家」，奉李奇微總部之命，攜帶了進行細菌戰的一切必要裝備，離開東京到達了朝鮮，準備以朝中人民部隊的被俘人員作爲細菌實驗的對象，並且將提出關於在冬天進行細菌戰的計劃的報告。而這三個「細菌專家」就正是一九五〇年二月一日蘇聯政府的照會中提議設立國際特別軍事法庭加以審判的五個大細菌戰犯中間的三個大戰犯。

以上這些令人髮指的滔天罪行，證明敵人企圖以違反人類正義和國際公法的行爲來挽救它在朝鮮戰

February 21, 1952, dispatch from the Korean front, Hsinhua News Agency.



Reveal Pentagon Aide Nazi Expert in Germ

13.3.52 Daily Worker (New York)

The employment by the Air Force of a Nazi expert in bacteriological warfare casts new light on charges that the Pentagon has been using deadly plague germs in the Korean War. True, the Pentagon has been trying to ridicule these charges, but it has never denied the charge that it has been employing the "experience" and services of Nazi "scientists."

Chief among these Nazis who worked on the plans for the destruction of 20 million men, women and children is a Dr. Walter P. Schreiber.

Dr. Schreiber was brought here by the Pentagon and stationed at the U. S. Air Force School in Texas. He stayed there until strong protests from medical sources and such organizations of the Anti-Defamation League of the Bnai Brith forced his removal.

The protests came because Dr. Schreiber was recognized as one of the leading Nazi army physicians who conducted experiments in torture on both military and civilian prisoners. The record was spread out in the Nuremberg trials with Supreme Court Justice Jackson as one of the prosecutors.

GERM EXPERT

But what has not been revealed in the press up to now is that Schreiber did more than conduct "ordinary" experiments in the torture of human beings. Schreiber was one of Germany's leading bacteriologists. He was a Major General of the Wehrmacht, and, in his own words, was "hygienist and bacteriologist at the headquarters of the High Command of the Army.

"I then became section chief in the High Command of the Army," Schreiber testified, "and was in charge of the science and health departments in the Army Medical Inspectorate and finally head of the Scientific Department, Group C, of the Military Medical Academy. In this capacity I was in charge of the scientific institutes of the Academy in Berlin." (Trial of Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg – Vol. IX, pages 540-547).

In this capacity, the record brought out, Schreiber was involved in experiments for dropping deadly germ bombs against "enemy" forces. It was true that Schreiber tried to get off the hook by claiming that he was, merely

Dr. Schreiber, it developed, had been brought to the U.S. in a Defense Department scoop-up of German technical men known as "Operation Paperclip." His job: consultant to the Air Force in a division with the grandiloquent title "Global Preventive Medicine." He was living comfortably in San Antonio with his wife and his son Paul, 17, a student at Alamo Heights High School.

In 1951, U.S. Department of Defense invited Nazi bacteriological war criminal, Walter P. Schreiber, to be consultant to the U.S. Air Force's division of "Global Preventive Medicine", and his work has since been included as "confidential and could not be discussed."

—See "Time" March 10, 1952, and New York "Daily Worker" March 13, 1952.

PROPAGANDA OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AFTER IT STARTED THE BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE



EUROPEAN EDITION

THE STARS AND STRIPES

Unofficial Publication of the U.S. Armed Forces in the European Command



Sunday, January 27, 1952

Germs, Gas Seen Cheapest War Weapons

WASHINGTON, Jan. 26 (UP)—Germs, gas and radioactive materials may prove the cheapest weapons for subduing an enemy, a top Army expert said yesterday.

Brig Gen William M. Creasy, chief of the Army Chemical Corps Research Cmd, said the U.S. now has "under development" weapons which may make it possible to "reduce an enemy's ability to resist" at a smaller "logistical cost" than any other type of warfare.

Creasy told the Women's Patriotic Conference: "Other nations are investigating these fields and we must assume they are making progress.

"While there is no need for alarm," he said, "the use against us by an enemy of any of these types of warfare . . . could create major dangers"

Weapons Carrying Germs

Creasy explained that weapons carrying disease germs, poison gas or radioactive materials could make it possible to defeat any enemy "without destruction of his economy."

The chemical warfare expert defined the new weapons broadly as:

1—Vastly improved versions of the poison gases introduced in World War I.

2—Disease germs spread by saboteurs in water mains or food supplies, or blanketed over entire cities by artificially produced clouds of mist.

3—Invisible coatings of highly radioactive materials, by-products of atomic-bomb production, which could render large areas uninhabitable.

"Major efforts" are being made, he said, to develop "protective measures" against such attacks.

Brigadier General William M. Creasy, Chief of the Research and Development Department of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, said in Washington on January 25, 1952, that "germs, gas and radioactive materials" might prove to be the cheapest weapons for conquering an enemy.

Similar remarks were also made on January 22, 1952, by Charles E. Loucks, Deputy Chief of the Army Chemical Corps.

—See the U.S. "Stars and Stripes", January 27, 1952. Photo: Document.



SPEND MORE ON WAR RESEARCH, U.S. TOLD

31.3.52 Daily Herald

RESEARCH men of the American Army have asked Congress to spend £17,700,000 to continue experiments in atomic, biological and chemical warfare.

Major-General F. T. Bullene, chief of the chemical corps, said increased funds for biological warfare were needed because people were taking it seriously.

Costs were rising, he added. But the development of bacteriological and chemical warfare was "very urgent."

He added: "We have been doing research for ten years and we think it is time to catch up with some hardware—including new laboratories."

UP TO 15 MILES

General Bullene's testimony, taken earlier this month, was released yesterday by a House Appropriations Committee.

Another witness, Brigadier General Stanley

Major General Bullene, Chief of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps requesting the U.S. House to appropriate funds for bacteriological warfare projects.

—See "Daily Herald", London, March 31, 1952.

Photo: Document.



U.S. News & World Report

WAR III—GERMS VS. GERMS?

Plagues and Pests Groomed as Weapons

vate scientific sources, are these:

Is it possible to start an epidemic of, say, bubonic plague by artificial means? The answer is yes. There is no practical reason why it cannot be done just as the Communists have charged the United States with doing it—by dropping diseased animals and insects from planes over wide areas.

The "U.S. News and World Report", March 21, 1952, stated that it is possible to start bubonic plague and other epidemics by scattering infected animals and insects over wide areas from the air.

Photo: Document. (From "U.S. News and World Report", March 21, 1952.)



certainty of whether it was caused naturally or by enemy action.

Is there any international agreement against the use of BW, as there is against the use of poison gas? Apparently not.

—Nat'l Institutes of Health

MASKED SCIENTIST

. . . 'BW' is being thoroughly explored

It is not mentioned in the Geneva Convention. Formal agreement seems to be lacking.

The "U.S. News and World Report", March 21, 1952, brazenly claimed that there is no international agreement banning bacteriological warfare.

Photo: Document. (From "U.S. News and World Report", March 21, 1952.)

Note: The Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925, specifically prohibits the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. The Protocol is reproduced on page 11.

ONE OF THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AGAINST BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

PROTOCOL FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES, AND OF BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE, SIGNED AT GENEVA, JUNE 17, 1925.



66 *Société des Nations — Recueil des Traités.* 1929

N° 2138. — PROTOCOLE [1] CONCERNANT LA PROHIBITION D'EMPLOI A LA GUERRE DE GAZ ASPHYXIANTS, TOXIQUES OU SIMILAIRES ET DE MOYENS BACTÉRIOLOGIQUES. SIGNÉ A GENEVE, LE 17 JUIN 1925.

Textes officiels français et anglais communiqués par le président du Conseil, ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République française. L'enregistrement de ce protocole a eu lieu le 7 septembre 1929.

Les plénipotentiaires soussignés, au nom de leurs gouvernements respectifs :

Considérant que l'emploi à la guerre de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires, ainsi que de tous liquides, matières ou procédés analogues, a été à juste titre condamné par l'opinion générale du monde civilisé ;

Considérant que l'interdiction de cet emploi a été formulée dans des traités auxquels sont Parties la plupart des Puissances du monde ;

Dans le dessein de faire universellement reconnaître comme incorporée au droit international cette interdiction, qui s'impose également à la conscience et à la pratique des nations,

---

[1] Dépôt des ratifications :

France, 9 *mai* 1926.

1° Ledit protocole n'oblige le Gouvernement de la République française que vis-à-vis des Etats qui l'ont signé et ratifié, ou qui y auront adhéré ;

2° Ledit protocole cessera de plein droit d'être obligatoire pour le Gouvernement de la République française à l'égard de tout Etat ennemi dont les forces armées ou dont les Alliés ne respecteraient pas les interdictions qui font l'objet de ce protocole.

Venezuela, 8 *février* 1928.

Italie, 3 *avril* 1928.

Autriche, 9 *mai* 1928.

Belgique, 4 *décembre* 1928.

1° Ledit protocole n'oblige le Gouvernement belge que vis-à-vis des Etats qui l'ont signé et ratifié, ou qui y auront adhéré ;

2° Ledit protocole cessera de plein droit d'être obligatoire pour le Gouvernement belge à l'égard de tout Etat ennemi dont les forces armées ou dont les Alliés ne respecteraient pas les interdictions qui font l'objet de ce protocole.



68 *Société des Nations — Recueil des Traités.* 1929

Déclarent :

Que les Hautes Parties contractantes, en tant qu'elles ne sont pas déjà parties à des traités prohibant cet emploi, reconnaissent cette interdiction, acceptent d'étendre cette interdiction d'emploi aux moyens de guerre bactériologiques et conviennent de se considérer comme liées entre elles aux termes de cette déclaration.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes feront tous leurs efforts pour amener les autres Etats à adhérer au présent protocole. Cette adhésion sera notifiée au Gouvernement de la République française et, par celui-ci, à toutes les Puissances signataires et adhérentes. Elle prendra effet à dater du jour de la notification faite par le Gouvernement de la République française.

Le présent protocole, dont les textes français et anglais feront foi, sera ratifié le plus tôt possible. Il portera la date de ce jour.

Les ratifications du présent protocole seront adressées au Gouvernement de la République française, qui en notifiera le dépôt à chacune des Puissances signataires ou adhérentes.

Suite de la note page 66.

Egypte, 6 *décembre* 1928.

Pologne, 4 *février* 1929.

Serbes, Croates et Slovènes (Royaume des), 12 *avril* 1929.

Allemagne, 25 *avril* 1929.

Finlande, 26 *juin* 1929.

Espagne, 22 *août* 1929.

Déclare reconnaître comme obligatoire de plein droit sans convention spéciale à l'égard de de tout Membre ou Etat acceptant et observant la même obligation, c'est-à-dire sous condition de réciprocité, le Protocole concernant la prohibition d'emploi à la guerre de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires et de moyens bactériologiques, signé à Genève, le 17 juin 1925.

Roumanie, 23 *août* 1929.

1° Ledit protocole n'oblige le Gouvernement royal roumain que vis-à-vis des Etats qui l'ont signé et ratifié ou qui y auront adhéré définitivement.

2° Ledit protocole cessera d'être obligatoire pour le Gouvernement royal roumain, vis-à-vis de n'importe quel Etat ennemi dont les forces armées ou dont les Alliés de droit ou de fait ne respecteront pas les interdictions qui font l'objet de ce protocole.

Turquie, 5 *octobre* 1929.

Danemark, 5 *mai* 1930.

Suède, 25 *avril* 1930.

Empire britannique, 9 *avril* 1930.

1° Ledit protocole n'oblige Sa Majesté Britannique que vis-à-vis des Puissances et des Etats qui l'ont signé et ratifié ou qui y ont adhéré définitivement.

2° Ledit protocole cessera d'être obligatoire pour Sa Majesté Britannique à l'égard de toute Puissance ennemie dont les forces armées ou dont les forces armées alliées ne respecteraient pas les interdictions qui font l'objet de ce protocole.

N° 2138



70 *Société des Nations — Recueil des Traités.* 1929

Les instruments de ratification ou d'adhésion resteront déposés dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française.

Le présent protocole entrera en vigueur pour chaque Puissance signataire à dater du dépôt de sa ratification et, dès ce moment, cette Puissance sera liée vis-à-vis des autres Puissances ayant déjà procédé au dépôt de leurs ratifications.

Suite de la note page 66.

Inde, 9 *avril* 1930.

1° Ledit protocole n'oblige Sa Majesté Britannique que vis-à-vis des Etats qui l'ont signé et ratifié ou qui y ont adhéré définitivement.

2° Ledit protocole cessera d'être obligatoire pour Sa Majesté Britannique à l'égard de toute Puissance ennemie dont les forces armées ou dont les forces armées alliées ne respecteraient pas les interdictions qui font l'objet de ce protocole.

Canada, 6 *mai* 1930.

1° Ledit protocole n'oblige Sa Majesté Britannique que vis-à-vis des Etats qui l'ont signé et ratifié ou qui y ont adhéré définitivement.

2° Ledit protocole cessera d'être obligatoire pour Sa Majesté Britannique à l'égard de tout Etat ennemi dont les forces armées ou dont les alliés en droit ou en fait ne respecteraient pas les interdictions qui font l'objet de ce protocole.

ADHÉSIONS :

Libéria, 2 *avril* 1927.

Union des Républiques soviétistes socialistes, 5 *avril* 1928.

1° Ledit protocole n'oblige le Gouvernement de l'Union des Républiques soviétistes socialistes que vis-à-vis des Etats qui l'ont signé et ratifié, ou qui y ont adhéré définitivement ;

2° Ledit protocole cessera d'être obligatoire pour le Gouvernement de l'Union des Républiques soviétistes socialistes à l'égard de tout Etat ennemi dont les forces armées ou dont les Alliés en droit ou en fait ne respecteraient pas les interdictions qui font l'objet de ce protocole.

Perse, 4 *juillet* 1929.

Chine, 7 *août* 1929.

Union Sud-Africaine, 22 *janvier* 1930.

Sous les réserves que ledit protocole n'oblige Sa Majesté que vis-à-vis des Puissances et des Etats qui l'ont signé et ratifié ou qui y ont adhéré, et que ledit protocole cessera d'être obligatoire pour Sa Majesté à l'égard de toute Puissance ennemie dont les forces armées ou dont les forces armées alliées ne respecteraient pas ce protocole.

Australie, 22 *janvier* 1930.

(Mêmes réserves que pour l'Union Sud-Africaine.)

Nouvelle-Zélande, 22 *janvier* 1930.

(Mêmes réserves que pour l'Union Sud-Africaine.)

N° 2138

The Undersigned Plenipotentiaries, in the name of their respective Governments:

Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; and

Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and

To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations:

Declare:

That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.

The High Contracting Parties will exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the present Protocol. Such accession will be notified to the Government of the French Republic, and by the latter to all signatory and acceding Powers, and will take effect on the date of the notification by the Government of the French Republic.



270 CHAPTER XX—WAR

The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilised powers are parties,

The Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.

Unperfected Treaty No. R-6, 1922 For. Rel., vol. I, pp. 267, 269. This treaty was ratified by the President of the United States on June 9, 1923, but, since the French Government did not ratify it, ratifications of the signatory powers have not been deposited and the treaty has not become effective.

It was stated in article V of the convention for the limitation of armaments signed by the Central American republics on February 7, 1923 that the contracting parties considered "the use in warfare of asphyxiating gases, poisons, or similar substances as well as analogous liquids, materials or devices", to be "contrary to humanitarian principles and to international law", and they obligated themselves not to use said substances in time of war.

Conference on Central American Affairs, Washington, December 4, 1922–February 7, 1923 (1923) 339, 341–342; II Hudson, *International Legislation* (1931) 942, 945.

A "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare" was signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925 by representatives of the United States and certain other countries. The protocol provides:

Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world; and

Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of the Powers of the World are Parties; and

To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations;

. . . .

. . . the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.

It was submitted to the Senate of the United States by the President on January 12, 1926, but the Senate's advice and consent to ratification



BELLIGERENT MEASURES 271

has not been given. It is in force, however, in respect to a number of other states.

For a copy of the protocol, see enclosure 2 in despatch 471, July 24, 1925, from the Minister in Switzerland (Gibson) to the Secretary of State (Kellogg), MS. Department of State, file 500.A14/379; 1925 For. Rel., vol. I, p. 89; Gt. Br., Treaty Ser. no. 24 (1930), Cmd. 3604; 94 League of Nations Treaty Series (1929) 65.



DIGEST
OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
BY
GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH
Legal Adviser of the Department of State

VOLUME VI
CHAPTERS XIX–XXI

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : [illegible]



FACTS ON FILE Reg. U.S. Pat. Office

WEEKLY WORLD NEWS DIGEST WITH CUMULATIVE INDEX

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Vol. VII, No. 337 Published Weekly Sunday, April 6 - Saturday, April 12, 1947



THE PRESIDENCY

(See also *WORLD AFFAIRS—U.S. Foreign Policy*)

(APRIL 8) Treaties. Pres. Truman withdraws from the Senate 19 old pigeon-holed treaties, including the 1925 Geneva protocol against gas and bacteriological warfare and a 1932 St. Lawrence Waterway pact with Canada.

Note: Regulations concerning the prohibition of bacteriological warfare were laid down in the Protocol signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925. Up to 1938, altogether forty nations had ratified and acceded to this Protocol: But the U.S. Senate refused to ratify it when it was submitted by President Coolidge on January 12, 1926. President Truman went even further and withdrew the Protocol from the U.S. Senate on April 8, 1947.

—See "Digest of International Law" by Green Haywood Hackworth, published by the United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943.

—See "Facts on File" Vol. VII, No. 337, Sunday, April 6—Saturday, April 12, 1947.

STATEMENT BY BAK HON YONG, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, FEBRUARY 22, 1952.

On May 8, 1951, the Government of the Korean Democratic People's Republic lodged a serious protest with the United Nations against the use of bacteriological weapons by the American imperialist interventionists in their war of aggression against Korea. However, the forces of the American imperialist invaders again used bacteriological weapons early this year for mass annihilation of the people. They have thus committed the most serious criminal act in the history of mankind, viciously violating all international conventions relating to war.

According to authentic data available at the Headquarters of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, the American imperialist invaders have, since January 28 this year, been systematically spreading large quantities of bacteria-carrying insects by aircraft in order to disseminate contagious diseases over our frontline positions and our rear.

On January 28, enemy military aircraft dropped three types of infected insects, over the Yongsodong and Yongsudong areas to the southeast of Ichon, such as have never been seen before in Korea. The first type resembles black flies, the second, fleas, and the third, ticks.

On January 29, enemy military aircraft again spread large numbers of flies and fleas over the Ichon area.

On February 11, enemy military aircraft dropped large numbers of paper tubes and paper packets filled with fleas, spiders, mosquitoes, ants, flies and other bacteria-carrying insects over our frontline positions in the Chorwon area; a large quantity of flies over the Sibyonni area, and a large quantity of fleas, flies, mosquitoes and grasshoppers in the Pyonggang area.

On February 13, enemy aircraft spread large quantities of flies, mosquitoes, spiders and fleas over the Kumhwa area.

On February 15, enemy military aircraft spread large quantities of bacteria-carrying flies, spiders and other insects over the Pyonggang area.

On February 16, enemy military aircraft spread these infected insects over the Hongsu and Ochonni areas east of the Pukhan River.

On February 17, four enemy planes spread flies and fleas over the Shankapri and Hakkapri areas north of Pyonggang.

Bacteriological tests show that these insects scattered by the aggressors on the positions of our troops and in our rear are infested with plague, cholera and the germs of other infectious diseases.

This is an irrefutable proof that the enemy has planned to employ bacteria on a large scale to slaughter the men of the Korean People's Army, the Chinese People's Volunteers and peaceful Korean civilians.

I am entrusted by the Government of the Korean Democratic People's Republic to raise a solemn protest in the name of the Korean people against these foul atrocities.

After starting the war of aggression in Korea, the American imperialists have violated international conventions and are conducting bacteriological warfare on a large scale to slaughter the Korean people at the front and in the rear, in an attempt to achieve their ambition of turning Korea into an American military base.

Of all the atrocities of the U.S. imperialist invaders in Korea, this is the most serious crime they have committed.

At the same time, it shows clearly that U.S. imperialism is the enemy not only of the Korean people but also of all peace-loving people in the world. The world must know that this criminal bacteriological warfare used by the American imperialists in Korea is being conducted after long preparations.

The U.S. Army Chemical Corps' Biological Warfare Section has manufactured 16 kinds of bacteriological weapons to spread bacteria by air and water for mass annihilation of the people.

In March, 1951, the U.S. landing ship No. 1091 sailed to Wonsan, under Crawford F. Sams, Chief of the so-called Public Health and Welfare Section of the U.N. Forces General Headquarters. They later went to Koje Island, where they used captured men of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers for bacteriological experiments.

In perpetrating these ghastly crimes, the American imperialists have been openly collaborating with the Japanese bacteriological war criminals, the former jackals of the Japanese militarists whose crimes are attested to by irrefutable evidence. Among the Japanese war criminals sent to Korea were Shiro Ishii, Jiro Wakamatsu and Masajo Kitano. On February 1, 1950, the Soviet Government proposed that these major bacteriological warfare planners be handed over to a special international military tribunal.

Working hand in glove with the Japanese who have been convicted as war criminals by the whole world, including America, the American imperialists are carrying on a large-scale bacteriological warfare in our country.

It is clear the American aggressors are out to use the deadly enemies of the Korean people—the Japanese imperialists and particularly the Japanese war criminals, the running dogs of American imperialism who are known to the world as major planners of bacteriological warfare—to wipe out the Korean people. This vicious scheme of the American and Japanese imperialists has aroused the wrath and indignation of the people throughout Korea.

Like the other outrages engineered by the American imperialists during the Korean armistice negotiations, the use of bacteriological warfare brings out the criminal character of American imperialism in all its hideousness. But whatever violent means it employs, American imperialism will never attain its ends in Korea. What is in store for it is nothing other than the most vehement opposition of the peace-loving people and the utter bankruptcy of its aggressive schemes.

The Korean people will continue their struggle with the people of the world against the savage atrocities of the American imperialists which run directly counter to international law and every human moral precept.

We resolutely protest against the new crime that the interventionists are perpetrating by spreading deadly germs in Korea. We appeal to the people of the whole world to check the outrages of the interventionists and we hold the organisers of the use of the bacteriological weapons responsible internationally.

STATEMENT BY CHOU EN-LAI, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, MARCH 8, 1952.

After launching large-scale bacteriological warfare in Korea on January 28, 1952, the American aggressive forces, between February 29 and March 5, sent 68 formations of military aircraft making a total of 448 sorties to invade China's territorial air in the Northeast and scatter large quantities of germ-carrying insects at Fushun, Hsinmin, Antung, Kuantien, Linkiang and other areas, and to bomb and strafe the Linkiang and Changtienhokow areas. The details of these incidents are as follows:

(1) On February 29, American aircraft, in 14 formations, flew a total of 148 sorties over Antung, Fushun, Fengcheng and other areas and scattered insects over Fushun. An investigation on the spot showed that insects of a black colour were found within an area of 15-20 kilometers in Fushun County covering Takow, Lijen, and Fangsiao Villages and Lientaowan.

(2) On March 1, American aircraft, in 14 formations, flew a total of 86 sorties to intrude over Fushun, Tatungkow, Changtienhokow, Kuantien and Chian and scatter insects of a black colour resembling fleas over Makinchwang and other places in Fushun County. Of these planes, 8 in one group strafed a point 5 kilometres northwest of Changtienhokow.

(3) On March 2, American aircraft, in 12 formations, flew a total of 72 sorties over Fushun, Antung, Tatungkow, Changtienhokow, Kiuliencheng, Chian, Kuantien and Changpai. They dropped large quantities of flies, mosquitoes, fleas and other types of insects over Takow and other parts of Fushun County and areas between Fushun and Shenyang.

(4) On March 3, five formations of American aircraft, flying a total of 23 sorties, intruded and scattered insects over Antung, Langtou and Chian.

(5) On March 4, thirteen formations of American aircraft flew a total of 72 sorties, to intrude and scatter insects over Antung, Langtou, Tatungkow, Kiuliencheng, Changtienhokow, Hsinmin, Chian, Hunkiangkow and Kuantien. At 11 a.m. of the same morning, six American aircraft were observed above Langtou. They dropped from a height of 5,000 meters two cloth receptacles which burst open some 2,000 meters from the ground; and then a swarm of flies was found near the highway. At 2 p.m., an American aircraft was observed over Paikipao and Jaoyangho in Hsinmin County. It dropped a load of flies. On the same day, American aircraft were active over Kuantien, and afterwards flies, mosquitoes, crickets and fleas dropped by American aircraft were immediately found east of Kuantien City and at Hungshihlatze and other places.

(6) On March 5, ten formations of American aircraft flew a total of 38 sorties to intrude over Antung, Anpingho, Changtienhokow, Hunkiangkow, Tunghua and Linkiang. Of these, one group of 8 planes at about 8 a.m. indiscriminately bombed and strafed Linkiang, wounding 2 people and destroying 5 houses.

In view of the fact that the United States government has dared repeatedly and openly to make air intrusions over China's territory, spread germ-bearing insects and indiscriminately bomb, strafe and kill Chinese people at the same time as it is delaying the Korean armistice negotiations and obstructing a peaceful settlement of the Korean question in an attempt to prolong and extend the Korean war, I am authorised by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to protest solemnly against these most savage and brutal acts of aggression and provocation by the United States government.

The open and direct acts of aggression of the United States government against the People's Republic of China date from June 27, 1950 when U.S. President Truman announced the despatch of its navy to invade and occupy China's territory, Taiwan. On August 27, 1950 the American aggressor troops in Korea began to send their military aircraft to intrude into the territorial air of Northeast China. From then on, the military aircraft of the United States government have many times intruded over Northeast China and carried out reconnaisance, strafing and bombing. Now, on the heels of its large-scale bacteriological warfare in Korea, the United States government is adding to its open violation of international law and all laws of humanity by scattering large quantities of bacteria-laden insects over Northeast China. This is an attempt by the criminal and vicious device of mass slaughter of peaceful people to further its aims of invading China and threatening the security of the Chinese people.

These brutal crimes of the United States government will never be tolerated by the Chinese people. The opposition of the Chinese people in their wrath will assure the ignominious failure of these crimes.

It is the view of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China that the United States government, pursuing its objectives of extending the Korean war and undermining peace in the Far East and other parts of the world, has employed bacteriological weapons, strictly prohibited by humanity and international conventions, against the peaceful population and armed forces of the Korean and Chinese peoples in Korea, and is even extending such crimes against the peaceful population in Northeast China by employing these unlawful bacteriological weapons in a brutal provocation.

In its statement on February 24, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China pointed out: "If the people of the world do not resolutely curb this crime, then the calamities befalling the peaceful people of Korea today will befall the peaceful people of the world tomorrow." Now is the time for the peace-loving people of the world to rise and put an end to the maniacal crimes of the United States government. We are confident that human justice and peace will triumph.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China hereby makes it known that members of the American air force who invade China's territorial air and use bacteriological weapons will be dealt with as war criminals on capture.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China at the same time declares that the United States government must bear the full responsibility for all the consequences arising from air intrusions over China's territory, the use of bacteriological weapons and the murder of the Chinese people by indiscriminate bombing and strafing.

INVESTIGATIONS ON THE CRIMES OF BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

THE KOREA GROUP OF THE COMMISSION FOR INVESTIGATING THE CRIME OF BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTED BY THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS

Taken at Iju, Korea, on March 20, 1952.

Ri Byong Nam, Minister of Health of the Korean Democratic People's Republic, telling the Commission about the spreading of germs in Korea by the U.S. Armed Forces.

THE NORTHEAST CHINA GROUP OF THE COMMISSION FOR INVESTIGATING THE CRIME OF BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTED BY THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS



Taken at Shenyang on April 1, 1952.

Chao Wen-Hsiu, a peasant in Shenyang, testifying before the Commission against the spreading of noxious insects in Northeast China by the U.S. Armed Forces.

THE COMMISSION FOR INVESTIGATING THE CRIME OF BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTED BY THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS IN KOREA

On March 28, 1952, members of the Commission inspected the bomb pit made by a bacteria bomb dropped by an American plane at Watae Dong, Kiljong Ri, Tosan Myen, Sangnyong Goon. Insects and spiders were found in the shell and around the pit. Witnesses: Ri Bok Sun and Min Won Sik.



On March 23, 1952, members of the Commission examined the cylindrical cardboard bacteria container dropped by an American plane.



On March 27, 1952, Hsiao Tien-Chen of the Chinese People's Volunteers, described to the Commission how American planes disseminated insects in the Naemun Ri, Majang Myen, Cholwon Goon.

On March 27, 1952, Baek Chon Sok, head of the People's Committee, Il Ri, Daejon, described to the Commission how American planes disseminated insects in Naemun Ri, Majang Myen, Cholwon Goon.

THE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS

The Commission of Investigation of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers was formed by eight internationally known lawyers. Its members consist of:

Heinrich Brandweiner, Professor of International Law in the University of Graz (Austria), President.

Luigi Cavalieri, Advocate at the Supreme Court of Rome (Italy), Vice-President.

Jack Gaster, Solicitor, London (Great Britain).

Marc Jacquier, Advocate at the Court of Appeal, Paris (France).

Ko Po-Nien, Deputy Director of the Research Department of People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, Peking (China).

Marie-Louise Moerens, Advocate, Brussels (Belgium).

Letelba Rodriques de Britto, Advocate, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil).

Zofia Wasilkowska, Judge of the Supreme Court, Warsaw (Poland).

At a press conference held on April 1, in Peking, the Commission gave evidence to prove that the United States Armed Forces are waging germ warfare both in Korea and in Northeast China.

THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS CONCERNING BACTERIAL WARFARE IN KOREA AND CHINA

The signatory members of the International Scientific Commission and the President of Academia Sinica, Kuo Mo-Jo, together with other invited guests.

At the formal signing of the Investigation Report on August 31, 1952, at Peking.

CONCLUSION

Since the beginning of 1952, phenomena of a very unusual character occurring in Korea and China, led to allegations by the peoples and governments of those countries that U.S.A. forces were waging bacteriological warfare. The International Scientific Commission which was formed to investigate the relevant facts has now brought its work to a conclusion after more than two months in the field.

It found itself in the presence of a mass of facts, some of which formed coherent patterns which turned out to be highly demonstrative. It therefore concentrated its efforts especially upon these.

The Commission has come to the following conclusions. The peoples of Korea and China have indeed been the objective of bacteriological weapons. These have been employed by units of the U.S.A. armed forces, using a great variety of different methods for the purpose, some of which seem to be developments of those applied by the Japanese army during the second world war.

The Commission reached these conclusions, passing from one logical step to another. It did so reluctantly because its members had not been disposed to believe that such an inhuman technique could have been put into execution in the face of its universal condemnation by the peoples of the nations.

It is now for all peoples to redouble their efforts to preserve the world from war and prevent the discoveries of science being used for the destruction of humanity.

THE CONCLUSION OF THE REPORT



MEMBRES DE LA COMMISSION SCIENTIFIQUE INTERNATIONALE CHARGEE D'EXAMINER LES FAITS CONCERNANT LA GUERRE BACTERIOLOGIQUE EN COREE ET EN CHINE:

ANDREEN, Andrea: M.D. Ph. D. (Médecine clinique et de Laboratoire) (Suède)

Andrea Andreen.

MALTERRE, Jean: Ing. Agri. (Physiologie animale et Biologie)

J Malterre

NEEDHAM, Joseph: Sc. D. F.R.S. (Biochimie, Embryologie, Langue et Littérature Chinoises). (U.K.)

Joseph Needham

OLIVO, Oliviero: M.D. (Médecine, Biologie et Anatomie) (Italie)

Oliv Olivo

PESSOA, Samuel, B.: M.D. (Parasitologie et Entomologie Médicales) (Brésil)

Samuel B. Pessoa

ZHUKOV-VEREZHNIKOV, Nicolai Nicolaievitch: M.D. Membre de l'Académie de Médecine (Bactériologie et Epidémiologie) (U.R.S.S.)

Pékin, le 31 Août 1952.

THE SIGNATURES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE REPORT

Doctor Andrea Andreen (Sweden).

Professor Jean Malterre (France).

Doctor Joseph Needham (United Kingdom).



Professor Oliviero Olivo (Italy).



Professor S. B. Pessoa (Brazil).



Academician N. N. Zhukov-Verezhnikov (U.S.S.R.)

THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION PROCEEDING WITH INVESTIGATION WORK

In Kannan County, NE China, Members of the International Scientific Commission listened to a local resident, Tsao Kuo-Chin, recounting the discovery on the morning of April 5, 1952, of hundreds of dead voles in the villages.

At Pyongyang, Korea, the Commission heard from the Chinese People's Volunteers' topographical surveyors Tsao Chin-Fu and Fang Yuan, an account of how on April 23, at 10 a.m., they discovered large numbers of human fleas in an area 10 meters wide and 30 meters long, at Songdong, Hoiyang Goon.

The Commission studying in Shenyang the pathological changes in the cerebrum and lungs of a fatal case of anthrax bacillus meningitis.

Members of the International Scientific Commission studying the three four-compartment bombs dropped by U.S. planes at Changpai County, NE China, on March 26, 1952, and an Ishii porcelain bomb from the ruins of a Japanese bacteria factory near Harbin.



IRREFUTABLE IRONCLAD EVIDENCE

SOME OF THE CONTAINERS EMPLOYED BY THE U.S. ARMED FORCES FOR DISSEMINATING INSECTS AND OTHER OBJECTS

The U.S. Armed Forces have employed many types of containers for disseminating insects and other objects. Those exhibited here represent only a small part of our collection.

1. **The first type is the four-compartment bacteria bomb, of which we have found quite a number. This kind of bomb resembles a 500-pound bomb, and is 137 cm. long and 36.4 cm. in diameter. The bomb shell, consisting of two longitudinal halves, is made of thin steel plate 0.15 cm. thick. The interior is divided into four compartments. This type of bombs usually opens before landing and the insects contained in it are dispersed in all directions. On-the-spot investigations all revealed the presence of numerous insects within and around the bombs dropped.**
2. **Another type of bacteria container is a cardboard cylinder attached to a parachute. Up to now such containers have appeared in two slightly different forms. One of these shown here has a length of 36 cm. and a diameter of 13 cm. The cylinder is fastened to a parachute about 70 cm. in diameter made of artificial silk. At a set time the bottom of the cylinder falls off to allow the insects to disperse.**
3. **The third type is a calcareous bacteria bomb. The shell of the bomb is made of calcareous material, with aluminum paint on its outer surface. Inside, there is an iron axis which is 28 cm. in length and to one end of which a steel plate is attached. The calcareous bomb is very fragile, breaking completely into fragments on hitting the ground. Large number of flies, spiders and feathers were found at the site where the bomb landed. According to the deduction of physicists, the bomb was in the shape of a cylinder with a rounded end.**

SPECIMENS OF THE FOUR-COMPARTMENT BACTERIA BOMBS

At 8 p.m. on Feb. 27, 1952, Comrade Chen Kuang-Han of the Chinese People's Volunteers observed that an American airplane dropped two bombs over Bobang Ri, Pyongwon Goon, which landed with very little noise. Soon afterwards Comrade Chen went with more than thirty other Chinese volunteers to search for the bombs. They found one bomb on the slope of a nearby hill and the other in a cotton field. These bombs of the four-compartment type were each split into two halves and numerous insects were crawling within and around them.

At 9:00 p.m., March 26, 1952, an American airplane dropped a four-compartment bomb over Chia Chai Shui Village, Pa Tao Kou District, Changpai County, Liaotung Province, China. The next day peasant Li Ming-Cheng of Ta Wei Tze Settlement found one half of the shell, and the other half was found by peasant Chiang Shu-Teh of the same village on the slope of a hill at Tieh Hua La Tze. Near the shell were many flies, midges and spiders. A time fuse, bearing the letters "US TIME" etc., was also found.



INSIDE THE U.N.

Daily Compass

Pentagon Confuses Germ Warfare Picture

Daily Compass

4.52

UNITED NATIO N. Y.

THE U.N. HAS BEEN STARTLED and horrified by Communist allegations that the U. S. command in Korea has used germ warfare. No pains have been spared to deny the charges. Trygve Lie has ridiculed them: Dr. Brock Chisholm of the World Health Organization has flatly said that if germ warfare were being waged we would know soon enough, since millions would die; and Lie has offered the services of the U.N. health organization to stem any epidemics that may be raging in Korea and China. But he has received no reply to four cablegrams sent during the past week.

On its side, Washington has issued a series of flat denials, ranging from those of Secretary Acheson and Gen. Ridgway to those of U. S. delegate Benjamin Cohen in the U.N. Disarmament Commission. And now Warren Austin, chief U. S. delegate in the U.N. has written to Frederic Joliot-Curie, French atom scientist, expressing astonishment that he has given support to the Communist charges.

¶ In these circumstances a Pentagon effort to discredit Communist propaganda photographs has created something of a muddle. Within 24 hours two flatly contradictory reports came out of Washington about methods of germ warfare

On April 3, A. M. Rosenthal, U.N. correspondent of The New York Times submitted a series of Chinese germ warfare photos to U.S. experts who denounced them to be fakes. One of these was that of a "germ bomb . . . which for physical reasons is not adaptable even theoretically to carrying germs." Rosenthal, who went to Washington to check the facts on his story, was told by the Pentagon:

"This is a photograph of the U.S. 500 pound size leaflet bomb. This bomb does not explode and is used to disseminate leaflet from aircraft."

"A Pentagon spokesman," the Times wrote, "added that the leaflet bombs even theoretically were not adaptable to germ warfare. He said that the leaflet bombs were made with holes in them. Any germs in the bomb would be killed by pressure as the missile descended."

Less than 24 hours after The Times published this story the Associated Press carried a report from Washington of a statement by the chairman of a House Appropriations subcommittee which had held secret sessions on the bacteriological warfare budget. This committee heard testimony from Maj. Gen. E. T. Bullene, chief of the Chemical Corps. Rep. Robert L. F. Sikes (D., Fla.), reporting on his testimony, was precise on the matter of weapons.

"Actually," reported the AP, "he said retaliatory bacteria warfare 'does not involve some complicated super-weapon.' The means of delivering germs to enemy territory are simple and involve equipment of the type with which the services now are 'already well-stocked . . . such as the containers used currently for dropping propaganda leaflets.'"

The Sikes statements is in obvious contradiction to what the Pentagon spokesman told The New York Times. It is ironical that the Pentagon, which has been the target of the Communist charges, should in seeking to refute them confuse rather than clarify the picture.

Robert L. F. Sikes, Chairman of a House Appropriations Subcommittee, said that in March, 1952, Major General E. T. Bullene, Chief of the U.S. Chemical Corps, had admitted in his testimony that the containers used for dropping leaflets could be used for spreading germs.

—See AP's Washington dispatch as quoted in the "Daily Compass", April 9, 1952. (According to the April 6 issue of the "New York Herald Tribune", the dispatch is dated April 5.)

The four-compartment bacteria bombs displayed here are but a small portion of what we have found in Northeast China and in Korea between February 27 and March 27, 1952. Descriptions relating to their contents, eye-witnesses, dates and localities of their discovery are shown beside each bomb.



CALCAREOUS BACTERIA BOMB

On March 12, 1952, at noon time, eight American airplanes flew over Kuantien County, Northeast China, from the southwest toward northeast direction. Soon afterwards, Han Yung-Pin, a merchant of T'ung-Chü-Ho grocery situated inside the south gate of that county seat, reported to the chief of the town administration that he had seen with his own eyes one of the eight American airplanes drop a white object cylindrical in shape. On receiving this report, the chief of the town administration immediately organized the public to look for this white object, but nothing was found. It was only until March 21, when Li Ssu-Chien, a pupil of Kuantien Middle School, discovered the distorted iron axis and steel plate and the calcareous bomb fragments. The bomb crater was about 12 cm. deep, near which large numbers of Anthomyiid flies, spiders and feathers were found. All these specimens have been proved by bacteriological examinations to carry *Bacillus anthracis*.



Metallic rod with metal disc and fragments of the calcareous bacteria bomb.

CYLINDRICAL CARDBOARD BACTERIA CONTAINER



This container was dropped by an American airplane on February 29, 1952, over Kalchi Ri, Koksan Goon, Korea. When discovered, one end of the cylinder was open. The attached parachute bears the mark "USC". In the container were flies, midges, other insects and spiders.

PRISONER OF WAR K. L. ENOCH (U.S. AIR FORCE) ADMITTED THAT HE HAD DROPPED GERM-LADEN BOMBS IN KOREA

Kenneth Lloyd Enoch, a U.S. prisoner of war, aged 27, of Youngstown, Ohio, U.S.A., is a first lieutenant of the U.S. Air Force (Serial No. AO 2069988), and a navigator of the Eighth Squadron, Third Group of the Third Bomber Wing of the U.S. Air Force. On January 13, 1952, his plane,

The Confession Written by K. L. Enoch Is Reproduced Below:

The Truth About How American Imperialism Launched Germ Warfare

I was at Iwakuni, Japan, during the last two weeks of August, 1951. During the month of August the 3rd Bomb. Wing was in the process of moving to Kunsan, Korea, and the last thing to make the move was the ground school, which moved on to Kunsan in early September, 1951. During my stay at ~~Kunsan~~ Iwakuni there were about 15 crews which had just come from the United States and were attending the ground school. This ground school gave the same kind of classroom subjects as the school at 4400 CCTG. We navigators recieved lectures and problems in navigation and the B-26 and Korea, so we would understand our jobs better and thus be better equipped to fly in combat.

On 25 August, 1951, at 1300 hours, we attended a secret lecture in the ground school navigation classroom. There were as I recall, 10 pilots and 15 navigators present at the lecture. Of the pilots I recall Lt. Broughton, Lt. Schmidt, and Capt. Lemak. Among the navigators I remember Lt. Brown, Lt. Hardy, Lt. DeGaugh, Lt. Zielinski, Lt Garvin, Lt. Larson, and myself. I did not know all the pilots and navigators, only those I had been with at Langley Field. Our instructor's name was Mr. Wilson, a civilian. There were no other instructors in attendance at this lecture.

Mr. Wilson told us that his lecture was concerning bacteriological warfare. He told us that our side had no plans at that time of using bacteriological warfare, but never-the less we might at some time, and thus the lecture was secret information and we were not to divulge its contents to anyone, ore or even talk about it among ourselves.

The main part of Mr. Wilson's lecture was devoted to the weapons of bacteriological ~~weapons~~ warfare. He did not have any examples with him, but he discussed the various methods of scattering germs, either by scattering the germs by themselves or by dropping insects and animals to spread the germs.

The contents of Mr. Wilson's lecture is as follows:

-1-

My next scheduled flight was on the night of 6 January, 1952. We were scheduled to fly on Green 8 route (between Pyongyang and Sariwon), and our take-off was scheduled for 0300. The crew was Capt. Amos, pilot, myself, navigator, and Sgt. Tracy, gunner. As usual Capt. Amos and I reported to the group briefing room and group operations office at 0200, an hour before take-off. There we always checked for the latest weather and information on the mission to be flown. On this night we were informed by the officer on duty, a captain I am not familiar with, that we were to fly to the town of Hwangju and drop our outboard wing bombs (of which there are two) and then to drop the rest of our load as quickly as possible and come directly back to Kunsan. He told us to drop at Hwangju at 500 feet of altitude and 200 miles per hour maximum airspeed. We called his attention to the low altitude, as we were to carry 10-500 pound bombs according to briefing, but he told us that this was top secret and that these were germ bombs, and to tell no one whatsoever about our mission. He told us that the wing bombs were already loaded and checked for us, and not to bother them, and when we returned to report them as "duds". We went over to squadron operations and met our gunner, who did not report to group, and, as far as I know, did not know of our special mission. When we got out to the plane a guard was standing there from armament section. He told us the wing bombs were already checked, which we already knew. I checked the bombs in the bomb bay, got there and they were 6 regular 500-pound bombs. We took off at 0300 and flew to Hwangju, dropping our two germ bombs just outside the west edge of town. There were no explosions or any unusual things to be seen. Then we continued for two minutes to the north and dropped our eight live bombs

-5-

a B-26, No. 600*, was shot down by the Chinese People's Volunteers and he was thus captured near Sunan,† Korea. According to his written confession, he had acted on instructions of his superiors and dropped two germ-laden bombs in the town of Hwangju, Korea, at 4:00 a.m. on January 7, 1952, and four other germ-laden bombs in the town of Chungwha, Korea, at 4:10 a.m. on January 11, 1952. He further admitted that he had received special training in bacteriological warfare in the Ground School of the U.S. Air Force in Iwakuni, Japan, in August, 1951, and in Kunsan, Korea, in October and December, 1951.

*** The assigned number of the bomber has 5 digits, 600 being the last 3 digits.**

† John Quinn was captured in the vicinity of Sunan, but this was not the same place where K. L. Enoch was captured.

The following comment was made by a leading authority in China on tropical and infectious diseases, Dr. Huei-Lan Chung, M.D. (P.U.M.C.—University of the State of New York); D.T.M. (certificate), University of London; formerly Fellow of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, London; formerly Research Fellow in the Tropical Institute, Hamburg, Germany; formerly member of the Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine, U.S.A.; Clinical Professor of Internal Medicine at the Chinese Union Medical College (formerly P.U.M.C.) and Peking University Medical College.

"The causative agents of typhus fever and malaria are Rickettsiae and Plasmodia respectively, whereas smallpox and yellow fever are due to two different kinds of filtrable viruses. It is only natural that the prisoner in question, not being a medical man, mixed up these infectious agents with pathogenic bacteria. He also misinterpreted the proper use of D.D.T."

Members of the International Scientific Commission Interrogating U.S. POW K. L. Enoch (the first man on the right).

The ways of dropping the germs by themselves are: ① by dropping a bomb full of dust and germs mixed together, which will open in the air and spread the germ-laden dust with the wind; ② by dropping dust directly from the airplane itself, by means of a spraying device, so that there will be germs in the air wherever the dust is sprayed; ③ or by dropping a container full of germ dust, either a bomb which will open in the water or a paperboard box which will be opened by the water, into reservoirs and lakes where the people and animals use the water, and where insects will pick up the germs and spread them.

The ways of dropping insects are: ① by dropping a germ bomb which looks just like an ordinary bomb, but is filled with germ-laden insects, and which will open on contact with the ground to release those insects; ② by dropping insects in paperboard containers which will break open on contact with the ground, releasing the insects with their germs; ③ or by spreading insects with animals.

The ways of releasing germs by animals are: ① To release the rats or ~~[illegible]~~ rabbits or small game by a parachute container which will release the animals upon contact with the ground, and these animals are covered with germ-bearing lice and fleas; ② or by releasing such animals from a boat behind the enemy shoreline.

There are other ways of spreading germs also: ① By dropping leaflets toilet paper, envelopes, and paper materials which have been covered with germs, ② by dropping germ-filled soap or clothing; ③ by dropping fountain pens filled with germ-laden ink; ④ or by dropping infected food to the enemy troops.

You can also spread germs by howitzer or mortar shells, but since it is so close to the front it is not safe to do so

~2~

There are many types of germs that can be spread In addition to many weird and unusual germs, the germs of more, well-known diseases, such as **typhus, typhoid, cholera, dysentery, bubonic plague, **smallpox, **malaria, and **yellow fever, may be employed There are many types of insects to carry those germs, the most popular being the louse, flea, fly, and mosquito. The louse can carry typhus, cholera, smallpox, plague, and dysentery, as can the flea and the fly. The mosquito can carry malaria, and yellow fever.

The best way to defend against germ warfare is to be prepared. All possible people should be inoculated against all diseases possible. If insects are dropped, it is advisable to pour kerosene or oil on the containers they are dropped in and set fire to them. If they have already escaped from the containers, it is best to spray DDT over the area, preferably from an airplane. In case germ-laden dust is employed, DDT spray must be used. All exposed food must be disposed of. All exposed clothing and articles must be washed with hot water and strong soap. All water must be boiled. All food eaten must be thoroughly cooked. You must use some protection over your nose and mouth to breathe, and you must, when every thing else is done change clothes and take a good bath. All trash and waste exposed to germs must be burned. Screens should be placed on all windows in the summer for insect protection. In all cases, small animals such as rats should be destroyed so the danger of plague, which they spread with their fleas, will be lessened. If paper objects or other such items are dropped, they should be burned at once.

~3~

All weapons of bacteriological warfare are of such a nature that they should, when employed, be dropped from as low an altitude and at as low an airspeed as possible, to avoid harm to the insects. If parachute-type weapons are used any altitude will suffice, but it should be sufficiently low, say 1000 feet, so that the parachute will not drift from the target area.

When Mr. Wilson had finished his lecture it was 3 o'clock (1500 hours) and he reminded us not to discuss the weapons subject to anyone and took his leave. This was the only such lecture we ever received. On September 1st, 1951, I went to Kunsan.

In October, 1951, and again in December, 1951, a one-hour lecture was given at Kunsan by a Major Browning on protection against germ warfare. This lecture he gave many times on each occasion, and every person was required to attend one hours lecture. He gave the same lecture in December as in October. The idea, of course, is that due to the rotation plan there are always new troops, and it is also good to keep in mind the contents of his lecture. He told us that it was not unreasonable to expect bacteriological warfare to be used against us by the enemy. If they did, germ dust or germ-~~[illegible]~~ laden insects would be used, and he stressed that we should keep our shot records, or inoculations, current and up-to-date, and also discoursed on the other pertinent data as I have discussed in the second paragraph on page 3 of this paper.

On the 1st of January, 1952, we were told by the operations section group briefing officer at our regular briefing to be sure and report all our duds and where they fell. This was a usual procedure and just seemed to be a casual reminder at that time. The reminder was given to all the crews at the briefing by Capt. Carey, the group briefing officer. Due to a head cold I did not fly on this night, but was replaced by another navigator.

~4~

on the highway 5 miles north of Hwangju, and went directly back to Kunsan. We took off at 0200, our bombs were dropped at 0400 and we landed at Kunsan at 0500. This was the first time I ever heard of anyone dropping germ bombs, and we kept it a secret. Those germ bombs looked exactly like a regular 500-pound bomb to me. In the day time they may have some distinguishing characteristics, but it was dark when I saw them. I did not load these bombs or see them loaded but there was no special equipment on the wings, so they are loaded in the same way as ordinary bombs.

When we reported to group intelligence for debriefing after this mission we reported two bombs (500 pounds (as a matter of fact, 150 pounds) dropped at Hwangju and reported them as "duds," and reported where we dropped our eight good bombs. The bombs are evidently reported as "duds" to keep too many people from knowing the purpose of the mission, but higher headquarters can check the reports and know where the germs were dropped.

On the 10th of January, whether by accident or design I do not know, I was again scheduled for the same mission with Amos and Tracy. This time Amos and I reported to group operations, and we were told that all 4 of our wing bombs were to be germ bombs This time our target was to be the town of Chunghwa, on Green 8, and we were then to get rid of the rest of our bombs as quickly as possible and return to base. We were still to keep our operation a secret and report our germ bombs as "duds". Our maximum airspeed was to be 200 miles per hour and our altitude 500 feet for the germ bombs. Once again armament was to have the wing bombs checked for us. We picked up Tracy at squadron operations and went out to the plane. Once again the wing bombs looked like regular bombs. An armament man told me that we were not to bother the wing bombs, as they were all set to go.

~6~

I checked the regular bombs in the bomb bay At 0300 … took off and flew diretly to Chunghwa, dropping our 4 germ bombs at 0410 hours, at an altitude of 500 feet and an airspeed of 190 miles per hour, on the western edge of Chunghwa. We proceeded south and dropped our regular bombs on the highway north of Hwangju and returned to Kunsan base, landing at 0515.

When we reported for debriefing we reported where we had dropped our 6 good bombs, and reported 4 "duds" at Chunghwa for the same reason as before, for secrecy.



DRAWING OF GERM BOMB

Above is a drawing of the type of germ bombs which we used.

As I see it, the germ bombs come from a medical supply source, such as the same type which manufactures the vaccine used to combat disease, and I believe this source is in Japan, either on Honshu or Kyushu Island.

If the type of germ bomb which we dropped is used, it will open on contact with the ground, exposing the germs and insects to the open air. If it is cold outside, the insects will be dormant and sluggish, but the sun will cause them, by its heat to become active.

The leaflets are dropped in North Korea by B-29's. These leaflets are dropped in boxes which open in the air scattering the leaflets over a wide area. These leaflets can be used in bacteriological warfare.

~7~

When the germ bombs are dropped, they are released by the pilot. The navigator takes notes on when and where they are dropped, and how many germ bombs. The bombs are released by pushing a button, which releases the bombs by electricity.

After the mission when the crew reports to group intelligence for debriefing, the whole crew attends the debriefing, and the report is given by the pilot and navigator. It is an informal report, and the whole crew sits around a table and give their report to an enlisted man from the intelligence section, who takes the report and puts it on paper, which he turns in to his superior. This is why the germ bombs are reported as "duds," to keep unauthorized personnel in intelligence and on the crew from knowing the secret of the mission.

To the best of my knowledge, B-26 aircraft are the only ones dropping the regular germ bomb, which looks like a regular bomb. However, the B-26 is unsuitable for dropping the other types of weapons. The leaflets are dropped by B-29's and cargo type, C-47 and C-46 aircraft, but mainly by B-29's. The cargo type aircraft are the best suited for dropping all other types of germ weapons, such as cardboard boxes, parachute containers, and articles of clothing, food, soap, and paper and fountain pens, but the B-29 can be used for those weapons also.

As to when we first started to use germ bombs, it was about the first of the year, about 1 January, 1952, I should say, since that is when we were all reminded to look for "dud" bombs. It is probable that other outfits, such as the 452nd Wing, started to use germ warfare at the same time.

The decision to use germ bombs, of course, is top secret, but due to the serious nature of this decision it undoubtedly rests with a very high command, probably the Far East headquarters in Tokyo.

Kenneth L. Enoch
Kenneth L. Enoch
7 April 1952

~8~

Members of the International Scientific Commission Interrogating U.S. POW John Quinn (the first man on the right).

PRISONER OF WAR JOHN QUINN (U.S. AIR FORCE) ADMITTED THAT HE HAD DROPPED GERM-LADEN BOMBS IN KOREA

John Quinn, aged 29, a U.S. prisoner of war, of Pasadena, California, is a first lieutenant of the U.S. Air Force (Serial No. 17993A), and a pilot of the Eighth Squadron, Third Group of the Third Bomber Wing of the U.S. Air Force. On January 13, 1952, his plane, a B-26, No. 600,* was shot down by the Chinese People's Volunteers and he was thus captured near Sunan,† Korea. According to his written confession, he had acted on instructions of his superiors, and dropped four germ-laden bombs in the southern suburbs of Pyongyang at 3:30 a.m. on January 4, 1952. At 3:25 a.m. on January 11, 1952, he again dropped two germ-laden bombs at a place northeast of Kunuri. He further admitted that he had received special training in bacteriological and atomic warfare in the Ground School of the U.S. Air Force in Kunsan, Korea, in December, 1951.

*** The assigned number of the bomber has 5 digits, 600 being the last 3 digits.**

† K. L. Enoch was captured in the vicinity of Sunan, but this was not the same place where John Quinn was captured.

The Confession Written by John Quinn Is Reproduced Below:



How I Was Forced To Take Part in the Inhume Bacteriological Warfare Launched By the U.S. Wall Street

I am John Quinn, a 1st/Lt in the United States Air Force, serial no. 17993A, I am 29 years old I joined the Air Force when I was 26 in February 16, of 1948. My home is in Pasadena, California. After I graduated from Aviation Cadets in February 25, 1949, I was assigned to the Air University. They sent me through a six weeks course on how to teach called the Academic Instructor's Course. After I finished they assigned me to the Academic Instructors Division as a Staff member. My job was training aide officer, to teach people how to make good use of pictures, charts, movies, and slides in their instruction. I was teaching there when I got my orders to the FarEast Air Forces for further assignment to fly B-26s in Korea. I was told to report first on ~~October~~ August 25 to Langley Air Force Base to learn to fly B-26s. I was there for 8 weeks. We were sent from there to

Camp Stoneman for processing. At Camp Stoneman I was innocculated for Typhoid fever, Typhus, Cholera, and Smallpox. We left the United States by airplane and arrived in Japan on 27 November 1951. We arrived at Haeneda Air Terminal and taken to Foochu, Area B, to await being sent to Korea. We were there until the 29th of November and then sent by train to Ashia Air Base in Southern Japan. It was an overnight trip by train and we arrived on the 30th. The same day we were sent by C-47 to Kunsan Air Base in Korea. I was assigned to the 8th Squadron, 3rd group, of the 3rd Bomb wing. The 3rd group is composed of 3 squadrons, 8th, 90th, and 13th and is the only group at Kunsan.

On December 17, 1951 I reported to the 8th Squadron orderly room and saw my name on the bulletin board to attend a lecture the next day at 9 o'clock The next day Larson, a navigator who was also on the list, and I went to the lecture. The lecture was given in the Ground School building in a large room. Filled the room would seat 30 people There were 20 people in the room, all pilots and navigators, In addition to Larson and myself were Roberts 2nd/Lt, Schwartz 1st/Lt, Rogers 1st/Lt, Watson 1st/Lt, Duffy-Capt Long-Capt, all navigators, Howarth-Capt, Land-Capt, Schmidt 1st/Lt, Beeson Capt, Robertson-Capt, McAllister 1st/Lt, all pilots. Larson and I had been drinking coffee and arrived a few minutes late, the others were already there. The Capt. that was talking seemed very displeased that we were late and repeated for us that the lecture that

we were to receive was considered very important and highly secret. That we were to pay close attention to everything that was told us but not to discuss the lecture later- even among ourselves. He said the lecturer had come from Japan and was an expert in his field. Then he introduced the lectures, a civilian, as Mr Ashfork. Mr Ashfork was a middle aged man, 40 years old, slender, 5 ft 10", and losing most of his hair.

He started his lecture by telling us that his lecture was on Biological warfare. He said that it was a terrible thing to contemplate but in this day of the atom bomb when science was making such rapid strides, that we must be prepared for any turn of events. He said that we never know what turn events might take in the

future and that we must be ready to defend ourselves, we must also know how to carry out Bacteriological warfare ourselves in case it proved necessary. He said that he had spent many years studying germ warfare and that he would give us as much information as he thought we needed.

He first told us that there were many many ways of spreading germ warfare. Germs ~~had been~~ could be spread anywhere at anytime, that the means were ready. He told us that germs by themselves could not be dropped because they would die in 60 seconds in direct sunlight. That germs could, however, be carried by many different types of insects and rodents. These insects and rodents have been bred for many of their Generations under laboratory conditions

and selected for their ability to survive anywhere at anytime, even under the most adverse conditions. To name a few of the ways that they can be spread, he said, was by dust, just like a smoke screen is laid down. That they could be spread in this way by ships moving in close to shore when the wind was blowing onto shore. That they could also be spread in this way by low flying jet aircraft. He meant any type of jet aircraft. He said that they could be spread by bugs in clothes, fleas, flies, lice, and mosquitoes. These same bugs could also be dropped in many other ways, in boxes that would become very fragile in the sun and allow the bugs to crawl out, and also in bombs. He said since we were flying B-26s he would dicuss mostly this last way, by bombs. He then showed us pictures of a jet, a drawing of an F-84, spraying dust with germs, out of its tip tanks. He showed us a picture of some old clothes with bugs that looked like flies and lice crawling in them. These bugs can keep very warm in the clothes, altho he said that they can be selectively bred so that the cold wouldn't harm them, also they can go a very long time without food.

He then showed us pictures of bombs which could be used for dropping germs. These bombs looked very much like 500 pound Gps that we had been carrying except that they had no fuzes. He said that the size and shape of the bomb was not important, only what it

contained. He said it was a very safe way to carry these germs since the bombs were sealed and would not open except when dropped from the airplane. The pictures he showed us was a picture of a 500 pound bomb with a very much thinner shell, less than 1/4 inch thick. These bombs, he said, were still in the experimental stage and there were various types. One picture he showed us was of a bomb that split in half when it struck the ground. Another had doors in the back (near the tail where the bomb curves) that open when the bomb hits. These doors are opened by a very small electric motor hooked to a battery which doesn't work until the bomb strikes the ground. The fluid is kept away from the

plates of the battery until the bomb strikes the ground by a thin plastic shield. The force of the bomb hitting the ground is sufficient for the fluid to break the plastic shield and then the fluid covers the battery plates and the motor opens the doors.



also he showed us a picture of a bomb which the tail breaks off ~~of~~ when it hits the ground. All of these bombs that he showed us were made to look like ordinary 500 pound bombs but none of them were pictured with fuzes. He told us they also had bombs which came apart in the air and the insects were scattered

in boxes to get them over a large territory before they struck the ground. He told us that these boxes would become very weak in the sunlight and the insects (flies, fleas, and mosquitoes) could crawl out. The structure of all three of the bombs he showed us was the same and they all looked like 500 pound bombs with thin casings. The first was shown split open the second with the doors in the back near the tail, and the third with the tail broken off . ~~He said if it were ever necessary~~ The bombs that open in the air are hooked up by a regular arming wire to the wing bomb racks. They have a little propeller in the nose which cannot turn before the bomb is dropped because of the arming wire. When

the bomb is dropped the arming wire stays with the airplane and the propeller is free to turn. The propeller turns a generator which supplies electricity to a small electric motor, just as the one I described. This motor first opens 3 doors in the back, just as in the other bomb, and then opens one door in the front. The wind thru the bomb is sufficient to blow the boxes out and they scatter as they fall. He showed us no pictures of this type of bomb and described it very little.

Next he described how germs could be spread. He said that almost any insect could be used for spreading germs, but he would just tell us about a few of them

In case any of these germs got back into South Korea and that would be sufficient for our own protection. He said that Boubonic Plague could be carried by rats, but it wasn't necessary for the rats themselves to be dropped, altho they could be. The germs could be dropped in anything that rats could and would get into and they would pick up the germs and carry them. The insects can most easily be dropped and these carry many germs. ~~They~~ Flies can caray Typhus and cholera and ~~so can~~ fleas can carry plague. Mosquitoes can carry fever of different types, yellow fever, typhoid fever, malaria, and encyphilitis for which no positive cure is known. Encyphylitis is also known as Japanese B and was brought to Korea first by Japanese as a desease in their own ranks very little is know about combating it and prevention

is the same as that for malaria. He said he would describe how malaria was carried and that the rest of the fevers were carried by mosquitoes in a similar way. He showed us a large picture of a mosquitoe. These mosquitoes are harmless, he said, until they have been infected with malaria either by biting someone who has malaria or, by being infected with it in the laboratory. The inner and outer tubes are both stuck into a person when bitten by the mosquitoe. The mosquitoe sucks blood up thru the inner tube and injects a form of saliva into the person thru the outer tube at the same time. If the mosquitoe is infected the germ is

carried by this saliva into the person bitten and he will get the fever. He said that the posters on the walls of the mess hall (on protecting yourself against encyphylitis) were not up there just to cover the walls.



He said that we must all follow rules of cleanliness, especially in the months to come. When we were given atabrin to take not to throw it away but to take it. He said we should all keep our innoculations up to date. If we did these things we had nothing to fear. The lecture started at 9 o'clock and was over just before 11 We all noted that germ bombs would not explode, that they would be duds.

In our regular briefing on the 31st of December the operations officer, told us to be sure and report all duds to the intellegence section at de-briefing when we returned.

On the 3rd of January I reported to Group Operations at 2 o'clock in the afternoon along with 26 other pilots, 27 navigators, 27 radio bombadiers, and 27 engineers (in some cases these engineers were gunners. In our squadron we had 3 ships which could carry gunners). My crew was Rogers 1st Lt navigator, and Sayer Sgt. as engineer. We didn't carry a radio bombadier because the weather was good. I copied off the board our route assignment which was Sariwon to Pyongyang and our time of take off which was 2:30 in the morning. The regular briefing started

The regular briefing consists of the operations officer Telling us that everything we are to hear is secret and to be treated as such – not to be discussed except among ourselves. Then the intellegence officer, ~~given~~ gave a picture of what traffic was sighted the night before and how many were damaged and destroyed. The Army liason officer explained the front line situation and the weather officer described the weather to us. Other information, winds and temperatures the navigator ~~takes~~ copied off the board. In every respect this seemed like it was to be a regular mission.

Rogers, Sayer, and myself met in group operations at 5 minutes after 1 and I went into the little room where the alert operations officer stayed at night, Capt Reynolds was on duty.

I gave him our names and he told me that I had a special mission. He said that before I did anything else I was to drop my wing bombs as Close to Pyongyang as I dared get He indicated a place on the wall map that he stuck a red pin into which was 5 miles south of Pyongyang and 3 miles east of the main highway. He said that we should then continue with our regular mission and finish it as soon as possible and report back to the intelligence section He said that I should drop the bombs from 200 ft or lower if possible and for me not to worry about them exploding that they would be duds. I asked him what it was all about, remembering the lecture we'd been given on germ bombs, but he said he didn't know a d it would be best just to do as instructed and not worry about why or what. I thought it was germ bombs.

When we went out to the airplane we were met by a guard and then I was sure they were germ bombs. He said not to worry about the wing bombs, they'd already been taken care of But I looked up at them when I was inspecting the airplane and noted that what, the navigator said "the wing bombs don't have any fuzes" was correct. We both looked at each other and I said orders are orders and we left it at that, I told him where we were to drop them and he marked it on his map.

We took off at 2:25 and arrived just south of Pyongyand at 3:30 I turned east from the road, just south of the bridge, and when we reached 200 ft Rogers said this ought to be it and I dropped the four wing bombs, one at a time, in rapid succession. They were duds. We both knew then for sure they were germ bombs.

We finished the rest of the mission by 4:15 and landed back at Kunsan at 5:10. We left the airplane and after turning in our equipment and reporting that the plane was OK we went directly to the intellegence section in group operations for de-briefing. We reported that we had dropped four bombs where we had been told at 200 ft and that they were all duds. The sgt took this down to give to intellegence that ~~next~~ morning.

On January 10th I was briefed on a regular mission as usual to fly between Kunuri and Kangye at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. My crew was Schwartz 1st Lt navigator and Sayer Sgt. engineer. Our take off time was 2 o'clock the next morning. This briefing was routine. When we reported at 12:30 to operations I went in as usual to check off our names and was told again that I had a special mission. Capt Reynolds was again on duty. He remembered that I had already had one special mission with duds so he referred to that and told me this would be the same type of mission. That this time I only had two duds and that I should drop them North-east of Kunuri and he showed me the place on the wall map which was 3 miles North of Kunuri and 5 miles east of the railroad track. Again we were met by a guard at the airplane and told that the wing bombs had been taken care of. I noticed that again the two outboard bombs had no fuzes. I told Schwartz where we were to make the special drop and we knew we had germ bombs. We took off at 2 o'clock and arrived over Kunuri at 3:25 I turned when Schwartz told me to and let down to 200 ft and dropped the bombs. They were duds.

We finished up the rest of the mission as quickly as possible and started back to Kunsan at 4:10. We landed back at Kunsan at 5:25 and after turning in our equipment and telling them the airplane was OK we went to the intellegence section in Operations and reported having dropped two duds and where we dropped them. The Sgt made a note of this to give to the intellegence.

— On the 14th of December I noticed my name on the bulletin board to attend a lecture the next morning at 9 o'clock in the ground school building. I was there at 9 o'clock in the large room with 25 other Officers, pilots and navigators. Beeson, Capt, Schmidt 1st Lt, Song Capt, Larson 1st Lt, Sand Capt, Howarth Capt, Schwartz 1st Lt, Roberts 2nd Lt, Watson 1st Lt were there. Maj Allen, base operations officer was the senior officer present and introduced the lecturer. He said that this lecture was important and secret He said that the lecturer, Mr Clark was an emminent physicist in the field of nuclear research and that he was there to explain some about atomic warfare to us. He said Mr Clark had come from Japan.

The lecturer started by saying that the science of atomic warfare had advanced a long ways since the bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The days when these bombs could only be carried by B-29's was over. Bombs of that size were now many times (he didn't say how many) as powerful as they were then. That bombs could now be made almost any size they wished to make them. He said that they had conducted experiments in the United States on what he called the "baby" atom bomb and that they were doing further work so that they could be used as artillery as well as bombs. He said that work on a mortar shell with an atomic warhead was nearly perfected for use. He said that much progress was being made on the hydrogen bomb which would be a thousand times more powerful than the types of atom bombs we now had. He said that these bombs, a single one, could completely level a city like New York. Then he told us that there were various ways of using atom bombs. They could be dropped to explode under ground and spread radio active dust over a large area. This dust is deadly to any living thing it comes in contact with and the radio activity lingers many weeks. He said that the bombs could be dropped by parachute to explode in the air as they were at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and in this way the heat and blast effect is more deadly, that the radio activity is not so persistent and most of it blows away and disperses in the air. He said that the bombs could be exploded deep under water and this could be used on cities near the coast. That it would lift most of the water out of any known port, the deeper the better, and the water would be radio active and rain down on the city. Besides that there would still be the

blast effect and a tidal wave would rush in to fill up the harbour and do much damage. He said that experimentation had been done on radio active clouds which would hold radio activity for a long time and would be deadly wherever it rained.

He said that experiments on the smaller atom weapons (bombs) had been carried out, in ~~in the~~ Nevada, United States, with troops in the fields near the blast - about 2 miles away, and that no one had been hurt. This was because the explosions had been small and proper precautions had been taken. He said that they had all been clothed well and were in deep fox holes so that their head were 2 to 3 ft below the top of

the fox hole. This was a very necessary precaution, he said, and we should understand why.

The atom bomb gives off three rays, he said. When a bomb goes off there is first very much heat created, the center of the blast is many millions of degrees, as hot as the sun, and this heat wave extends outward from a half mile to many miles depending on the size of the blast. Next there is the shock wave which is much longer in duration than a high explosive blast. And next there is the radio activity. If you are far enough away from the blast not to be killed outright the fox hole will protect you against both the heat wave and the blast effect, and also

against radio activity unless it comes in as dust or rain. The three rays given off by the atom bomb are alpha, beta, and gama. The alpha and beta only last during the explosion and if you are safe from the searing heat of the blast, then even a shirt, especially a light coloured shirt, is sufficient to keep the alpha and beta rays from burning you. Where ever you don't have clothes like hands, neck, face, that part will be burned that is facing the blast when the bomb goes off. The gama rays last for a longer time depending on the type of blast, but a fox hole is good protection against this altho clothes are not of any use. Only

lead or a thick layer of dirt will stop these gama rays which go thru everything just like X-rays and destroy the life of bones and cause blood to break down. Then he showed us pictures of how the fox holes must be dug.



He said that a half inch of lead would stop the gama rays, but it took at least two feet of dirt to stop them. They could penetrate almost two feet of dirt. The area around the blast continues to give off gamma rays because those objects which are strongly effected by the gama rays also become radio-active and give off these rays. It would be very dangerous to touch

especially metal objects which were in the near vicinity of the blast. He said that most of the radio active gamma rays are carried off in a large cloud in an air burst and dispersed by the winds. He showed us a picture of this.



He said that although after being dispersed they would not be harmful to people, that a report had come from a photographic laboratory in New York, several days after the experiments in Nevada, that much of their photographic paper showed signs of having been exposed to gamma rays. These rays had traveled in clouds all the way across the United States and exposed this

paper. He said that because of most of these rays being carried off in the radio active cloud it was quite possible to safely enter an area after an air burst provided you didn't stay too long. However, except when absolutely necessary to enter for some reason it was best to wait until trained people could go in first with giegar counters. If you must go in, he said, don't touch metal objects. He said that they had a pocket radiation detector that could be carried by everyone that would indicate when you had been in the area as long as was safe. He showed us this object which was the same size as a pack of cigarettes but only 1/8" thick. It had an opening

in the middle 1/4" high and 2" long covered with a thin piece of lead. This lead could be slid out of the way and expose the opening. Behind the lead was a piece of photographic paper which would turn drark when exposed to radio-activity. It also had on the outside a colour with which to match the coular of the paper so that when they matched you could leave the area, otherwise you would get too much radio-activity and it would be dangerous. After you go in once you can't go back again.



When you enter the area you raise the lead shield and then watch the colour of the opening and compare it to the dark colour and leave when theyre the same

Next he told us that these pocket indicators were only necessary substitutes for giegar counter which were much more accurate. The giegar counter works like a radio and when it is near radio-activity you can hear it in ear phones connected to the giegar counter. Also it has a little meter which looks like an amp meter in a car to tell how much radio activity is present. He said it was measured in radiotrons, or some term like that. Then he let each of us file up and put the earphones on and listen as he brought a piece of radioactive matrial near the giegar counter. At first the ticking was very slow but as the piece came close the ticking got very fast until it sounded like a purr, one tick mixed with the next.

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The lecture lasted from 9 o'clock to 10:30.

It is very clear from these facts that the capitalistic wall street war monger in their greed, their ruthless greed, have caused this horrible crime of Bacteriological warfare to be launched in order to get more money for themselves and in the hope of spreading this war. Even their desire to start a third world war by adding atomic warfare to their list of inhumane crimes is indicated. These imperialists will stop at nothing to get more money in their pockets and the more war the more they make. They do not care about the innocent people of the world. Surley the people of America, the workers, if they know about these crimes must condem them. The America

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workers seldom get the truth from their newspapers, magazines, and radios which are controled by the money mad wall street imperialists. These war mongers do not want the people to learn the truth or they would not permit them to carry out their war mongering inhumane crimes against the people of the world. It is very clear that they are doing these inhumane crimes to expand the war and make more profits.

I was forced to be the tool of these war mongers and made to drop germ bombs and do this awful crime against the people of Korea and the Chinese Volunteers Because I am a soldier I must follow orders and these orders came from those imperialists on wall Street. I could not refuse to

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do this crime. But on the other hand I was the person who did this inhumane crime against the people, by carrying germ bombs and dropping them where innocent women and children would be the most likely victims. This is a horrible crime against the people, even the German Nazis would not use it those people like Ilsa Koch who would make lamp shades out of human skin would not use it, but I used it for the U.S. imperialist warmongers of wall street. Since I have been captured by the Chinese Volunteers and I laid down my arms I have been treated far better than a person who had committed even much lesser crimes deserves to expect. But

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they always said after I laid down my arms that I was no longer an enemy. They explained the lenient policy toward POWs which I, braught up as I was on the propaganda lies of the Wall Street imperialists, found very difficult to understand But the Chinese Volunteers were very patient They issued me warm clothing against the cold, gave me excellent food, bedding, and a warm place to sleep. I am eternally grateful for their kind treatment. At last, after much patience on the part of the volunteers [redacted], I realized my crime. My own concience bothered me a great deal, and it is very good to be rid of this burden, to confess and repent

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I have realized my terrible crime against the people, I have done an inhume thing against innocent peace loving people. I know now how wrong this crime is, and I ask that the people can see it in their hearts to forgive me for this crime. It was a crime against all the peace loving people of the world ~~and~~ one which should surely be condemed by all peace loving people. I ask forgiveness from all people who want peace because my crime has been against them.

John Quinn
13 April 1952

The following comment was made by a leading authority in China on tropical and infectious diseases, Dr. Huei-Lan Chung, M.D. (P.U.M.C.—University of the State of New York); D.T.M. (certificate), University of London; formerly Fellow of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, London; formerly Research Fellow in the Tropical Institute, Hamburg, Germany; formerly member of the Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine, U.S.A.; Clinical Professor of Internal Medicine at the Chinese Union Medical College (formerly P.U.M.C.) and Peking University Medical College. —Interrogator.

"The accepted vectors of rickettsial diseases are lice, fleas, ticks and mites. So far as known, flies do not transmit typhus fever as they do not normally carry pathogenic rickettsiae. The transmission of typhoid fever requires no insect vector except flies which may serve as mechanical carriers of various virulent microorganisms on account of their habitual contact with fecal matter. Certainly mosquitoes are not vectors of typhoid fever. Some of the statements given by this prisoner concerning the transmission of infectious diseases are not consistent with current medical knowledge. However, the prisoner in question, not being a medical man, cannot be expected to know or remember everything about disease transmissions. Thus it is also natural that he spelled and wrote *'encyphilitis'* for encephalitis."

WOUNDED U.S. POW MARVIN L. BROWN CONFESSES THAT U.S. ARMED FORCES ARE USING GERM SHELLS

U.S. POW Marvin L. Brown, (Serial No. RA 18397178), PFC, U.S. 3rd Division, 7th Infantry Regiment, King Company, 3rd Platoon, confesses that, in April, 1951, in Hawaii and in July, 1951, in Yokohama, Japan, he was shown a secret U.S. training film on "the use of germ artillery shell". He also confesses that, in the latter part of February, 1952, Cpl. Edward Barron told him that U.S. 65th Infantry Regiment "had fired germ shells to the Chinese line" (the positions of the Chinese People's Volunteers).





Regarding the questions raised by the Press, I wish to state the following:

1) My name is Kenneth L Enoch, First Lieutenant in the US Air Force. My serial number is Ao-2069988.

I was born on the 14th of January, 1925, in Washington, Pennsylvania. At present, I am living in Youngstown, Ohio, 18 South Osborne Street, with my mother, brother, sister, and brother-in-law. I graduated from High School in January, 1943, worked in a steel mill and joined the US Army Air Force on June 7, 1943. After training in basic, gunnery and navigation, I was trained as a B-24 navigator at Casper, Wyoming and Langley Field, Virginia. I served in China and Okinawa during World War II, flying twenty-one missions. After leaving the service in 1947, I worked in different steel mills and had two years at College. Then I took a job with an electric

all in B-26s. … against supply routes— … highways, bridges, railroad yards and … I had thirty ordinary missions and two germ bombing missions.

2) On our last flight, on the night of January 13, 1952, I flew with First Lieutenant Quinn as pilot, Lt. Downes as SHORAN operator

… People's Volunteers … The airplane had crashed, and was burning about half a mile away. I was told Lieutenant Quinn had also landed safely. I met him at Pyongyang on the last day of January.

First Lieutenant Roy … Zielinski, … Ronald Brown, Second Lieutenant Larry … Second Lieutenant John Larson, First Lieutenant Charles Garvin and Captain Kenneth Carson, apart from myself.

… poisoning the water used by … beings and animals. You could also drop germ-laden articles such as leaflets, fountain pens, clothing, food, et cetera.

in Kunsan … warfare, given by Major … and Education officer.

4) I have had two germ bomb missions.

… the 7th of January … Captain Amos and I … Operations Office to see if any … been made in our orders. This is a … procedure. At this time, Captain Robert Stuart of Group Operations gave us a secret change in orders. He explained that we were to drop two germ bombs at Hwangju. He told us that the two outboard wing bombs ~~of our plane~~ were germ bombs to be dropped at Hwangju at a maximum altitude of five hundred feet and a maximum airspeed of two hundred miles per hour. He said that the bombs

We took off at 0200 … to Hwangju. In the Sariwon area we let down to five hundred feet and at two hundred miles per hour airspeed, we dropped the two germ bombs at the western edge of Hwangju at 0300 hours. I recorded them as "two five hundred pound duds". We proceeded five miles northward and

… were to drop germ bombs. This time we were to drop four germ bombs at Chunghwa. The bombs were to be carried on both the outboard and inboard racks and as before they were to be

At debriefing … at Chunghwa and our six … as duds at Chunghwa … bombs on the railway and highway north of Hwangju.

5) After having been brought to the POW camp, I have received good treatment. I have received

… People's Army and the … Volunteers have adopted a correct and noble attitude.

Kenneth L Enoch
6 May 1952

The Joint Interrogation Group of Korean and Chinese Specialists and News Correspondents Interrogating K. L. Enoch

NOTE ON THE JOINT INTERROGATION GROUP OF KOREAN AND CHINESE SPECIALISTS AND NEWS CORRESPONDENTS

In order to find out all the details concerning the dropping of bacteria bombs in Korea, the Joint Interrogation Group of Korean and Chinese Specialists and News Correspondents was organized in April 1952 under the auspices of the Korean National Peace Committee and the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace. The Group interrogated 1st Lt. Kenneth L. Enoch, navigator of the U.S. Air Force, and 1st Lt. John Quinn, pilot of the U.S. Air Force, who were captured by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers on January 13, 1952. The Group began its work in a POWs camp at a certain place in Korea on May 1, and accomplished its task on May 10.

Interrogation of U.S. POW Kenneth L. Enoch

KENNETH L. ENOCH

Record of the interrogation of Kenneth L. Enoch conducted by the Joint Interrogation Group of Korean and Chinese Specialists and News Correspondents on May 6, 1952.

Q. Please give us a brief account of yourself before you were captured.

A. My name is Kenneth L. Enoch, First Lieutenant in the US Air Force. My serial number is AO-2069988.

I was born on the 14th of January, 1925, in Washington, Penna. At present, I am living in 18 South Osborne Street, Youngstown, Ohio, with my mother, brother, sister and brother-in-law. I graduated from high school in January, 1943, worked in a steel mill and joined the US Army Air Force on June 7, 1943. After training in basic gunnery and navigation, I was trained as a B-24 navigator at Casper, Wyoming, and Langley Field, Virginia. I served in China and Okinawa during World War II, flying twenty-one missions. After leaving the service in 1947, I worked in different steel mills and had two years at college. Then I took a job with an electric power company from which I was recalled to active duty for the Korean War.

I was sent to the Far East in the middle of August, 1951, arriving in Korea on September 1. My base was Kunsan. My outfit was the 8th Bomber Squadron, Lt. Col. Leahy commanding, Third Bomber Group, Colonel Morgan commanding, Third Bomber Wing, Colonel Ohman commanding—all of the Fifth Air Force.

I have flown thirty-two missions in Korea, all in B-26's. Our missions were primarily against supply routes—vehicles, trains, highways, bridges, railroad yards and airfields. I had thirty ordinary missions and two germ bombing missions.

Q. When, where and how were you captured?

A. On our last flight, on the night of January 13, 1952, I flew with First Lieutenant Quinn as pilot, Lieutenant Downes as SHORAN operator and Sergeant Campbell as engineer. I was navigator. We flew in B-26 No. 600 and were briefed to bomb the railroad yards at Chongju. We took off from Kunsan at 2145 hours and at 2330 hours we were over the target where we were hit by anti-aircraft fire at an altitude of 1,500 feet. We began to lose height rapidly and at 2335 hours I bailed out, approximately ten miles northwest of Sunan. I left the plane at an approximate altitude of 1,500 feet and due to the fact that I could not find my ripcord, my parachute opened at about fifty feet from the ground. Almost instantaneously, I hit the ground where I removed my parachute. My first thought was to escape, but the terrain made this impossible and I was soon surrounded by members of a Chinese People's Volunteers Unit. The airplane had crashed, and was burning about half a mile away. I was told Lieutenant Quinn had also landed safely. I met him at Pyongyang on the last day of January.

Q. When and how did you receive your bacterial warfare training?

A. On August 25, 1951, from one o'clock to three o'clock in the afternoon I attended a lecture given at the Ground School at Iwakune, Japan. This lecture was on bacterial warfare and was given by a civilian, Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson emphasized that this lecture was highly secret and we were not to divulge its contents to anyone. The lecture was attended by about twenty-five personnel, ten pilots and fifteen navigators. Of the pilots I recall First Lieutenant Guy Broughton, Captain Frank Lemak and First Lieutenant Eldon Schmidt. Among the navigators I remember First Lieutenant Emmett Hardy, First Lieutenant Roy DeGaugh, First Lieutenant Ronald Brown, Second Lieutenant Larry Zielinski, Second Lieutenant John Larson, First Lieutenant Charles Garvin and Captain Kenneth Carson, apart from myself.

Mr. Wilson talked on various weapons of bacterial warfare. He mentioned that you could carry bombs that looked quite like ordinary bombs but which were filled with insects and germs and would open on contact with the ground, to release their cargo. You could carry not only these regular bombs but also cardboard containers which would carry germs and insects and also burst open on contact with the ground. You could drop parachute contrainers containing small animals, rodents, et cetera, to carry germs and insects. These small animals could also be released from ship to shore behind the enemy lines. Another method is to spray germ-laden dust directly from an aircraft. You can also drop germs in containers on lakes, rivers, reservoirs poisoning the water used by human beings and animals. You could also drop germ-laden articles such as leaflets, fountain pens, clothing, food, et cetera.

The germs of typhoid, typhus, cholera, smallpox, bubonic plague, malaria, yellow fever, encephalitis, dysentery and many others may be employed. Such insects as flies, fleas, mosquitoes, lice and many others may be used to carry the germs. Also small animals such as rats and small game may be used to carry these germs and insects, such as rats carry plague bearing fleas.

Q. Please tell us in detail about your germ bombing missions.

A. I have had two germ bomb missions.

On January 6, 1952, at 1400 hours, I attended a briefing at the Third Bomber Group Briefing Room at Kunsan. We were briefed by Captain Gilbert Carey, Group Briefing Officer. There were twenty-four crews to fly that night. Our crew, Captain William Amos, pilot, Sergeant Richard Tracy, gunner, and I were briefed to fly our mission on Green 8 Route, between Pyongyang and Sariwon. Our takeoff time was to be 4000, the 7th of January.

At 0200 hours, January 7, Captain Amos and I reported to Group Operations Officer to see if any changes had been made in our orders. This is a usual procedure. At this time, Captain Robert Stuart of Group Operations gave us a secret change in orders. He explained that we were to drop two germ bombs at Hwangju. He told us that the two outboard wing bombs were germ bombs to be dropped at Hwangju at a maximum altitude of five hundred feet and a maximum airspeed of two hundred miles per hour. He said that the bombs were already loaded and checked for us and that after we dropped the two germ bombs we were to get rid of the rest of our load as quickly as possible and return immediately to base. We were to report at debriefing that these two germ bombs were "duds" in order to maintain secrecy.

We picked up Sergeant Tracy at Squadron Operations and proceeded to the plane, B-26 No. 247. There was a guard from Armament Section at the aircraft, and he told us not to bother the wing bombs as they were already checked for us, which we already knew. This was very unusual, since we never had guards for ordinary missions. I checked the six regular five-hundred-pound bombs in the bomb bay. Besides the two germ bombs on the outboard wing racks there were two regular five-hundred-pound bombs on the inboard wing racks.

We took off at 0300 hours and went directly to Hwangju. In the Sariwon area we let down to five hundred feet and at two hundred miles per hour airspeed, we dropped the two germ bombs at the western edge of Hwangju at 0400 hours. I recorded them as "two five-hundred-pound duds." We proceeded five miles northward and regained about 1,500 feet altitude and dropped the regular bombs on the highways close together. Normally approximately 1,200 feet is regarded as the minimum dropping altitude for five-hundred-pound bombs.

We returned to Kunsan at 0500 hours. At debriefing after the mission, we reported to the enlisted man from Group Intelligence. Apart from routine matters we reported that we had dropped "two five-hundred-pound duds" at Hwangju and eight five-hundred-pound bombs north of Hwangju on the highway and railroad.

On the 10th of January, I was again scheduled with Captain Amos and Sergeant Tracy on plane 247, Green 8 Route. We were due to take off at 0300 hours next morning. At 0200 hours, January 11, Captain Amos and I reported to Group Operations Office and again we were told that we were to drop germ bombs. This time we were to drop four germ bombs at Chunghwa. The bombs were to be carried on both the outboard and inboard racks and as before they were to be checked for us. The rest of the information we received at this time was the same as on the 6th of January and from the same briefing officer. We took off at 0300 hours and in the Sariwon area we let down to one thousand feet. We proceeded north of Chunghwa and let down to five hundred feet, several miles from Chunghwa coming over the town at an altitude of five hundred feet at an airspeed of one hundred and ninety miles per hour, we dropped four germ bombs in the western sector of Chunghwa at 0410 hours and proceeded south to the point on the highway and railway five miles north of Hwangju where we dropped our remaining bombs at fifteen hundred feet.

We returned to Kunsan at 0515 hours. At debriefing we reported the four germ bombs as "duds" at Chunghwa and our six remaining bombs on the railway and highway north of Hwangju.

Q. What was the treatment you received after you were brought to the POWs Camp? What are your feelings about this?

A. After having been brought to the POWs Camp, I have received good treatment. I have received warm clothing, good food of adequate quantity, medical treatment, tobacco, sugar, special meals on holidays, toilet articles and many other kindnesses. Now that the warm weather has come, I have received summer clothing.

I feel that this treatment I received is humane and very reasonable and the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers have adopted a correct and noble attitude.

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* The assigned number of the bomber has 5 digits. 247 being the last digits.



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To the many questions put to me by the Korean and Chinese Correspondents, I have summarized my answers in the following form:

1. My name is John Silas Quinn, born in Pittsburg, Kansas, on April 16, 1922. I am now a 1st/Lt in the U.S. Air Force, serial number 17993A. My family's address is 1090 North Marengo Avenue, Pasadena, California.

In May 1939, I joined an inactive reserve unit of the U.S. Marine Corps in Pasadena. I joined the Air Force in February, 1948. After I graduated from Aviation Cadets in February, 1949, I was assigned to the Air University, Craig Air Force Base, Alabama. I was with the Air University till August 25, 1951, when I was called to Langley Air Base, Virginia for B-26 combat crew training. I came to Japan on 27 November, to Kunsan Korea on December 1, 1951. I was assigned to the 8th Squadron, 3rd Bomber Group, 3rd Bomber Wing.

2. Well, I was shot down in the same plane as 1st/Lt Enoch on January 13, this year. After I was captured, I was treated in a friendly way by the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers. They have always given me everything they were able to get under the circumstances. I have learned to respect

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John Quinn
May 8, 1952

The Joint Interrogation Group of Korean and Chinese Specialists and News Correspondents Interrogating John Quinn.



JOHN SILAS QUINN

Interrogation of U.S. POW John Quinn

Record of the interrogation of John Quinn conducted by the Joint Interrogation Group of Korean and Chinese Specialists and News Correspondents on May 8, 1952.

Q. Please give a brief account of yourself up to the time you arrived in Korea.

A. My name is John Silas Quinn, born in Pittsburg, Kansas, on April 16, 1922. I am now a 1st Lieutenant in the US Air Force, serial number 17993A. My family's address is 1090 North Marengo Avenue, Pasadena, California.

In May 1939, I joined an inactive reserve unit of the US Marine Corps in Pasadena. I joined the US Air Force in February, 1948. After I graduated from Aviation Cadets in February, 1949, I was assigned to the Air University, Craig Air Force Base, Alabama. I was with the Air University till August 25, 1951, when I was called to Langley Air Base, Virginia for B-25 combat crew training. I came to Japan on 27 November, and to Kunsan, Korea on December 1, 1951. I was assigned to 8th Squadron, 3rd Bomber Group of 3rd Bomber Wing.

Q. How were you treated after you were shot down?

A. Well, I was shot down in the same plane as 1st Lieutenant Enoch, on January 13, this year. After I was captured, I was treated in a friendly way by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. They have always given me everything they were able to get under the circumstances. I have learned to respect the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers for the way they have treated their POWs.

Q. How many times have you received bacterial warfare training? When and where? Who were the lecturers, what were the contents and who attended?

A. On December 18, 1951, in the Ground School Building at Kunsan, together with about 19 other airmen, I attended a lecture given by Mr. Ashfork. Among those present were pilots, Capt. Cary Land, Capt. Howarth, Capt. Schmidt, Capt. Robertson, Capt. Beeson and 1st Lieutenant McAllister and navigators, Capt. Long, Capt. Duffy, 1st Lieutenant John Larson, 1st Lieutenant Schwartz, 1st Lieutenant William Watson, 1st Lieutenant Rogers, and 2nd Lieutenant Bob Roberts. We were told the lecture was very important and top secret. We shouldn't discuss the contents even among ourselves. Ashfork had just come from Japan and knew the subject very well.

Ashfork said that research had opened up an unlimited field in bacteriological warfare, that this type of warfare was not only capable of destroying human life but also animal life and crops. Almost any insect could be used in germ warfare and they could be selectively bred for many of their generations under laboratory conditions to endure cold and starvation. A wide range of germs could be employed and for some of them no treatment has yet been found.

Germ warfare, Ashfork said, could be conducted in many ways but as we were flying B-26's, he would talk more about germ bombs. He then described four types of germ bombs, one of which had three small doors in the back near where the bomb curves back to the tail fin and one door at the front. The three back doors opened by a small electric motor as the bomb dropped and then the one at the front would open so that the wind blowing through would scatter small insect-filled boxes. These boxes, according to Ashfork would become very fragile in the sun and allow the insects out. All the bombs looked like five-hundred-pound bombs but with a very thin shell and without fuses. Ashfork said, "Of course these bombs would not explode, they would be duds."

Q. How many times have you dropped germ bombs, when and where? What were the names of your crew members? How do you know that the bombs you dropped were germ bombs?

A. I dropped germ bombs twice. On January 4, I dropped four germ bombs near Pyongyang. The crew members were myself as pilot, Lt. Rogers navigator and Sgt. Sayer engineer. On January 11, I dropped two more germ bombs, three miles north of Kunuri. The crew apart from myself was Lt. Schwartz navigator and Sgt. Sayer engineer.

I was sure they were germ bombs because:

a. The B-26 crews had a special briefing by Group Operations Officer on December 31, where we were told from then on we should specially report to Intelligence Section at debriefing details of all duds dropped.

b. Also when I checked at the duty officer's room at Operations an hour before my flights on January 4 and 11, I was told to drop my wing bombs at a height of about 200 feet and airspeed 200 miles per hour.

c. When I pointed out to the duty officer Capt. Reynolds that the plane would be blown to bits if we dropped 500-pound bombs from that altitude, he said not to worry as the bombs were duds and wouldn't explode.

d. When I went to the plane to check the bomb load, on each occasion it was guarded by guards who told the navigator and myself not to worry about the wing bombs as they had already been checked. Ordinarily there were no guards and the bombs were checked by the crew members.

e. I noticed the first time that four wing bombs, the second time two wing bombs, had no fuses so they could not be ordinary bombs.

f. The germ bombs we dropped on January 4 and 11 corresponded exactly to one of those described by Ashfork only two weeks previously.

g. In discussions with other pilots and navigators in the house where we lived, I found that several of them had been given so-called special missions and had even been told by the briefing officer that the duds are in fact—germ bombs.

Q. Who else do you know has dropped germ bombs?

A. The others that I know personally as having dropped germ bombs, are Kenneth L. Enoch, Jack Larson, Schmidt, and Francis Duffy. I know that these people dropped germ bombs because they lived in the same house as I did and we talked about germ bomb missions. Enoch dropped a total of six germ bombs on January 7 and 11. Jack Larson four on January 4, Schmidt four on January 7 and Duffy four on January 5. As to whether there are others who have dropped germ bombs, I don't know, because it is a matter of such high secrecy.

PRISONER OF WAR F. B. O'NEAL (U.S. AIR FORCE) ADMITTED THAT HE HAD DROPPED GERM-LADEN BOMBS IN KOREA

Floyd Breland O'Neal, aged 24, a U.S. prisoner of war of Fairfax, South Carolina, U.S.A., is a second lieutenant of the U.S. Air Force (Serial No. AO-1848575). He received air training in the U.S. Air Force in August 1950. He arrived in Korea on Jan. 16, 1952, and was assigned to the 67th Fighter-Bomber Squadron of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Group. His plane was shot down by the anti-aircraft fire of the Chinese People's Volunteers west of Sinmak at 9:15 a.m. on March 4, and then he was captured. According to his own written confession, he dropped two bacteria bombs in Sibyon Ri, Korea, on February 15, 1952.

Members of the International Scientific Commission Interrogating U.S. POW F. B. O'Neal (the first man on the right).

The Confession Written by Floyd Breland O'Neal Is Reproduced Below:

My Testimony

How I Was Ordered to Participate in the Germ Warfare Waged by the American Forces in Korea

I am Floyd Breland O'Neal, a second lieutenant in the United States Air Force Reserve, AO-1848575. I am 24 years old and my home address is Box 66, Moye Avenue, Fairfax, South Carolina. I have not married yet and have only my mother, one sister, and four brothers. I attended The Citadel college at Charleston, South Carolina, from September 1945 to June 1948, receiving a B. S. degree and a commission as a second lieutenant through the Reserve Officers Training Corps. In September 1948 I attended Tulane University in New Orleans, Louisiana, where I held a position as a graduate assistant in chemistry, which was to supervise the freshmen in their chemical laboratory work and to grade papers for the freshmen, and worked on my Master's degree at the same time. I graduated from Tulane in June 1950, receiving an M. S. degree in physical chemistry.

I was then recalled into the service and chose flying training in August 1950. I reported to Randolph Air Force Base at San Antonio, Texas on August 24, 1950, and received my basic pilot training there until March 19, 1951. I received advanced pilot training at Craig AFB at Selma, Alabama in F-51s from April 3, 1951 to September 15, 1951. I was then assigned from Craig to the gunnery school at Luke AFB at Phoenix, Arizona. On December 1, 1951, I received a secret lecture on bacteriological warfare at this school. I finished my gunnery training on December 15, 1951 and reported to Camp Stoneman, California on January 3, 1952, and waited for overseas shipment there. I received tetanus, typhoid, cholera and smallpox shots at Camp Stoneman before I left the States.

I left Camp Stoneman on January 10, 1952 and arrived at Haneda AFB at Tōkyo Japan on January 12, 1952. I was taken to Foochow Area B for further assignment and on January 16, 1952 I left Japan from Tachikawa AFB for K-10 at Chinhae, Korea which is the rear base for the 18th Fighter Bomber Group. At K-10 I was assigned to the 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 18th Fighter Bomber Group. On January 19, 1952 I was sent to K-46, the advance base of the 18th Fighter Bomber Group which is located about 5 miles north of Wonju, to be checked out in combat operations. I was assigned to Stem Flight in the 67th Squadron and received lectures on group and squadron policies such as the types of formations used, the discipline expected, and the rest leave policy. I received two orientation flights at K-46, one a solo flight to familiarize myself with the area, and the second a formation flight carrying a full load of armament, which was dropped in the ocean off the east coast of Korea. I was then called "combat ready".

I received a lecture on bacteriological warfare on January 22, 1952 at K-46. My flight, Stem flight, was on rest leave at the time in Japan and I had to wait for their return before I began flying missions. I flew my first mission on January 28, 1952. We were flying F-51 aircraft, or Mustangs. I flew my first and only germ warfare mission on February 15, 1952. I was ill with pneumonia from February 20, 1952 to February 29, 1952, being sent to the hospital at K-10 on February 22nd. I began flying missions again on March 3rd. On March 4th I was shot down by antiaircraft fire on my 13th mission west of Sinmak at approximately 09:15. I was captured immediately by members of the Chinese People's Volunteers.

I Attended a Secret Lecture on Bacteriological Warfare at Luke Air Force Base

The secret lecture at Luke AFB on bacteriological warfare was given on December 1, 1951 in the base theater to all of the gunnery school students. There were about 70 students present, 40 from the F-84 squadron and 30 from the F-51 squadron. The lecture was held at 15:00 hours and lasted for approximately half an hour or until 15:30 hours. Among those gunnery students present beside myself, so far as I can remember, were Captain William Pohner, 1/Lt. Joe Young, 2/Lt. Frank Charette, 2/Lt. Allen Bettis, 2/Lt. John Yingling, 2/Lt. W. C. Sankey, 2/Lt. Mel Souza, 2/Lt. R. L. Michael, 2/Lt. R. S. Greyell, 2/Lt. Jack Cook, 2/Lt. John Shelander, 2/Lt. Rick Canady and 2/Lt. Jack Shepard. All of the officers were assigned to the Far East at that time, and of them 2/Lts Yingling, Sankey, Souza, Greyell, Michael and Shepard are already in Korea, all assigned to the 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 18th Fighter Bomber Group.

The lecture was given by Major Bethel W. Williams, an Air Force major. He was introduced before his talk by the base information and education officer, a captain whose name I do not remember now. The captain said that the major came to Luke from Washington especially to give this lecture about once a month to the new gunnery students assigned to Luke who had not received the lecture previously. Major Williams was assigned to Headquarters, USAF. I imagine he was under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. The major was about 5 ft 7 in tall, looked to be around 34 years old, and had a deep voice. He was of average build and had a slightly protruding stomach.

The major began his talk by telling us that the topic and contents of his lecture were classified as secret information, and that what he said was to go no farther than the four walls of the theater. He stated that the purpose of his giving this lecture was to introduce the subject of bacteriological warfare to us and to give us general knowledge so that we would have a foundation in the subject and it would not be new to us if it were ever brought up again. He then began his lecture.

He said that bacteriological warfare could be waged in two ways: (1) by the ground forces using bacteriological artillery shells, and (2) by the Air Force dropping germ bombs, these germ bombs containing either bacteria or bacteria-infected insects. He said that the Air Force could deliver more bacteria in one germ bomb than the ground forces could deliver in many germ shells; also that the range of the artillery was limited to the front lines or relatively close to them while the Air Force could deliver their germ bombs far behind the front lines and deep into enemy territory. Thus the artillery germ shells would be directed against enemy front line troops while the germ bombs would be used against reserve troop concentrations behind the front lines and against enemy towns and cities.

The major said that the danger to artillerymen and crews of the aircraft carrying the germ shells and germ bombs was very small - none, in fact, unless there was an accident, such as accidentally dropping the germ shells and germ bombs and the bacteria or bacteria-infested insects were allowed to escape and contaminate the area. He said that these germ shells and germ bombs were prepared and handled by special crews who had been trained for this type of work. He said that an anti-toxin had been developed for each type of bacteria so that our men were safe from the danger of catching any of the diseases used in this type of warfare.

The major told us that bacteria are grown in our special laboratories in culture mediums, each type of bacteria requiring a certain culture medium and special conditions of temperature and humidity for growth. He told us that the insects and rodents used for bacteriological warfare were chosen from among those known to medical science to be carriers of diseases, such as flies, fleas, lice, ticks, gnats, mosquitoes, spiders and rats. The insects and rodents are also grown in our special laboratories at Aberdeen, Maryland.

Major Williams said that special cold-withstanding bacteria and insects had been developed for use in bacteriological warfare in cold climates. The bacteria are made to withstand cold by acclimatization. The bacteria are placed in air baths and the temperature and humidity lowered small amounts at a time, allowing the bacteria to become used to the change before lowering the temperature and humidity again. In this manner, the bacteria would become used to colder and colder climates. After each change only the strongest bacteria are used for the next lowering of the temperature and humidity.

The cold-withstanding insects are obtained by cross-breeding. One insect which is a disease carrier will be cross-bred with a similar insect which is used to a cold climate. The offspring is then cross-bred with an insect used to the cold climate, and by continuing this cross-breeding an insect can be obtained which will have the desired disease carrying characteristics as well as being used to a cold climate.

The major said that such research on bacteria and insects done on this project was extensive, and also expensive, but that this research had given the United States forces the desired bacteriological weapons. He told us that most of this research was being done by the Chemical Corps and the Army Ordnance Department in the so-called "Special Project". The Army Ordnance Department has large laboratories at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. Most of the work done at Aberdeen is done by men in the Army who are specialists in the various fields. Scientific workers in the Civil Service also work here and leading scientists of the nation are available for consultation. The Army Ordnance Department will design the germ bombs in cooperation with the Air Force, the Air Force supplying the qualifications and specifications and the Army doing the actual designing and construction work on the germ bombs.

The major told us the common types of bacteria used for bacteriological warfare such as typhoid fever, typhus fever, cholera, bubonic plague, malaria fever, dysentary, yellow fever, etc. These diseases are not necessarily fatal, but all are serious illness-causing bacteria. The persons catching these will become very ill and unless prompt medical care is obtained, many will die. If an epedimic could be started among the troops or the civilian population, much damage would be done. Those troops affected would be useless as far as battle is concerned and the civilian population affected would be able to do no work. The medical facilities of the enemy would be heavily burdened and conditions in general would be bad. The major pointed out that morale would be especially low and that this would also help weaken the enemy forces, both on the front lines and in the rear areas.

The major had a few notes before him which he would briefly refer to on occasion, apparently an outline, so that he would cover his subject thoroughly and in the same manner each time. He said that he was going from Luke to Nellis AFB at Las Vegas, Nevada, to give the lecture at the gunnery school there. He again reminded us of the secret nature of the lecture and then he dismissed us at 15:30 hours. On the way to ground school at Luke we were wondering why we had received such a lecture. We all felt surprised at the nature of the lecture.

Captain McLaughlin's Lecture on Germ Warfare

The lecture on bacteriological warfare at K-46 was given by Captain McLaughlin on January 22, 1952 in the small debriefing room behind group operation. The other pilots present besides myself were 2/Lt. Pete Hibley, 2/Lt. Jim Horsley, and 2/Lt. R. S. Greyell. We were returning to

our tent when we were told that Capt. McLaughlin was looking for us. The four of us went into the group operations building and Capt. McLaughlin took us into a small debriefing room in the rear of the building. This was at 14:00 hours. Capt. McLaughlin is the group intelligence officer. I don't know his initials, but we usually called him "Captain Mac". He is about 5 ft 10 in tall, around 30 years old, and has black hair which is beginning to turn gray.

The lecture had been given previously to all of the pilots in the group and we received it then because we were new arrivals. The room was about 8 by 10 ft in size, with a table and chairs and a blackboard on the wall at one end of the room. We were told to make ourselves comfortable and to smoke if we wished. The captain then told us that even though our regular missions were classified "secret", we could discuss them among ourselves and tell each other what we had done. However, we were not to mention the subject he was about to bring up to anyone at all, and we must not discuss the subject even among ourselves. He told us that it was "top secret" and stressed the fact that we should never discuss it with anyone. He said that what he was about to tell us was a new subject to us and that we should pay close attention to what he was saying. He then began the lecture dealing with germ warfare.

The captain did not have any notes with him and did not refer to any during the lecture. It was apparent that he was thoroughly familiar with the subject and had received training in it. I imagine that he received his training at Aberdeen, Maryland. The intelligence school in Washington, D.C. is fairly close

to Aberdeen. I did not ever hear the background of Captain McLaughlin discussed, so I cannot state positively where he received his training.

He said that there were two general types of germ bombs: (1) air burst type and (2) parachute type. The parachute type were used for dropping insects infected with bacteria and the air burst type were used for dropping bacteria. It is also possible to spray germs and insects from aircraft, as well as to drop various infected articles such as leaflet, papers, etc. Our group was using the air-burst type of germ bombs and spraying at that time.

The air-burst germ bombs, Capt. McLaughlin said, are the same size as a regular 500 lb. bomb, only they weigh about 150 to 200 lbs. These bombs are especially made for this purpose. They contain jelly-like materials in which the bacteria are living. The bomb will contain enough explosive powder to scatter the jelly but not too much, as too much would kill the bacteria. The bomb would have a regular air-burst or variable time, "VT", fuse which would explode the bomb about 50 to 100 ft above the ground. The bombs have to be dropped at least 5000 ft. above the ground as this distance is necessary for the VT fuse to properly arm itself so that it will explode at the proper height.

The captain said that the types of bacteria which could be in these germ bombs were typhus, typhoid, cholera, dysentary, and bubonic plague. Insects are not used in these air-burst bombs because of the danger of the insects being killed by the explosion. The VT-fuse is set up so that if it does not have time to properly arm itself and explode in the air, it will explode upon contact with the ground. These germ bombs have a lighter casing or outer shell than the regular bombs, that is, the outside is thinner, so that they can easily burst when the explosive charge is set off. The germ bombs


small propellor to arm the fuse
VT fuse
explosive to scatter the germs
About 100 lbs of jelly containing the bacteria
weight: 200 lbs
length: 3 ft
width: 1½ ft
outside casing is 1/4 of an inch thick

Air Burst Type of Germ Bomb

are brought in and are handled by a special crew from the armament section. At K-46 the germ bombs are kept in a concrete underground shelter in a barbed-wire enclosure in the bomb dump next to the loading area. The germ bombs are placed on the planes by the special crew from the armament section.

The captain told us that in the event of engine trouble on the way to the target, if we were south of the bomb line or in friendly territory, we should drop the germ bombs in an uninhabited area. We were to circle the place where we dropped the bombs and call a radar station for a "fix" or the exact location of the place where the bombs were dropped. The radar stations can give us the exact location and we were to report this position immediately to group operations so that men could be sent to this spot to remove the bombs so that our forces will not be exposed to danger. We were to drop the bombs unarmed. (Normally, a bomb is armed by the pilot, who will push two electrical switches in the cockpit if he wishes the bombs to explode.) If we were north of the bomb line or in enemy territory, we were to

drop the germ bombs armed and report the location where they were dropped if it was different from the assigned target area.

The captain said that we should do our best in aiming the germ bombs so that none would be wasted and so that the targets would be hit correctly. He said that the germ bombs were expensive and hence the necessity for wasting as few as possible. We would be using the germ bombs over towns or over areas which had large troop concentrations in them, as the bombs would be most effective if dropped very close to human beings. The germs could thus contaminate food and water supplies as well as being scattered over the people and their clothes. The captain told us that we should not act suspiciously when we went out to our aircraft to fly a mission with germ bombs, but to act normally, as if nothing unusual were happening.

Captain McLaughlin then briefly explained the parachute germ bombs and how they worked. These parachute type germ bombs were used for dropping bacteria-infected insects rather than germs. The bomb would have some sort of device to release the insects when the bomb touched the ground. The parachute germ bombs had no fuses and no explosive powder. The method of releasing the bacteria-infected insects, when only one type of insect



Parachute Germ-Infected Insects Bomb
(for one type of insects inside)

was used in the bomb, was for the bomb to split into two sections when it touched the ground. The parachute would be released at the same time so that it would not cover the insects and trap them under it. When the germ bomb touched the ground the switch in the nose would start the small electric motor, which would unfasten the latches and allow the two sections of the bomb to fall apart. The motor would also pull the pin out of the parachute harness, allowing the parachute to be blown away by the wind.

If the germ-infected insect bombs contained more than one type of insects, they could be separated by pasteboard partitions inside the bomb. Then when the bomb touched the ground there would be a small door in each section which would open to release the insects.



Parachute Germ-Infected Insect Bomb
(Door type with four sections)

When the bomb touched the ground the switch would start the motor, which would open the doors to release the insects, and at the same time release the parachute pin, allowing the parachute to fall free. At this point we were given a ten minute rest to get a coke.

The captain then explained the set-up used for spraying germs or insects. The apparatus for spraying was mounted in the rear end of the aircraft. The fuselage gasoline tank which is normally behind the pilot

would have to be removed in order to insert the container which was to hold the germs or the germ-infected insects. This would be a special aircraft which would be used only for spraying purposes. A special crew would handle the cans of germs or insects to get them into the container of the spraying aircraft.


pilot
small door
safety cap
pipe, about 8 in. in diameter and 15 to 20 ft. long
spraying container about 3 ft. high, 2 ft. wide, capacity of about 7000 insects or 100 lbs. of germ jelly
lever in cockpit for pilot to operate the spraying mechanism

Spraying Mechanism in the Special Aircraft

"To start spraying, the captain continued, the pilot pushes the lever in the cockpit. This lever will open the can of insects or germs, open the door to the spraying pipe and push up the safety cap to allow the insects or germs to be sprayed out the rear end of the pipe. The spray nozzle on the end of the pipe, under the safety cap, would be removed for spraying insects as the insects could not escape through the small holes in the nozzle.


spray nozzle, at the end of the spraying pipe, with small holes to spray germs out.

The germs would come in tin cans while the insects would come in cans with tin sides and screen or cloth ends so that the insects could breathe. The safety cap on the end of the pipe is closed by the lever in the cockpit so that no germs or insects

remaining in the pipe can escape after the aircraft lands. After landing the pilot would taxi to a special area for the aircraft to be sterilized by a special crew. The pilot himself would go in and change clothes and bathe himself immediately. His clothes would be sterilized. When an aircraft which had been on a spraying mission landed, there would be a truck equipped with a sprayer to follow the plane and spray the ground behind the aircraft with a disinfectant to safeguard the base.

The captain went on to say that the jelly with germs would be diluted with water or some other solvent, as the jelly itself could not be sprayed for it is too thick. The aircraft used for spraying the germs or germ-infected insects would be restricted to fighter type aircraft as they are the most maneuverable at low altitudes. The altitude used for spraying would be 500 to 1000 ft above the ground. The airspeed used for spraying germs or germ-infected insects would be 350 miles per hour for the former and 200 miles per hour for the latter. F-51s, F-80s, F-84s, or F-86s could be used for germ or bacteria-infected insect spraying missions. In the event of engine trouble, the pilot was to land at the closest friendly airfield. If the engine quit anywhere, the pilot was to bail out and let the aircraft crash and burn, as the fire would destroy the insects or germs. This type of mission would usually be flown by two aircraft, flying side by side, separated by about 200 yards. The missions of spraying germs or infected insects would be flown over towns or troop areas.

The captain told us that our group had four air-

craft equipped for spraying germs or infected insects. These aircraft are parked at the north end of the parking ramp away from the rest of the aircraft. Each aircraft has a mechanic and also one of the special ground crew trained for germ warfare to take care of the spraying apparatus. Besides these four men, there are other special crew members attached to the armament section to handle and load the germ bombs and germ containers.

The aircraft to be loaded with germ bombs are parked next to the special ramp for loading. The germ bombs are loaded at night or early in the morning by the special crew. The spraying aircraft are taxied down to this area to have the germ containers loaded into the spraying mechanism. There are a chain hoist to help load the germ containers into the spraying aircraft and the usual bomb loaders to assist in loading the germ bombs onto the aircraft.

The captain said that the germ bombs and containers came in from Japan by air about every two weeks and a large supply was not kept on hand but they were brought in as needed. The germ bombs are brought in from Japan in cargo aircraft such as C-46s, C-47s and C-54s.

The air-burst germ bombs could be dropped by B-26, B-29, F-51, F-80, F-84 or F-86. The B-26 and B-29 are most suitable for dropping parachute germ bombs.

The captain touched briefly on the growth of bacteria. He said that they are troublesome to grow and required constant care. They require special condition for growth, being grown in culture mediums, and they were expensive to cultivate.

The captain again warned us that this was top secret information and that we were not to repeat any of it or even discuss it among ourselves. He was very grave and stern-looking as he said this, and we realized the seriousness of the situation.

The lecture had lasted for two hours, from 14:00 to 16:00 hrs, with a 10 minute rest at 15:00 hours. It was given in the small debriefing room because of its secret nature. This room was so small that only small groups of us received the lecture together. The briefing room is large enough to accomodate 60 people, but there are people in and out of the briefing room all of the time and secrecy would have been impossible. There were only ten of us who were new to the group and as the briefing room would have been large enough for all of us, while the debriefing room limited the size of the group of us. Captain McLaughlin explained his talk by drawing about 7 diagrams of the bombs and spraying mechanism on the small blackboard with chalk and pointing to each part of the diagram as he discussed it. He had evidently given the lecture enough times so that he was so familiar with the subject that he needed no notes, even for reference. He had undoubtedly given the same lecture to each new pilot who had come into the group.

After the lecture was over, we left the room and returned to our tent, no one saying anything. Each of us was thinking about what we had just been told. I was wondering why we were using this terrible weapon when the peace talks were going on and the war was at a stalemate. We sat down in the tent and looked at each other for a few minutes. Then I suggested

a card game of hearts to shift our thoughts to more pleasant topics than the one we had just heard.

My Participation in the Germ Bombing Mission

Item flight was assigned the first mission of the day from the 67th Squadron on February 15, 1952. 1/Lt. Frank Harvey, the flight leader, chose 1/Lt. Padgett, 2/Lt. R. L. Greyell and myself to accompany him on the mission. We went to early or 05:30 briefing. Nothing was said in the regular briefing about germ warfare. All of the squadrons were represented by about 20 pilots at this briefing. Some were going on rail cuts, some on the Main Supply Route cap, etc. The operations officer, Major Clark, asked who was going on the first mission from Topkick, which is the call sign of the 67th Squadron. When "Item Flight" was called out, he said "Flak Suppressor". He then went on with the other missions, giving the assignment with any special instructions. We then all set our watches to the correct time. Next we received the weather briefing by 1/Lt. Scott, and then the intelligence briefing from Captain McLaughlin.

Briefing was over at 05:45 and Capt. McLaughlin called out "Item flight come up and get the photos". We went to the front of the room and the captain led the way to the small debriefing room where he had given us the lecture on germ warfare days before. He handed 1/Lt. Harvey an aerial photo of Sibyon-ni and then said "You'll be carrying germ bombs. Drop them on the west side of town and come directly back to K-46. I'll be waiting to debrief you. Report the bombs as air-burst VT bombs when you debrief. Remember not to act strangely when you go out to the aircraft. Remember that this is

top secret".

We went over to 67th Squadron operations and left the photo there while we went to breakfast. We didn't talk about the mission we were about to go on. After breakfast we went back to Squadron operations and planned the mission – the route up, altitudes, airspeeds, etc. Captain McLaughlin had told us that our take-off time was at 08:00. The usual time was 07:00 for the first mission. We put on our parachutes and went out to the aircraft. Our four aircraft were parked right next to the loading platform. We inspected the aircraft to see that everything was in order. The germ bombs were already on the wings, having been placed there by the special crew from the armament section. I only checked the arming wire in the nose fuse of the germ bomb to make sure that it was in position properly and then got into the aircraft.

We took off and climbed on course, leveling off at 9000 ft at an airspeed of 250 miles per hour. We went to a point about 10 miles west of Sibyon-ni and then headed east toward the town. As we approached Sibyon-ni, 1/Lt. Harvey gave the signal to get into in-trail formation, by diving and climbing the aircraft several times quickly – no radio signal, and then he began his dive-bombing run. We began our runs at 9000 ft, released the germ bombs at 7000 ft and pulled out of the dive at 6000 ft at an airspeed of 350 miles per hour. We then climbed up to 7000 ft and returned to K-46 at 250 miles per hour. We took off at 08:00, dropped our germ bombs at 08:50, and landed at K-46 at 09:30 hours. When we dropped our germ bombs, we armed them by pushing two electrical switches in the cockpit and we

dropped our germ bombs by pushing a button on the control column (or stick). Each of us had dropped two germ bombs on Sibyon-ni – eight germ bombs total. We did not know what type of germs the germ bombs we had dropped contained. We only knew that they were germ bombs.

After landing, we parked the aircraft on the ramp and went to Squadron operations to put up our parachutes and flying helmets. We then walked across the street to intelligence, where Capt. McLaughlin was waiting for us. He said "I'll get them", meaning that he would debrief us. After a normal mission any of the intelligence personnel can debrief the pilots. He led the way into the small debriefing room where we had received the photo and special instructions earlier. I had seen the germ bombs of the first three ships go off and the leader had seen mine explode, so we reported 8 bursts of VT bombs over the target. The debriefing form which the captain used looked like the regular form and the questions he asked were the usual ones, such as flak encountered, weather over the target, any malfunctions, any troubles, any enemy aircraft sighted, names of pilots, aircraft numbers, etc. The true nature of our mission was not mentioned. We reported a successful flak suppressor mission. We had gone into debriefing at 09:40 and finished at 09:45 hours.

I had flown aircraft number 055 that day, flying the number four position. Harvey was leader, Greyell was number two, and Padgett was number three. When the germ bombs had exploded, they were grayish clouds of smoke, or at least that is how they

looked to us from above. The sound of the explosion to those on the ground would have been small, not nearly so loud as an ordinary bomb. The germ bombs were all dropped over the west side of the town of Sibyon-ni.

Our Group Activities in Germ Warfare Missions

Judging by their actions at our base, I am sure that every pilot in the 18th Group had carried out germ warfare missions. The relatively new pilots like myself had few of these missions, while the old pilots, or ones who had been in the group longest, had more. Lts. Harvey and Padgett appeared to be accustomed to this sort of mission, while Lt. Greyell and I were nervous and apprehensive on our first mission. I noticed that some of the other boys who had come over with me – 2Lts John W. Yingling, Mel Souza, W. C. Sankey, Pete Nibley and Jim Horsley – appeared to be nervous after some of their germ missions. I respected their nervousness, however, and did not question or tease them about it. I also respected the secret classification placed on the subject of germ warfare.

From their expressions and attitudes, I would say that Lts Harvey and Padgett had five germ warfare missions to their credit each. Lt. Greyell had only one to my knowledge. Lts. J. B. Armstrong and M. Satenstein had three germ missions apiece. Lts Jim Horsley and Pete Nibley had two missions of this type. They appeared to have become accustomed to the idea that they were carrying germ bombs.

I know of only one pilot, 1/Lt. C. O. Armstrong, leader of H flight, from the 67th Squadron who has sprayed germs. Around the 18th of February, I saw

the spray truck going down the runway spraying the ground behind an aircraft, and this was the only occasion that I observed this. I don't remember whether this was on the same day that 1/Lt. C. O. Armstrong sprayed germs or not. When taxiing out for take-off, I have seen the four spraying aircraft parked at the north end of the field.

The 18th Group, which consists of the 2nd South African Air Force Squadron, the 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron, the 39th Fighter Bomber Squadron and the 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron, apparently already had an operational policy for dropping germ bombs set up in January 1952, for when I arrived, the procedure had already been established. From my knowledge, I would say that such a policy would take at least a month for planning, preparation, and training. This would mean that the 18th Group must have been dropping germ bombs since the middle of December, 1951, or perhaps even earlier. Judging by all signs, the decision by the American forces to use germ warfare in Korea was made early in the fall of 1951. This would allow several months to get the necessary personnel and equipment into the theater and to set up the policies and procedures to be used in carrying out the germ warfare.

Our Group Morale on Germ Warfare Missions

Due to the germ warfare missions, the morale of the group was becoming lower because I am sure that every pilot was not willing to fly the germ warfare missions. The pilots would usually be talkative before the regular mission, going out to the planes,

telling about the mission after it was over, etc. However, after a germ warfare mission, the less said the better it would be. The pilots would say where they had been on the mission, but none of the usual details such as flak encountered, number of hits with bombs, etc. would be volunteered as was the usual case. When talk would begin on the day's missions, those who had had germ warfare mission would be conspicuous by their silence. The only mention of these missions would come as a slip of the tongue in general conversation or else when alone with a very close friend. If such mentioning of these germ warfare missions came up in general conversation, everything would become quiet for a few seconds and then the topic of conversation would be quickly shifted to another subject.

I remember going to see 2/Lt. R. L. Michael, who was in the hospital, shortly after my germ warfare mission. He asked what I had been doing and he guessed from my looks and answer that I had been on a germ warfare mission. He said "In a way, I'm glad I'm in here (the hospital) and not out flying missions with you boys." He had only flown two or three missions before he was injured in a take-off accident. I knew him to be a person of strong religious sentiments, so I knew that he was not anxious to get out of the hospital and perhaps have to fly germ warfare missions. I told him that I wasn't exactly happy about everything and he said that he could sympathize with me.

After a germ warfare mission, those pilots who had flown on the mission would seem gloomy

for the rest of the day and would usually be found in the club trying to drink away their troubles. The topic of conversation at their table would usually be the sad state of affairs which the government of the United States is now in. I remember the conversation of Lts Harvey, Padgett, Greyell and myself on the night of February 15th, after our germ warfare mission on that day, was how we'd like to see Truman flying a Mustang over Korea. This thought proved to be funny and we promptly dubbed Truman as another "George two". The term "George Two" was applied to Col. Levinson, the group commander, when he wasn't around. He had flown on a mission with George flight as number two man. He became flustered over the target and threw his bombs away. The flight leader told number two to lead the flight back to the base, but Col Levinson, the number two man, replied that he wasn't sure of his exact position. This incident caused no little amount of laughter behind the colonel's back, and the nickname "George two", which is an uncomplimentary name, has stuck to him. The four of us at our table in the club had the table to ourselves, for the other pilots apparently decided to let us get over our mission by ourselves. This was the custom, for we all respected the feelings of those who wished to avoid the subject of germ warfare or not be reminded of their recent part in it.

The following incident occurred at the Officer's club one evening in the middle of February. 1/Lt. C. O. Armstrong was asked by someone at the next table what he had done that day. He

replied in a rather loud voice, for he had had several drinks: "I wasn't spraying bacteria today, that's certain." Lt. Col. Crow, the 67th Squadron commander, was sitting at our table, and he immediately got up and went over to the table and took Lt. C. O. Armstrong outside and talked to him for about fifteen minutes. Lt. Armstrong left the club and went to his tent. The group in the club was quiet for a moment after the incident and then someone called for "more beer" and talking was resumed, with everyone closely watching what he was saying.

I cannot say how the enlisted men reacted to the subject of germ warfare for we had little contact with them. I do know that the crew chief would usually be talkative while you were getting in the plane, but on the morning of February 15th, my chief only said "Good Morning". Usually the crew chief would ask the pilot to "Please bring this plane back – we don't have many of them" and other such remarks, all in a good-natured manner.

The policy of being careful what one said naturally put a strain on most of the pilots, for discussion was usually very free and frank on all subjects, except bacteriological warfare, of course. However, the germ warfare missions did serve to lower the morale of the pilots and the group as a whole.

My Conscience Wants Me to Speak Out

We know that the aircraft which carried out the germ warfare missions in Northeast China would be the F-80s and F-84s and F-86s. They



operated generally in the area between the Chong-chong and Yalu Rivers. These aircraft are fast and maneuverable and can reach the Northeast China area easily from their bases in South Korea. These aircraft also would stand a better chance of survival in the event that any MIGs were encountered on the mission as they are faster than the F-51s. There would be F-86s flying top cover or protection for the F-80s and F-84s in the event that any MIGs made an appearance and threatened them.

In my opinion, it was apparent that the American forces had chosen winter time to start using bacteriological warfare for the purpose of using Korea as a testing ground to test the cold-withstanding bacteriological weapons developed in our special laboratories. The final purpose is to use them in bacteriological warfare against the countries with cold climates such as the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

From these facts, I testify that the American forces have waged germ warfare in Korea for over half a year now. This was done even while the peace talks were in progress. It is a difficult thing for a pilot to do, dropping these germ bombs on innocent civilians and taking part in this inhuman type of warfare; but he has no choice but to do as he is told, even though it means dropping these terrible weapons upon the North Koreans and the Chinese People's Volunteers. The use of germ warfare is against all humanitarian principles, and all the peace loving peoples of the world are against it. Americans should speak out and con-

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

demn those who made the decision to use this inhuman weapon. It is the duty of everyone to do his part to stop germ warfare at once, before any more of these innocent people are killed by this terrible weapon. All men of righteousness the world over, and especially the Americans, must stand up without any hesitation against this inhuman warfare!

Floyd B. O'Neal
18 June 1952

PRISONER OF WAR P. R. KNISS (U.S. AIR FORCE) ADMITTED THAT HE HAD DROPPED GERM-LADEN BOMBS IN KOREA

Paul R. Kniss, a U.S. prisoner of war, born on April 29, 1927, in Monmouth, Illinois, U.S.A. is a second lieutenant of the U.S. Air Force (Serial No. AO-1909070). After completing his training in December, 1946, he served at the same base as a flight training officer. He arrived in Korea on March 20, 1952, and was assigned to the 12th Fighter-Bomber Squadron of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Group. He was shot down by the Chinese Volunteers on his 27th flying mission near Namchi on May 31. According to his own written confession, he did drop bacteria bombs in Sariwon, Korea.

The Confession Written by Paul R. Kniss Is Reproduced Below:



This Inhuman Warfare must be stopped

My name is Paul R. Kniss and I am a member of the United States Air Force Reserve. My rank is 1st Lieutenant and my serial number is AO1909070. I was born April 29, 1927 in Monmouth Illinois. My Wifes address is 1103 Southwest Military Drive San Antonio Texas. My Parents address is, 339 So. 7th Street Monmouth Illinois.

In December 1946 I enlisted in the Air Force as a Corporal. Later after graduating as a pilot, I served as a flight instructor at Craig Air Force Base. I remained at Craig until January 30, 1952 when I was ordered to Korea. I arrived at Camp Stoneman, California on the 21st of February 1952 for further assignments overseas, together with 5 other instructors from Craig who were also going overseas. Their names were 1/LT John Carleton, 1/LT John Jansen, 1/LT James Camp, 1/LT Robert Manning, and 1/LT Randall. From Camp Stoneman we were sent to Korea. We arrived at K-46 (F-51 base about 5 miles North of Wonju) on the 20th March 1952. I was assigned to the 12th Filghter Bomber Squadron 18th Fighter Bomb Group flying F-51s.

In June 1951 while I was still at Craig, I attended a lecture in Flight room of our Squadron all the pilots of 3616th Pilot Training Squadron were there.

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

Our lecturer was a Captain Laurie, our Wing Information and Education officer. He talked for about 1 hour on Atomic defense. He went to great detail to explain our defense against atom bombs on the ground. He stated an atom bomb did no more damage than a normal bomb only that it destroys a larger area. Our means of protection was to get down on the ground or under a table or against a wall to protect ourselves from the blast. He stated the blast would kill a person 3/4 of a mile away if he were not behind something, the radiation was safe if you were half a mile or further from the bomb. He stated the heat would kill everyone 1/4 mile from the blast.

He then said the real danger was the germ warfare being planned by other nations. He said they would bomb germs and also be smuggled in by agents, fired in artillery shells from submarines. He stated he expected to see in 1952 all military personel having to attend special courses in germ warfare, being issued protective masks and would be given special innoculations against germs. Pilots of our Squadron asked him where he had gotten this information, but he would not say where, only that we would be told more later on.

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

The day after we reached Camp Stoneman, that is on February 22 the six of us new-arrivals with others who were going to different groups in Korea, were given a 15 minute briefing by Captain Holleman. 1/Lt. Charles Brooks a classmate of mine at Barksdale Air Force Base Louisiana also attended this lecture; he was going to fly B-26's in Korea. All together there were 50 pilots at this lecture. Captain Holleman is about 35 years old, wore glasses, about 6 feet tall, dark haired, and getting bald on top. He stated that there were stories circulating to the effect America was using germ Warfare in Korea. These stories are untrue, he said, and our job was to deny these stories. America has, he says germ bombs and they can also spray germs from airplanes but we are not doing it and want you men to deny every story you hear about germ warfare. We have now in America a V.T. germ bomb (with variable time fuze) and we also have a parachute bomb for germ warfare. This latter bomb is loaded with diseased animals and insects which will, when released

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

from the bomb, spread their diseases around. We can also spray germs direct from airplanes. We can also have them carried into enemy territory by our agents who could put the germs in the water supply of all the towns and cities. Captain Holleman gave us all this information in our processing room at Camp Stoneman. After this lecture was over myself and the other pilots in my group discussed it among ourselves. I was of the opinion as were the other men, that we were not using germ Warfare in Korea, that it was propaganda being circulated by the North Koreans. We thought our government naturally wanted to stop all stories circulating to this affect.

Again the very day after our arrival at K-46 in Korea, we six pilots, Lieutenants Carleton, Jansen, Camp, Manning, Randall and myself were given a 1 hour lecture on March 21 by Captain McLaughlin. He is about 30 years old, and about 6 feet tall. He is our Group intelligence officer and the briefing was held in our briefing room with the door locked. The 18th Ftr Bmr Group has been waging germ Warfare since January 1st 1952, Capt. McLaughlin stated. We are using two types of bombs at present, a V.T. germ bomb and a animal parachute bomb. We are going to start spraying germs from our aircraft in June. We will send four aircraft from our Group the 30th of April, 1952,

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(Comment on the Testimony of Kniss)

On the face of it there appears to be a number of contradictions between the evidence of Kniss and that of O'Neal, especially as both are from the 18th Fighter-Bomber Group, both were flying F-51's, both were briefed by the Group Intelligence Officer Captain McLaughlin. Important points of agreement between the testimony of these two pilots are:

1) Both were briefed on germ warfare by Capt. McLaughlin in small groups immediately on arrival at their base. O'Neal was told it was policy for McLaughlin to brief all pilots on germ warfare as soon as they arrived.

2) The methods to be used, namely the V. T. bomb for germs, the parachute bomb for germ-infected insects and small animals and spraying germs direct from aircraft.

3) The need for secrecy.

4) The height from which the V. T. bombs were to be released, O'Neal said he dropped from 7,000 feet, Kniss that they were ordered to drop from 6,000 feet.

5) The fact that artillery shells could also be used in germ warfare but that germ bombs were more effective.

6) That special crews would handle the loading of the germ bombs.

7) That there would be a special way of reporting results of missions and that Captain McLaughlin himself would be on hand to take the debriefing reports.

Points of disagreement are as follows:

1) O'Neal was told it would not matter much if the V. T. bombs exploded in the air or on the ground, that the bacteria would survive. Kniss was told the explosion would kill the bacteria if the bombs hit the ground, but they would survive if the bomb exploded as scheduled at 100 feet above ground. (Both agreed that the V. T. bombs would be set to explode at 100 feet above the ground.)

2) Kniss was warned not to fly over 12,000 feet as the germs and insects would be killed by lack of oxygen or the cold. O'Neal was not briefed on this point.

3) O'Neal was told the germ bombs would be dropped over towns or areas with large troop concentrations while Kniss was briefed to drop on the edge of towns and cities —from 5 to 10 miles outside as is shown by the actual mission which he participated in or had knowledge of.

(In connection with these three discrepancies, it is important to note that Kniss was briefed just two months after O'Neal. The Americans must have realised by this time that germ warfare, already in progress for at least 3 months, was not producing the results that had been expected. It seems logical to expect that the experts cast around for every possible explanation for the lack of success, and that by the time Kniss was briefed there was an attempt to eliminate any unfavourable factors. The Americans had found that germ warfare was not as simple as had first appeared. Kniss was specifically told not to drop germ bombs on towns because of the decontamination measures taken by the Korean people.)

4) O'Neal was told in the event of not being able to drop his germ bombs in North Korea to pick some uninhabited spot in South Korea and dump them there, asking the nearest radar station for a fix so that a special team could be sent to retrieve the bombs—which should be dropped without arming the fuse so they would not explode. Kniss was told to keep the bombs aboard and return to base. (A possible explanation of this is contained in a report carried by all the American news agencies in early March to the effect that a"mysterious" outbreak of typhus had occurred in a remote, mountain village in South Korea. It is highly likely that this was the result of some airmen "dumping" germ bombs which actually did explode or burst asunder on impact.)

5) O'Neal describes spraying missions as early as mid-February and was briefed in detail about how they were to be carried out. Kniss was told spraying would only start in mid-June and that aircraft would be sent to Japan at the end of April for adaptation. Both O'Neal and Kniss are equally sure their versions are correct. O'Neal actually saw the spraying aircraft parked apart from the rest of the planes. There seem to be two possible explanations for this. (a) That the spraying as tried out at first was unsuccessful and further modifications had to be made in the methods so it was temporarily abandoned. (b) That the operational losses either of the spraying aircraft themselves were so great (or the losses of other F-51's were so great that the spraying aircraft were put back into regular combat operations) that the project had to be temporarily abandoned. It is noteworthy that McLaughlin told Kniss that spraying had already been used successfully in Korea, also that February was a month in which American plane losses were exceptionally high.

6) Kniss and the others were forced to sign a secrecy statement which was not required of O'Neal and those with him. On January 22, when O'Neal was briefed the Korean-Chinese side had made no mention of germ warfare—in fact it was not even confirmed that it had been started. By March 21, of course there had been a great deal of publicity about germ warfare which as we know from discussions with all prisoners did provoke debates and discussion at the air bases. The necessity to stop such discussion would logically be more imperative on March 21 than January 22. At the briefing which Kniss attended at Camp Stoneman on February 22, he was specifically told to deny rumours that the Americans were waging germ warfare. Obviously such instructions were not necessary for O'Neal at the time he was briefed.

7) Greater precautions were taken for the pilot's health in the period in which Kniss was operating. Pilots were given blood tests following their germ warfare missions.

***Conclusion*: The discrepancies between the evidence of these two pilots seem merely to reflect the modification of methods introduced by the Americans as they developed their germ warfare plan.**

to Tachikava (Japan) to be fixed up for germ spraying. They will put a tank behind the pilot to hold the germs and they will spray out behind the aircraft. The aircraft will be ready the 15th June and then we will brief all the pilots of the group on how to spray germs. This method has been used in Korea and was successful.

In our V.T. bombs Captain McLaughlin stated, we will use deseases like typhoid, bubonic plague and so forth. I think he mentioned Malaria but I cant recall for sure. These bombs will come from Wonju in a special truck and will be loaded 15 minutes before your takeoff time. (Ordinarily our aircraft are loaded two hours before takeoff time) You will know what they are when you see the truck which is a closed one. The aircraft will be loaded by a special crew from the ordnance department and the men loading will wear white uniforms masks and gloves. Do not be afraid of these bombs. You will not wear any special equipment but the germs cannot escape. The aircraft will be sterilized when you return from these missions.

We do not use any special aircraft for germ warfare missions he continued, but use whatever are available. When you return from such a mission you will take a shower immediately after debriefing and the following day you will be given a blood test to see if you are allright. If for any reason you cannot complete your mission you will not drop your bombs but return to K-46 and land with them. You men will not talk about germ warfare at any time and will always report after a germ mission as I shall instruct you. You will sign a statement of this meeting saying you will not discuss among yourselves or with anyone, the contents of this meeting. The material in this lecture will be considered "Top Secret." Our Government will deny the facts of germ warfare as long as possible. Do not feel bad about using germ warfare as all other pilots in the Group are doing it now and it will increase later on.

Here is our V.T. germ bomb as Captain McLaughlin drew it on the blackboard.



This bomb will always be dropped by four aircraft at a time the Captain went on. You will dive from 10,000 feet to 6000 feet as a flight and release your bombs at the target. The bomb will explode about 100 feet above the ground and spread the germs for around 100 yards. If the bomb does not explode in the air but, explodes on the ground the germs will be killed by the blast. If the bomb explodes in the air the germs are just spread out by the force of the explosion.

Member of the International Scientific Commission Interrogating U.S. POW P. R. Kniss (the first man on the left).

This bomb will be dropped close to a city but not in it because the North Korean people have used dis-infectant widely in their cities and it would kill the germs. We drop our bombs close to a large city and let the animals and humans carry the germs to the city, where they will spread, but these germs must get on animals or humans within 3 hours or they will die. These germs Captain McLaughlin stated are parasitic, meaning they cannot exist by themselves but must live on something living, they can exist for about 3 hours by themselves. When you return from a mission if it was sucessfull you will report, "Mission accomplished. Results unobserved," that is so we can say it was a "Flack Suppressor" mission in our releases to the newspapers. The bomb Captain McLaughlin said looks like a regular 500 pound V.T. bomb and has no special marking on it.

This is our parachute bomb as drawn by Captain McLaughlin.



This bomb Captain McLaughlin said will only be carried by one of the old Pilots in the Group. He will be the only one of the Group carrying this bomb on a Group formation. He will dive with his flight from 10,000 feet to 1000 feet and release them. The door will open in the rear of the bomb and the parachute will lower the bomb gently to earth. When the bomb strikes the ground, it will break into two parts, at the position where the hinges are located. The bomb was originally cut into two parts then joined together by hinges. When the bomb breaks into two parts the animals or insects will escape. We are using rats, lice, mice and fleas in these bombs, It will also be dropped near a large city but not in it where the people could kill the animals or insects as they escape. This bomb will be reported as a dud when the pilot returns from his mission. You can reconize this bomb by the door in the rear, the hinges in the middle and where the bomb has been cut in two. With both types of bombs you must not fly over 12,000 feet or else the animals, insects or germs will be killed due to lack of oxygen and the extreme cold. "Again" Captain McLaughlin said, "I want to tell you men not to discuss this information out of this room as you will be court-martialled." With these words, he concluded our briefing. Our briefing lasted from 08:00 till 09:00.

There were the following named men present. Myself, 1LT John Carleton, 1Lt John Jansen, 1LT Robert Manning, 1Lt James Camp and 1LT Randall. We had all been instructors at Craig and had joined the Group at the same time.

Captain McLaughlin brought the statements that we signed to the lecture, and at the conclusion of the lecture gave each one of us one to sign. We then returned the statement to him. The statement was about 10 inches long and 2 inches wide, as best I remember it, it was worded as this.

I UNDERSTAND I WILL NOT DISCUSS ANY OF THE INFORMATION DISCUSSED
AT THIS MEETING 21 MARCH 1952 AND IF I DO. I MAY BE PUNISHED
DATE
UNDER THE – ARTICLE OF WAR.

Paul R Kniss
SIGNATURE

I forget the exact number of the article of War it mentioned.

The Group intelligence Officer will keep this statement in his office. If any of the pilots were ever heard discussing germ bombs they would be court martialed and this statement would be used as evidence against them.

I was very disgusted myself at the prospect of having to wage germ Warfare, but I also realized I had no choice in the matter but must do as I was ordered. I remembered also the words of Captain Haldeman when I had believed and at this time I was starting to wonder who was right, and who was wrong in this War.

The 27th of March 1952, at 05:30 myself, Captain Thomas (our flight leader) Captain Burton and 1LT Fluke all of whom were in the 12th Ftr Bmr Squadron were briefed for a germ mission. We were briefed by Captain McLaughlin in our Group briefing room with the door locked. Captain McLaughlin showed us a photograph of some hills with bare spots on them South of Sariwon, 10 miles. These pictures were about 12 inches long and 8 inches wide and had been taken by the 67th Tactical reconnaissance Group. The bare spots on these hills, he said are gun positions. I looked at the pictures with a magnifying glass but could see no guns or gun positions. Your mission is a "Flack Suppressor mission." Captain McLaughlin said. You will takeoff at 07:00 and be over your target at 08:00. You will climb to 10,000 feet on course to the target. When you are over the target, dive as a flight to 6,000 feet and release your bombs. When you return report to me and say "Mission accomplished with results unobserved."

Our briefing lasted for 15 minutes. After briefing I went to my squadron Operations room and put on my flying equipment. At 06:45 I went out to my airplane. Two men dressed in white fatigues, wearing a mask over their nose and mouth, and gloves were loading the bombs on my airplane. They removed the bomb from the truck and placed them on the bomb shackles by hand. The bombs looked liked regular 500 pound V.T. bombs and had no strange markings on them. When they had finished and drove away, I looked at my bombs to see if they were securely on the bomb hooks. My plane like the other 3 planes had two 500 pounds V.T. germ bombs on it.

We took off at 07:00 and climbed on course to 10,000 feet. We arrived over our target which was 10 miles South of Sariwon about 100 feet to the side of the railroad track, at 08:00. We dove as a flight to 6000 feet and released our bombs. Two exploded on the ground and six of them exploded in the air. The bombs that exploded on the ground threw debris and a gray cloud of smoke up to a height of 100 feet. The bombs that exploded in the air formed a gray cloud about 100 feet feet in diameter which disapeared in about 45 seconds. Our flight then climbed back to 10,000 feet and returned to K-46. We landed at 09:00 and told Captain McLaughlin in the intelligence office "Mission accomplished - Results unobserved". Our flight then took a shower. While we were taking the shower, I said to Captain Thomas "This may clean my body but my mind will never be clean after committing such an act." At 08:00 on March 28th we were given a blood test by our doctor.

Other germ bomb missions which I personally know about are as follows. On the 29th of April, 1LT Dake told me that he and 1LT Curry, 1LT John Jensen, and 1LT Randall had dropped 8 V.T. germ bombs, 5 miles South of Sinanju the 5th of April. (All these Pilots are in the 12th Ftr Bmr Squadron). He also said that Lt. Col. Crane, our Squadron Commander (12th Squadron) had dropped two parachute bombs the 15th of April 5 miles east of Sanchon. The 5th of May at 09:00 I heard Lt. Col. Crow, squadron Commander of the 67th Squadron, tell Captain McLaughlin he had dropped 2 "duds" near Pyongyang. These were the parachute germ bombs. The 21st of May, Captain Thomas told me that 1LT Ed Williams, 67th Ftr Bmr Squadron had led a flight of 4 aircraft to a position 5 miles east of Kunuri on a "Flack suppressor" mission. We knew then that they had dropped 8 V.T. germ bombs.

I want it known by whoever reads this statement that it is my own sense of justice, my own ability to tell right from wrong has forced me to let everyone know the facts. My Conscience has always bothered me since I've committed this act as I believe it would any man that knew justice from injustice. This inhuman Warfare must be stopped. I offer these facts to the world that an inhuman weapon is being used in Korea by the United States forces. It is not only being used against the North Korean and Chinese Volunteers soldiers but also against the people of North Korea. The civilians of North Korea have suffered terribly from the War already and now they are being subjected to the most inhuman type of warfare. It is now the job of all the people in the world to take these facts that I have presented and demand an immediate stop to germ warfare in North Korea. The people of the United States should insist That no nation should ever use this type of warfare again. Only by every person in the world doing their part towards stopping wars and inhuman acts will we have world peace. All men of the world are brothers and until we all learn to live together and help each other we cannot have the world peace we desire so much.

Paul R Kniss
20 July 1952



WANG CHI

SPIES PARACHUTED BY THE AMERICAN ARMED FORCES TO GATHER INFORMATION ON THE EFFECT OF GERM WARFARE



The above is a reproduction of the original written confession by U.S. air-borne Spy Wang Chi.

Below is a translation of his confession:

My name is Wang Chi, alias Wang Chih-Chia, aged 21, native of Chuchi, Chekiang Province. In November, 1951, I began to study in a school for training secret agents established by the intelligence organisation of the U.S. Far Eastern Command in Japan. The school is headed by a Japanese named Kazumasa Ito with two American superintendents. There I studied for two months, the main subject of our training being how to carry out espionage. On January 26, 1952, I was sent to Seoul where I worked as an agent in the TLO, an intelligence organization of the Headquarters of the U.S. Armed Forces. At 9 p.m. on March 12, this year, two instructors named Wang and Kim (both Chinese-speaking Koreans), told me and two other persons to immediately proceed to North Korea to find out whether there are any epidemic diseases; the situation of their spreading; the death rate caused by them; the anti-epidemic activities of the Communist army; what kinds of inoculations have been taken, effective or otherwise; the general sanitary conditions of the Communist army and whether there are lots of flies, rats, fleas, lice, etc., in the areas affected by epidemic diseases. This was our first assignment to conduct investigations relating to diseases and germs. However, both Wang and Kim declined to reveal the cause of this sudden investigation. Besides, they told me to find out the activities of the Communist troops in the daytime as well as in the night, and whether there were traces of tanks on the road. Before our departure, Wang and Kim gave us a telephone interceptor (used for secretly intercepting telephone conversations), two forged official seals of the Chinese People's Volunteers, four carrier pigeons, two carbines (carried by the other two people), six sheets of 1:50,000 scaled military maps, and the forged pass written by myself, rations, etc. Wang and Kim instructed us to collect information after our landing, in areas centering around Sokpongsan, to release a pair of the pigeons the first day after our landing, reporting the time and place of our safe landing, to release another pair of them the following day if there was any information, to fulfill our mission within a week and to return to Seoul from the place of our landing. We should say "I am TLO" if we should meet the American troops on our way, and say in Korean "I am an intelligence agent of the American authorities" upon meeting the South Korean troops. All three of us, together with six others, left Seoul at 11 p.m. on March 13, arrived at the airfield at midnight, and we took off in two double-engined transports. We landed at Sokpongsan, north of Ichon, at one o'clock on the 14th. I was captured at 8 o'clock on March 15, two days after our landing.

(Signed) WANG CHI

March 23, 1952

Tang Chü-Sheng

Li Hsing-Shun



Tan Tse-Min

Chang Kuei-T'ang

> "But between BW bombs refrigerated dumps and germs loosed to kill men, animals and plants, a great hiatus stretches. What, really, can these germ bombs do? And how does one get them to do it?
>
> "There is only one true way of answering this question at the moment—nobody really knows. In its modern form BW has never been used in a military operation. Until it has been used we will have no way of knowing exactly what it can do, how effective it can be, to what degree it must contribute toward victory or defeat in a World War III."
>
> —See Rosebury: "Peace or Pesitlence", pages 98-99, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1949.

> ". . . . No commander would dare to plan an assault on the assumption that a target which had been germ-bombed must be sufficiently softened—that is, unless he had up-to-the-minute intelligence."
>
> —See "Epidemics Made to Order", *Science Digest* Vol. 29, No. 4, page 57, Chicago, April, 1951.

ABNORMAL SEASON AND PLACES IN WHICH INSECTS WERE FOUND

After the invasion of American planes, various kinds of insects and spiders were discovered. The season and places in which these insects and spiders appeared are unusual. For instance, black springtails were found at the beginning of March, 1952, six meters above ground level on a concrete grand stand, and field crickets which overwinter in the egg stage were discovered in March, 1952, on the surface of snow. These unusual events are more than sufficient to indict the American Government of having spread these creatures from the air. Following photographs show some of the evidence collected.



On March 4, 1952, American aircraft spread large quantities of field crickets over the eastern suburb of Kuantien City and Hung Shih La Tze Village. View of some of the field crickets massed on snow at the Hung Shih La Tze Village, Kuantien County, Northeast China.



View of a large group of spiders discovered on snow at Ping Chung Chieh, Langtou Section of Antung City and its vicinity, immediately after the raid by six American planes on March 4, 1952.

Field crickets, which overwinter as eggs and of which the adults die off in winter, appearing en masse on the surface of snow.

View of false ground beetles found on snow at Ping Chung Chieh soon after the invasion on March 4, 1952, by six American planes.



On March 2, 1952, American aircraft invaded Shenyang, Fushun and other places and scattered numerous Anthomyiid flies. This is an enlarged view of one of the flies on snow.

Close view of the concrete grand stand at the race course of Fushun City. After the invasion by U.S. planes at the beginning of March, 1952, springtails were discovered on the grand stand six meters above ground level. Photo shows entomologists of the Investigation Commission making observations on March 24, 1952.

Specialists Have Conducted Investigations, and Made Examinations and Identifications

H. F. Chu, entomologist, examining insects spread by U. S. planes.



Samuel H. Zia, Professor of Bacteriology, watching a technician injecting a mouse with saline emulsion of ground spider material.



S. H. Chen (on the right), entomologist and his assistant, Y. T. Kung examining insects spread by U.S planes.



Y. T. Ch'in, entomologist, Professor of Biology, China Medical College, Shenyang.

C. Hsin, Chief Technical Expert in Bacteriology, Institute of Infectious Diseases, Changchun.

C. L. Liu, Professor of Entomology, and his assistant F. Li examining insects spread by U.S. planes.



S. C. Ma, entomologist, examining insects spread by U.S. planes.



N. C. Chang, Assistant Professor of Bacteriology, examining a smear of anthrax bacilli under the microscope.



L. C. Feng, Professor of Parasitology, examining insects spread by U. S. planes.



P. L. Luh, Assistant Professor of Entomology, examining insects spread by U. S. planes.

K. H. Ching, Assistant Professor of Bacteriology, China Medical College, Shenyang.



W. P. Wei, bacteriologist, performing postmortem examination of guinea-pig which died after inoculation with material prepared from springtails.

Prof. Samuel H. Zia and Assistant Professor H. T. Chang discussing cases of encephalitis.



C. M. Hsieh, Bacteriologist, Institute of Medical Research, Shanghai.

C. H. Hu, Professor of Pathology, doing postmortem examination of duck succumbed to injection of culture of *Pasteurella multocida*.



C. I. Shen, Professor of Plant Pathology, Peking Agricultural College.



C. K. Yen, Assistant Professor of Pathology, Shanghai Medical College.

P. L. Li, Professor of Pathology, China Medical College, Shenyang.



W. F. Chiu, Assistant Professor of Plant Pathology, Peking Agricultural College.

C. Ho, Professor and Head of the Department Biology, Dairen Medical College.



Y. K. Hsü, neuropathologist, Professor of Neurology.

H. Wei, Professor and Head of the Department of Bacteriology, Dairen Medical College.



L. Fang, Assistant Professor of Bacteriology, Peking University Medical College.

“WE HAVE OBTAINED SUFFICIENT SCIENTIFIC PROOFS THAT THE U.S. ARMED FORCES HAVE DEFINITELY BEEN USING BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN KOREA AND IN OUR COUNTRY. THE EVIDENCE OF THEIR CRIMES IS IRREFUTABLE.”

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M.D. (West China Union University)
League of Nations Health Officer for plague studies in India, 1946.

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INSECTS, SPIDERS AND OTHER OBJECTS UTILIZED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

American planes have raided Korea, Northeast China, and Tsingtao, and have on numerous occasions, by means of different kinds of containers or by direct sprays, disseminated large quantities of insects, spiders, feathers, tree leaves, corn kernels, etc., in waging bacteriological warfare.

I. THE ROLE PLAYED BY INSECTS AND OTHER OBJECTS DISSEMINATED BY AMERICAN PLANES:

A. Insects having great adaptive, dispersive, and reproductive powers are effective means for spreading pathogenic organisms. Certain pathogens die easily when disseminated alone, but survive well when carried by insects. Besides, certain pathogenic organisms are only transmitted through insects.

B. Other objects such as feathers, tree leaves, corn kernels, etc., are able to carry pathogenic organisms causing human, animal or plant diseases.

II. INSECTS, SPIDERS AND OTHER OBJECTS DISSEMINATED BY AMERICAN PLANES FROM WHICH PATHOGENIC ORGANISMS HAVE BEEN ISOLATED:

A. Insects and Spiders: Pathogenic organisms have been found in at least eight kinds of insects and one kind of spider:

1. Human fleas:	Plague bacilli.
2. House flies:	Anthrax bacilli.
3. Anthomyiid flies:	Anthrax bacilli, dysentery bacilli, typhoid bacilli, paratyphoid bacilli, and cholera vibrios.
4. Ptinid beetles:	Anthrax bacilli.
5. Wolf spiders:	Anthrax bacilli, dysentery bacilli, and *Pasteurella multocida.*
6. Non-biting stable flies:	Typhoid bacilli.
7. Chironomid midges:	Typhoid bacilli.
8. Helomyzid flies:	Paratyphoid bacilli.
9. Black springtails:	Dysentery bacilli.

B. Other objects: Pathogenic organisms have been found in at least six kinds:

1. Voles:	Plague bacilli.
2. Feathers:	Anthrax bacilli.
3. Clams:	Cholera vibrios.
4. Corn kernels:	Smut.
5. Soybean stalks and pods:	Soybean purple spot fungi.
6. Tree leaves:	Anthracnose fungi, ring spot fungi.

III. THE FOLLOWING INSECTS ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR PRESENCE OF PATHOGENIC ORGANISMS:

Blue bottle flies, field crickets, migratory locust, stoneflies, and many other insects.

The above clearly indicates that in the present bacteriological warfare, the U.S. Government, besides aiming at direct destruction of life, is also testing out the resistance of insects to cold, their ability to disseminate pathogens, etc.

They also use insects and other objects which carry no pathogenic organisms with the malicious intention of confusing the populace and creating public alarm.

But because of the extensive and effective anti-epidemic measures taken by the Chinese and Korean peoples, the U.S. Government has not been able to attain the results expected.

EXAMPLES OF INSECTS AND SPIDERS DROPPED IN NORTHEAST CHINA BY AMERICAN AIRPLANES



×5.5

House Fly

(*Musca vicina* Macquart)

Large quantities of house flies were found in the field outside San Ho Village, Szeping, after the invasion by American planes on March 17, 1952. Under natural conditions house flies are found in the vicinity of houses and animal enclosures. In Northeast China they do not begin to become active until May. Their appearance outdoors in large numbers in the cold March weather must be attributed to the activities of U.S. aircraft.

Identification made by:
Y. T. Chin and L. P. Feng.

×3.5

Non-biting Stable Fly

(*Muscina stabulans* (Fallen))

On March 15, 1952, a large number of these flies were found on cement-floored yards and open veranda of the dormitory of the Department of Trade of the People's Government of Northeast China. Flies of this species breed under ordinary conditions in decaying organic matter, and absolutely will not appear outdoors in great numbers in the snow-clad Northeast.

Identification made by:
S. H. Chen and P. L. Luh.



×4.5

Blue Bottle Fly

(*Lucilia sericata* (Meigen))

Blue bottle flies were found on March 15, 1952, on a cement tennis court, where snow had not completely melted, in the vicinity of the dormitory quarters of the Department of Trade of the People's Government of Northeast China, Shenyang. In the Northeast these flies normally begin to appear between April and May. Their appearance on snow is decidedly unnatural and indicates their having been scattered by American airplanes. Blue bottle fly is one of the insects of great sanitary importance.

Identification made by:
L. C. Feng and C. S. Chao.



×8

Anthomyiid Fly

(*Hylemyia* sp.)

In many of the localities invaded by American planes, such as Shenyang, Antung, Kuantien, Tsingtao, large numbers of Anthomyiid flies suddenly made their appearance. Under natural conditions flies of this genus will normally appear between April and May. Their occurrence in large numbers in March on snow-covered fields is, therefore, entirely abnormal. Evidently, the American Armed Forces used these flies as media for disseminating diseases.

Identification made by:
S. H. Chen and P. L. Luh.



×6.5

Helomyzid Fly

(Helomyza modesta Meigen)

Large numbers of Helomyzid flies were found on snow and ice in Chinchow, Kuantien and Antung after the invasion by American military planes. As a rule, these flies breed in animal excreta or decayed organic matter. Their appearance at temperatures below zero is totally unnatural and leads to the obvious conclusion of their having been scattered by U.S. aircraft.

Identification made by:
S. H. Chen and P. L. Luh.



×7.5

Chironomid Midge

(Orthocladius sp.)

After the invasion by U.S. military aircraft, large numbers of midges were found in Chinchow, Antung, Kuantien, and Changpai. At Changpai where four-compartment bacteria bombs were discovered, these midges were found in the vicinity of the bombs and in association with field crickets and spiders—creatures with widely different habits. This proves that the midges were dropped by American planes.

Identification made by:
C. L. Liu.



×18

Human Flea

(Pulex irritans Linn.)

After the invasion by American military planes, fleas were discovered in Fushun, Kuantien, etc., in open fields and on snow surface—places obviously unnatural for fleas to appear. It is thus proved that these fleas must have been disseminated by American planes.

Identification made by:
L. C. Feng and C. S. Chao.



×6.4

Ptinid Beetle

(Ptinus fur Linn.)

Ptinid beetle is a storage pest, and under natural conditions is usually found in factories and storehouses of animal and plant products. But on March 20, 1952, inhabitants of Pei Chiao Tsang Village, Liaoyang County, found these beetles outdoors on the walls, on the ground and in cultivated fields. Previously the villagers had heard of the drones of an American plane and witnessed the dropping, at the places where insects were discovered, of reddish objects of the size of a thermos bottle. This fact effectively proves that these beetles were spread by the U.S. aircraft.

Identification made by:
C. L. Liu and P. L. Luh.



×0.95

Migratory Locust

(Locusta migratoria Linn.)

Migratory locust is a major agricultural pest. Under natural conditions, the adult locust dies in the fall, after having laid eggs which will overwinter and hatch in the following May. Many live adult locusts, however, were found on March 15, 1952, on the veranda on the second storey of a dormitory building of the Department of Trade of the Northeast People's Government, Shenyang. Very obviously, these locusts could not have appeared naturally but must have been dropped by U.S. military planes.

Identification made by:
S. H. Chen and P. L. Luh.



×1.7

Field Cricket

(Gryllus testaceus Walker)

This agricultural pest overwinters in the egg stage. The adults die in winter. But on March 4, 1952, large numbers of this insect were found on the snow in Kuantien. Undoubtedly their appearance was not natural and they must have been scattered from the air by American airplanes.

Identification made by:
H. F. Chu.



×20

Black Springtail

(Isotoma negishina Börner)

In those areas of Shenyang, Fushun, Antung, Kuantien and Hsinpin invaded by U.S. planes black springtails were found. Of the places where they occurred, many were unnatural for them to be present. For instance, in Fushun they appeared six meters above ground level on a concrete grand stand. This is impossible under natural conditions.

Identification made by:
S. C. Ma.



×3

Wolf Spider

(Tarentula sp.)

Immediately following the invasion by American military aircraft over Penhsi, Antung and Kuantien, large number of wolf spiders were discovered. Ordinarily, these spiders appear in quantities in mid-April at the earliest. Their apearance en masse on snow at subzero temperature is abnormal. These facts indicate that the wolf spiders were scattered by American planes.

Identification made by:
F. C. Wang.

PARATYPHOID C BACILLUS ISOLATED FROM HELOMYZID FLIES



This bacillus was Gram-negative and motile; produced acid and gas in glucose, maltose and mannitol; did not hydrolyze lactose and sucrose; produced no indole; did not decompose urea; and was agglutinated by anti-paratyphoid C serum to a titer of 1:800.

Examination made by:
K. H. Ching.

TYPHOID BACILLUS (*Salmonella typhosa*) ISOLATED FROM THE NON-BITING STABLE FLY AND THE CHIRONOMID MIDGE



This bacillus was Gram-negative and motile; produced acid without gas in glucose, maltose and mannitol; did not hydrolyze lactose and sucrose; produced no indole; and could not decompose urea. It was agglutinated by anti-typhoid serum (titer 1:3,200).

Examination made by:
K. H. Ching.

PASTEURELLA OF HEMORRHAGIC SEPTICEMIA FOUND ON SPIDERS DROPPED BY AMERICAN AIRPLANES



Three of the wolf spiders dropped by American airplanes in Tsingtao.



Wolf spiders dropped by American airplanes being ground in sterile mortar with sterile normal saline.



Colonies of Gram-negative non-motile bacilli on culture medium inoculated with ground wolf spider material.



Saline suspension of ground wolf spider material being inoculated into white mouse. The mouse died within 24 hours after the inoculation.



Duck and rabbit, inoculated with the culture isolated from the wolf spiders, died in two days.



Heart of the duck showing hemorrhage in epicardium following inoculation with the same culture.



Ducks in the districts of Antung, Chinchow, etc., developed hemorrhagic septicemia after having swallowed the spiders dropped from American airplanes. From the dead ducks *Pasteurella multocida* has been isolated.



Bipolar staining Gram-negative bacilli from culture of ground wolf spider material.



Bipolar staining bacilli in a smear made from the heart blood of a duck found dead in Antung.



Liver of the same duck showing acute peritonitis with inflammatory exudate over its surface.



Section of liver of the duck showing acute peritonitis (exudate over surface of liver) and fatty change.



Section of liver of the same duck, showing abscess formation.



Section of spleen of the same duck showing small abscesses.

Cultural characteristics of organisms isolated from wolf spiders: acid production without gas in glucose, mannitol, sucrose and sorbitol. No fermentation of lactose and maltose. Production of indole and hydrogen sulphide. No growth on potato and media containing bile salts.

The bacilli isolated from spiders and ducks were identified as *Pasteurella multocida* which causes severe epizootics with hemorrhagic septicemia in domestic animals and birds.

Identification made by: Samuel H. Zia and K. H. Ching.

ANTHRAX BACILLI FOUND ON INSECTS, SPIDERS AND FEATHERS DROPPED BY AMERICAN AIRPLANES



In the night of March 14, 1952, an American airplane intruded into the district of Szeping. In the afternoon of March 17, an inhabitant of San Ho Village in the first district of that city, named Wang Yu-T'sai, discovered large groups of flies in San Tao Ling Tze outside the village. He immediately reported to his group leader and District Government. The villagers were mobilized for their extermination. The specimen collected has been identified by entomologists as house fly (*Musca vicina*), from which anthrax bacillus (*Bacillus anthracis*) has been isolated by bacteriologists.



In the evening of March 20, 1952, two American airplanes intruded into the district of Liaoyang. At that time, a militiaman, Jen Wan-Ku and inhabitants Wang Yung-Chang and Wang Hua-Ming of Pei Chiao Tsang Village of that county, all saw a red object about the size of a thermos bottle dropping from the air. It burst suddenly when it was about 3-4 meters above the roofs with a slight noise and an unpleasant smell. A little while later, a large number of insects were discovered in the village. The same kind of insects were later also found in the fields and in its neighbouring villages and towns, including Liu Erh Pu Town and the suburbs of Anshan City. These insects were identified by entomologists as Ptinid beetle (*Ptinus fur*) and were proved by bacteriologists to carry anthrax bacillus (*Bacillus anthracis*).





On March 12, 1952, eight American airplanes intruded into Kuantien, disseminating large quantities of Anthomyiid flies and wolf spiders in addition to dropping of feathers. On March 6, 1952, an American airplane intruded into Tsingtao district. On the next day, numerous Anthomyiid flies and wolf spiders were similarly discovered along the bay. From the Anthomyiid flies and wolf spiders, collected from both localities, *Bacillus anthracis* was isolated by bacteriologists.



Feathers dropped by U.S. aircraft in Kuantien.

On March 12, 1952, eight American planes invaded Kuantien City in Northeast China. One of the planes dropped a calcareous bacteria bomb which landed outside the east gate. The remnants of the bomb are shown in a photograph on page 18. Eight meters northwest of the bomb pit were found many feathers from which anthrax bacilli were isolated by bacteriologists Samuel H. Zia and N. C. Chang.



Culture of feather washings grew grayish colonies with rough surface as shown on culture plate. The bacilli of these colonies were non-motile on microscopic examination.



No matter whether inoculated with washings from feathers, or with culture of the aforementioned material, all the white mice became sick and died.



Postmortem examination of mouse: Hemorrhage and necrosis at site of inoculation.



Postmortem examination of mouse: Congestion of liver and spleen.



Postmortem examination of mouse: Microscopic section of liver showing the presence of numerous anthrax bacilli.



Postmortem examination of mouse: Microscopic section of spleen showing the presence of numerous anthrax bacilli.



Gram-positive bacilli from culture of washings from feathers disseminated by US planes.

The organism isolated from the feathers dropped by American planes has been identified as *B. anthracis*. This organism is well known for its deadly infection of domestic animals and man.

Identification made by:
Samuel H. Zia and N. C. Chang.

CASES OF RESPIRATORY ANTHRAX AND ANTHRAX MENINGITIS IN LOCALITIES INVADED BY AMERICAN PLANES

Following the intrusion of American airplanes into Northeast China to disseminate insects and other objects carrying anthrax bacillus, cases of respiratory anthrax and hemorrhagic anthrax bacillus meningitis, which were never seen before in the Northeast, suddenly appeared one after another in some districts. All these victims had during life either participated in the work of collecting these insects, or had contact with these feathers. Therefore, we affirm that the occurrence of these cases is caused by the bacteriological warfare waged by the U.S. Government. The recurrence of cases was averted by the emergency measures adopted.

THE PATHOLOGICAL CHANGES OF HEMORRHAGIC ANTHRAX BACILLUS CEREBROSPINAL MENINGITIS



A surface view of the anterior portion of the brain: Extensive hemorrhage in the subarachnoid space.



A microscopic picture of the cerebrum: Marked hemorrhage in the subarachnoid space.



A coronal section of the brain: Extensive hemorrhage in the subarachnoid space.



A microscopic picture of the cerebellum: Hemorrhage and inflammatory cell infiltration in the subarachnoid space.



A surface view of the spinal cord: Extensive hemorrhage in the subarachnoid space.



A microscopic picture of the cerebrum (Gram stain): Large numbers of anthrax bacilli contained in subarachnoid space (in the sulcus).

THE PATHOLOGICAL CHANGES OF ANTHRAX BACILLUS PNEUMONIA AND HILAR LYMPHADENITIS



A picture of the cut surface of the left lung: Pneumonia and hemorrhagic hilar lymphadenitis.



A microscopic picture of the lung showing pneumonic changes: The alveoli of the lung filled with cellular and serous exudate.



A microscopic picture showing bronchitis (Gram stained section): The bronchial mucosa containing many anthrax bacilli.



A microscopic picture of the enlarged lymph glands (Gram stained section): The inflammatory tissue containing a large number of anthrax bacilli.

AMERICAN AIRPLANES DROPPED LARGE NUMBERS OF VOLES CARRYING PASTEURELLA PESTIS IN KANNAN COUNTY HEILUNGKIANG PROVINCE

On April 4, 1952, American airplanes invaded at night Kannan County. In the morning of April 5, a large number of voles were found throughout 31 of the 45 settlements *(tun)* of Hsin Min, Ming Chung, Kung Yi and Kung Nung, 4 villages of the 10th District. Altogether 717 voles were found from places such as in the fields and ponds, inside houses and on the roofs, and in vegetable cellars and open wells. Examination by bacteriologists proved that these voles carried *Pasteurella pestis.*


The vole dropped by American plane.


Colonies of plague bacilli 48 hours after incubation.


Injection of 0.5 ml of the suspension under the skin of a white rat.


Autopsy of the dead rat.


Gram-negative bacilli isolated from the white rat.


A lytic test by plague bacteriophage proves these bacilli to be *Pasteurella pestis.*

ENCEPHALITIS CASES OCCURRING IN LOCALITIES INVADED BY AMERICAN AIRPLANES

In certain localities in Northeast China raided by American planes, there has suddenly occurred a kind of acute infectious disease hitherto unknown to us. Its clinical picture fits in with that of acute encepalitis. Pathologically, aside from changes of encephalitis, some of the cases also show the presence of a peculiar form of pneumonia. The disease is receiving epidemiological, bacteriological and virological studies. The spread of the diseases is checked by the extensive anti-epidemic measures taken.

PATHOLOGICAL CHANGES IN THE BRAIN OF CASES DIED OF ENCEPHALITIS



**Occipital lobe of cerebrum.
Marked perivascular lymphocytic infiltration.**



**Occipital lobe of cerebrum.
Perivascular lymphocytic and glia cell infiltration.**



**Cortex of cerebrum.
Glia nodule.**



**Hippocampus.
Perivascular hemorrhage.**



**Pons.
Marked congestion.**



**Cortex of cerebrum.
Neuronophagia.**

PATHOLOGICAL CHANGES IN THE LUNGS OF CASES DIED OF ENCEPHALITIS



Solitary, delimited pneumonia in the upper portion of the right upper lobe.



Solitary, delimited pneumonia in the lower portion of the left upper lobe.



The alveoli in the pneumonic area are filled with leucocytes.



The alveoli in the pneumonic area are filled with leucocytes and fibrin.

EXAMPLES OF PLANT PATHOGENS DISSEMINATED IN NORTHEAST CHINA BY AMERICAN AIRPLANES

FUNGUS-LADEN CORN KERNELS DISSEMINATED BY AMERICAN PLANES

On March 19, 1952, Mr. Fu Min (aged 37) of Sunchiapaotze of Wulungpei District, Antung, discovered at a riverside a large quantity of corn kernels.



Black spots on the top of corn kernels.



A small quantity of the spore mass from the black spot of the corn kernel is transferred into a drop of water for germination test in a Van Tieghem cell.



The chlamydospores germinate after 24 hours at room temperature (about 15°C.). Each chlamydospore of the spore-ball produces a promycelium, and from the tip of some promycelia a single sporidium buds out.

This smut was identified as *Thecaphora* sp. by Prof. Shen Chi-I, Peking College of Agriculture. Fungi of this genus are hitherto unknown in China. They are generally known to be detrimental to legumes in America and Europe.

PEACH LEAVES HARBOURING PEAR AND APPLE RING SPOT FUNGUS DISSEMINATED BY AMERICAN PLANE IN NORTHEAST CHINA

Shortly after 11 a.m. July 10, 1952, in Chuan Yen Kou, Shun Tzan Village, Siuyen County, Ma Siu-Ling, a farmer of the Second District, witnessed an American plane flying in a northeastern direction. Very soon afterwards he discovered large quantities of tree leaves scattered over an area of about 10,000 square meters, with an average of 1 leaf per 3 square meters.

Isolation and inoculation experiments demonstrated the presence on these peach leaves a pathogenic organism, identified as *Macrophoma kuwatsukai* Hara. This fungus is a dangerous parasite causing serious rots on both apple and pear fruits, and die back and canker on apple twig.



Sample of peach leaves disseminated by American plane in Siuyen County, Northeast China.



Two apple fruits 5 days after inoculation showing ring spot symptoms.



From the peach leaves disseminated by American plane, a pear and apple ring spot fungus, *Macrophoma kuwatsukai* Hara, was isolated. Photo shows a colony of the fungus growing on a culture plate.



Large lesions are produced on pear fruit 48 hours after inoculation. *Left*, 2 inoculated pears; *right*, control.



Pycnidia of the ring spot fungus, *Macrophoma kuwatsukai* Hara, are produced in abundance at the center of the lesions on the apple fruit 6 days after inoculation. Photo shows a cross section of a pycnidium in the host tissue.

EXAMPLES OF INSECTS AND SPIDERS DROPPED IN KOREA BY AMERICAN AIRPLANES



×7.2

Anthomyiid Fly

(*Hylemyia* sp.)

American planes have dropped large quantities of Anthomyiid flies over Cholwon, Cholsan, Sunan, Sunchon, Songchon, Hichon, Tokwon, Yangtok and other districts in Korea. On March 17, 1952, at 7 a.m., a Chinese volunteer, Wang En-Kuei, witnessed four American planes bombing the Kocha railway station in Yangtok District. One of the planes dropped a package which broke up in the air into more than ten small ones. After the planes had left, a large number of flies and pieces of torn paper were found on snow scattered over an area of 2,500 square meters. But beyond this zone, no such insects could be found.



×9

Helomyzid Fly

(*Helomyza modesta* Meigen)

American planes had also dropped Helomyzid flies in Korea. On March 9, 1952, at 2 p.m., a Chinese volunteer, Chang An-Chang, saw two American planes coming from the northwest and circling over Chonnae Myen, Munchon Goon. The second plane dropped two black objects which fell on the western and eastern slopes of a hill. After the planes had left, Chang and eleven other comrades found a large number of flies at the places where these black objects landed. The flies were identified by Professor C. Ho as Helomyzid and Anthomyiid flies.



×7.4

Chironomid Midge

(*Orthocladius* sp.)

Chironomid midges are one of the most frequently found insects dropped by American planes in Korea. They were often mixed with other insects such as the Anthomyiid flies. At 9 a.m., February 29, 1952, an American plane was found spraying a dark mass over Ochon Ri, Korea. After the plane had left, large quantities of insects were found. These were identified by Professor C. Ho as Chironomid midges.



×31

Human Flea

(*Pulex irritans* Linn.)

On April 23, 1952, around 10 a.m., at a hillside near Songdong, Hoiyang Goon, large numbers of human fleas were found on a bare ground, covering an area of 300 square meters. In the thickest part measuring 3-4 square meters, the fleas were so numerous that the ground appeared black. On the same day about 4 a.m., an American plane circled over this region without bombing or strafing. These fleas, therefore, could only have been disseminated by the American plane.

This flea was identified by entomologist as human flea, and plague bacilli were isolated from it by bacteriologist.



×4.3

Stonefly

(*Nemoura* sp.)

On April 2, 1952, while travelling in a certain locality in Korea, Allan Winnington, correspondent of London "Daily Worker", noticed a U.S. plane flying high above. About twenty minutes later, he observed some little spots floating down from a great height. As they came to a lower level, he saw that they were large numbers of brown leaves and long-winged insects, many of which landed on Winnington himself. These insects were later recognized as "stoneflies" by the entomologists.



×45

Black Springtail

(*Xenylla* sp.)

American planes have on numerous occasions dropped black springtails over Yangtok, Ichon, Kaepung, Cholwon and other Goons in Korea. At 2 p.m., February 12, 1952, Squad Leader Hsiao Tien-Chen saw three American planes circling overhead and ejecting black fumes. Thirty to forty minutes later, Hsiao, together with Li Ching-Hsiang and other comrades, discovered many scattered masses of black springtails on the snow. At the same time, these insects were also found on their clothes and caps.



×5.5

Spider

(*Lycosa* sp.)

American planes dropped large quantities of spiders at Ichon, Taechon, Hichon, Songchon, Yongbyon, Kaepung and other districts in Korea. On March 10, 1952, at Changdo Ri, Hoiyang Goon, Platoon Leader Liang saw an American plane dropping a brown paper package, which burst on reaching the ground. Many spiders were found around the broken package.

EXAMPLES OF INSECTS, CARRYING ENTERIC PATHOGENS

ISOLATION OF TYPHOID BACILLI FROM ANTHOMYIID FLIES DROPPED BY AMERICAN PLANES

Anthomyiid Fly

(*Hylemyia* sp.)

On March 5, 1952, two American planes were seen flying low over Ryongjo Ri, Munchon Goon, Korea. After the planes had left, numerous Anthomyiid flies were found. On bacteriological examination, these flies were found to carry typhoid bacilli.



Photomicrograph of the typhoid bacilli isolated.

Identification made by: **C. M. Hsieh.**

ISOLATION OF PARATYPHOID BACILLI FROM ANTHOMYIID FLIES AND HELOMYZID FLIES DROPPED BY AMERICAN PLANES



Anthomyiid Fly

(*Hylemyia* sp.)

On February 28, 1952, American planes scattered a large number of Anthomyiid flies, midges and other insects over Ujik Ri, Korea. The insects were dispersed over an area of 1,500 × 30 meters. On bacteriological examination, the Anthomyiid flies were found to carry paratyphoid bacilli. Anthomyiid flies dropped on the same day by American planes over Ochon Ri, Korea, harboured the same bacteria.

Helomyzid Fly

(*Helomyza modesta* Meigen)

At 8 p.m. on March 2, 1952, a sentry of the Chinese People's Volunteers heard an American plane flying at a low altitude over Baeksok Ri, north of Sukchon Goon, Korea, but no bomb explosion was heard. The next day, he discovered masses of densely packed insects within an area of 2,500 × 750 meters. On bacteriological examination, the Helomyzid flies collected were found to carry paratyphoid bacilli. On the same day, Helomyzid flies dropped by American planes into a river near Taekoyojam, Sukchong, Korea, were found to carry the same organism.

ISOLATION OF DYSENTERY BACILLI FROM ANTHOMYIID FLIES AND BLACK SPRINGTAILS DROPPED BY AMERICAN PLANES

Anthomyiid Fly

(*Hylemyia* sp.)

On February 20, 1952, Anthomyiid flies, spiders and other insects were dropped by an American plane at Rangha Ri, Pyongwon Goon, Korea. On bacteriological examination, these Anthomyiid flies were found to carry dysentery bacilli.

Black Springtail

(*Xenylla* sp.)

On February 25, 1952, American planes were seen circling low over Sangpal Ri, Sangsip Ri and Pyongchon, Korea. After they had left, the troops stationed there found a large number of insects including black springtails scattered over an area of 600 × 1,000 meters. These black springtails were examined and found to carry dysentery bacilli.



Photomicrograph of the paratyphoid bacilli isolated.

Identification made by: **C. M. Hsieh.**



Photomicrograph of the dysentery bacilli isolated.

These bacilli exhibited the following characteristics: non-motile, Gram-negative; produced acid in glucose without gas formation; did not ferment lactose, mannitol, dulcitol and maltose; produced no indole; agglutinated by anti-Shiga dysentery serum up to a titer of 1:640.

Identification made by: **C. M. Hsieh.**

AMERICAN PLANES DISSEMINATED CHOLERA VIBRIOS IN KOREA

CHOLERA VIBRIOS CARRIED BY FLIES

Han Su Yun, a member of the deceased family, accusing the American aggressors before the Commission for Investigating the Crime of Bacteriological Warfare Committed by the American Imperialists (*upper*).



Smear made from Han Sang Kuk's stool culture showing cholera vibrios (*right*).

On the night of March 4, 1952, American aircraft raided Pyongyang, flying over the central part of the city several times. Early next morning, a sixty-eight-year-old resident of that district by the name of Han Sang Kuk found many flies and white paper packages in his courtyard and in the street in front of his house. Opening the packages, he found numerous flies again. He took the matter as a mischief done by children. He put some of the flies in his palm and showed them to his neighbor, Choe Du Sop. The latter, a factory worker, who had read the announcement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs Bak Hon Yong concerning the bacteriological warfare waged by the U.S. Armed Forces, realized that those flies must have been dropped by American planes, and so he told Han Sang Kuk the whole story. Meanwhile, two of Han Sang Kuk's grandsons, aged 6 and 2 years respectively, were around, and they played with the flies. Choe Du Sop and Han Sang Kuk together burnt the packages and flies. Choe disinfected his hands and advised Han to do the same. Han, however, ignored Choe's advice.

At midnight, March 6, 1952, Han suddenly took ill. The chief symptoms were uncontrollable vomiting, and diarrhea with rice water stools over ten times before daybreak. His condition became rapidly worse. He was seen next morning by Dr. Kim Wan Jun. It was ascertained that he did not eat any food bought from the market, did not receive any guest, nor did he leave Pyongyang, but had handled flies on March 5. He was found to be badly dehydrated, his pulse feeble, extremities cold and body temperature subnormal. He was treated as a case of cholera but without avail. He died at 8 a.m., March 8, 1952.

The patient's two grandsons who had played with the flies, contracted the same disease in the afternoon of March 7, and they both died the next evening. In the same household there lived also Han Sang Kuk's daughter-in-law and eldest grandson (12 years old). However, they were not at home in the morning of March 5th. After the old man became ill, the doctor made them live apart. This and other precautionary steps stopped the further occurrence of cholera cases.

Jon Si Un, Professor of Bacteriology of Pyongyang Medical College, performed detailed bacteriological and immunological examinations and identified cholera vibrios from the stool of Han Sang Kuk.

From the above facts, it is clear that the cause of death in these three cases was cholera.

Korea is not an endemic focus of cholera and has been free from this disease since 1947. Furthermore, these three cases appeared during the cold season. There can be no question but that this outbreak was caused by cholera vibrios carried by the flies disseminated by American planes.

SUMMARY OF CHOLERA CASES IN HAN FAMILY

Name	Han Sang Kuk	Han Kyong Sup	Han Kyong Sun
Age	68 years	6 years	2 years
Sex	Male	Male	Male
Date of Infection	March 5, 1952, a.m.	March 5, 1952, a.m.	March 5, 1952, a.m.
Onset of Illness	March 6, 1952, midnight	March 7, 1952, 3 p.m.	March 7, 1952, 8 p.m.
Chief Complaints	Uncontrollable vomiting and diarrhea	Same complaints	Same complaints
Time of Death	March 8, 1952, 8 a.m.	March 8, 1952, 8 p.m.	March 8, 1952, 10 p.m.

RESULTS OF BACTERIOLOGICAL EXAMINATIONS (Han Sang Kuk)

Stool Smear	Actively motile Gram-negative vibrios
Peptone Water Culture	Pellicle formation on surface, same organism identified
Agglutination Test	Positive, titer 1:3,200
Pfeiffer Reaction	Positive
Gelatin Liquefaction	Positive

FERMENTATION OF SUGARS

Maltose	Acid produced, no gas
Glucose	Acid produced, no gas
Sucrose	Acid produced, no gas
Mannitol	Acid produced, no gas

CHOLERA VIBRIOS CARRIED BY CLAMS

In the night of May 16, 1952, American planes circled low for a long while over Cha Ri, Kopyong Myen, Daedong Goon, Pyongan Nam Do. Early in the morning of May 17, the wife of Cho Man Pok, a merchant in Cha Ri, found on a nearby hill some clams in a straw package. She brought some home and ate them raw with her husband, as was customary with the Koreans. They both fell ill that evening with symptoms of vomiting and diarrhea, and died late on May 18. Postmortem pathological and bacteriological examinations established the cause of death in both cases to be cholera. From an uneaten raw clam left in their kitchen *Vibrio cholerae* was also found.

On May 19, the local militia found on the same hill four more straw packages containing clams, some of which were already broken. Bacteriological examinations on two unbroken clams again revealed the presence of *Vibrio cholerae*.

This clam was identified as *Meretrix meretrix* Linn., a marine species.

These facts proved once more the activities of the American Armed Forces in disseminating cholera in Korea. That these attempts failed to create an epidemic was due to the effective counter measures taken.

AMERICAN PLANES DISSEMINATED PLAGUE BACILLI IN KOREA

THERE HAS BEEN NO PLAGUE IN KOREA FOR MANY YEARS. A STATEMENT MADE IN THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATION ON THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF DISEASES IN KOREA ISSUED BY THE U.S. NAVY DEPARTMENT IS TO THE SAME EFFECT.

IN PLAGUE-FREE KOREA, PLAGUE PATIENTS HAD SUDDENLY APPEARED.

AMERICAN PLANES HAD ON MANY OCCASIONS DROPPED IN KOREA FLEAS AND RATS. FROM THE FLEAS AND RATS DROPPED BY THE AMERICAN PLANES, PLAGUE BACILLI WERE FOUND.

ALL THESE FACTS CONCLUSIVELY BEAR OUT THAT THE PRESENT INCIDENCE OF PLAGUE IN KOREA IS THE RESULT OF THE BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE UNLEASHED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

NO PLAGUE IN KOREA FOR MANY YEARS



EPIDEMIOLOGY OF THE DISEASES
OF NAVAL IMPORTANCE
IN KOREA

Navmed P-1289

BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.



3. Other Arthropod-Borne Diseases

Plague has never been prevalent in Korea although it is rampant from time to time in neighboring China. According to the statistics of the Government General of Korea and the reports of the League of Nations, Korea has been free from plague for many years. This is attributed by some authors to the heating system practiced by the people which diminishes to some extent the rat infestation in the house.

Kala azar is not known in this country except for occasional cases brought in from China. However, due to the proximity of this territory to Manchuria and the Shantung Province of China, its introduction would not be surprising.

That there had been no plague in Korea for many years was definitely stated in the official publication: "Epidemiology of the Diseases of Naval Importance in Korea", Navmed P-1289, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., 1946.

VICTIMS OF PLAGUE IN KOREA

PLAGUE CASE No. I

Keh Chuan-Shu, male, 21 years old, volunteered and went to Korea in November, 1950, and had never left Korea since. In the afternoon of March 4, 1952, he suddenly became sick and died on March 7, 1952.

A specimen of postmortem heart blood was taken for culture. The organism isolated was identified as *P. pestis* through careful bacteriological, biochemical, serological and animal inoculation tests. From the above facts, it is clear that the patient died of septicemic plague.



Body and Tomb of Keh Chuan-Shu who died of plague.

PLAGUE CASE No. II

Chang Chin-Lung, male, 21 years old, had always been healthy in the past. In the last three months prior to his death, he was never away from the the place where he had been stationed. He suddenly began to feel ill in the afternoon of March 7, 1952, and died at 6 a.m. on the next day.

A specimen of postmortem heart blood was taken for culture. The organism isolated was identified as *P. pestis* through careful bacteriological, biochemical, serological and animal inoculation tests. The above facts prove that the patient died of septicemic plague.



Bipolar staining Gram-negative bacilli from culture of Chang Chin-Lung's heart blood.

INFECTED RATS AND FLEAS DROPPED BY AMERICAN PLANES IN KOREA

In the morning of February 29, 1952, a Chinese volunteer by the name of Huang Sheng-Ch'ang saw an American airplane over the railroad station at Namjon, near Kujang, Yongbyon Goon. The plane circled over the station, dropped an article which did not explode. On closer inspection, he saw a rectangular wooden box, green in color, about half a meter long, with holes on four sides. The box was broken and at its side there was a dead rat.

On February 29, 1952, at a certain place in Tongchon Goon, a Chinese volunteer by the name of Chang Shun-Yu, found two dead rats near the shrapnels of a bomb dropped by American planes. From one of the rats, pieces of viscera were taken for culture. The organism isolated was identified as *P. pestis* through careful bacteriological, biochemical, serological and animal inoculation tests.

The dissemination of plague-infested fleas by American planes in Korea has already been mentioned under Human Flea. (See page 46.)

PLAGUE CASE No. III

At about 4 a.m., March 25, 1952, an American plane had circled low over Namsong Ri, Sungtai Myen, Kangsou Goon. At about 6 a.m. Bak Yon Hao, a farmer in Namsong Ri, found many fleas floating on the water in a tall big jar by the side of a well. These fleas were identified by entomologists as human fleas (*Pulex irritans*), and shown to be infected with *Pasteurella pestis* on bacteriological examination.

Bak Yon Hao took ill on April 2, with symptoms of high fever, chills, headache, congestion of conjunctivae, and swelling and tenderness of the right inguinal lymph node. He died on April 4.

Postmortem pathological and bacteriological examinations established the cause of death in this case as septicemia secondary to bubonic plague.

Although cases of plague occurred, an epidemic was prevented by the emergency measures enforced.

AMERICAN PLANES DISSEMINATED PLANT PATHOGENS IN KOREA

SOYBEAN STALKS WITH PODS HARBOURING SOYBEAN PURPLE SPOT FUNGUS DISPERSED IN KOREA BY AMERICAN PLANES

At 1:00 p.m., on March 20, 1952, in Yongpung Ri, Koan Myen, Chongju Goon, Pyongan Buk Do, Korea, Sun Chih-Chien, Deputy Political Instructor of a certain detachment of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea, saw one of four American "sabre" jet planes drop a dark mass. The mass broke up at a height of about 300 meters, and soybean stalks with pods and tree leaves began to fall. These were scattered over an area about 200 meters wide and 500 meters long, there being on the average 2 to 3 soybean stalks and pods and 15 to 16 tree leaves per square meter.



Soybean stalk with pod, dropped by an American plane.



Photomicrograph showing mycelium and two tufts of conidiophores characteristic of soybean purple spot fungus.

The fungus was identified as *Cercospora sojina* (*Cercosporina kikuchii*) by Assistant Professor Chiu Wei-Fan of the Peking College of Agriculture. This fungus is detrimental to the soybean crop. It can survive for one to two years on the soybean pod and can produce spores in abundance for dissemination.

LEAVES HARBOURING ANTHRACNOSE FUNGUS SCATTERED BY U.S. MILITARY PLANES IN NORTH KOREA

At 11 a.m. on February 28, 1952, a Chinese People's Volunteer, Wu Yao-Chuen, at Dae Tok San, east of Kaison, North Korea witnessed U.S. airplanes dropping five big round objects from which large quantities of leaves were dispersed over an area of about one square kilometer, with an average of 1 to 3 leaves per square meter. These leaves were found yellowish brown in color. The identity of the plant cannot be determined on account of the fragmentary condition of the leaves. Careful studies have confirmed that a species of *Glomerella*, an anthracnose fungus, detrimental to apple, pear and cotton plants, was carried on these leaves.

A sample of the leaves dispersed by U.S. airplanes in North Korea.



From these leaves a species of *Glomerella*, an anthracnose fungus, was isolated. This fungus produces acervuli abundantly both on culture media and infected plant material:

Left: Side view of an acervulus showing the short conidiophores and single-celled conidia.

Right: Top view of an acervulus showing prominent setae.



Two asci of *Glomerella* sp. each containing 8 single-celled ascospores.



Apple and pear fruits, 5 days after being inoculated with the culture of *Glomerella* sp., showing circular brown spots with concentric acervuli at centers.

Left: Apple.

Right: Pear.

Cotton seedlings grown in soil inoculated with cultures of *Glomerella* sp. showing lesion on stem and roots.

IN EMPLOYING BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS VIOLATED:

1. THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 CONCERNING THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF POISON OR POISONED WEAPONS.
2. THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF JUNE 17, 1925, WHICH PROHIBITS THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES, AND OF BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE.
3. ARTICLE 6 OF THE CHARTER OF THE NUREMBERG INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF 1945 CONCERNING CRIMES AGAINST PEACE, CONVENTIONAL WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.
4. ARTICLE 5 OF THE CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST OF 1946 CONCERNING CRIMES AGAINST PEACE, CONVENTIONAL WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.
5. THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON GENOCIDE, ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON DECEMBER 9, 1948, WHICH UNDERTAKES TO PREVENT AND TO PUNISH CRIMES OF GENOCIDE.

THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE FOR WORLD PEACE
PEKING, 1952